Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera
Biographic Data
| ID | 6298417 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alfonso |
| FAMILY NAME | Muñoz-Corcuera |
| SIGNATURE | MUÑOZ-CORCUERA A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Complutense de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0098-1489 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Beyond Fictionality
While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some …
Sometimes I Am Fictional
Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen i…
Las teorías narrativas frente a los casos de duplicación
En este artículo argumento a favor de dos tesis. Primero, defiendo que las teorías narrativas de la identidad personal deben comprometerse con la intuición de que la identidad es una relación determinada. Segundo, muestro cómo las teorías narrativas pueden ser exitosas en este empeño dando cabida a la dimensión social de nuestra existencia en tanto personas. Para organizar mi exposición me centro en uno de los casos más conflictivos para las teor…
Thought experiments in personal identity
In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ cr…
No prominent works on this page.
Thought experiments in personal identity
In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ cr…
Las teorías narrativas frente a los casos de duplicación
En este artículo argumento a favor de dos tesis. Primero, defiendo que las teorías narrativas de la identidad personal deben comprometerse con la intuición de que la identidad es una relación determinada. Segundo, muestro cómo las teorías narrativas pueden ser exitosas en este empeño dando cabida a la dimensión social de nuestra existencia en tanto personas. Para organizar mi exposición me centro en uno de los casos más conflictivos para las teor…
Sometimes I Am Fictional
Most analytical philosophers consider that we cannot identify with fictional characters in a literal sense. Specifically, Carroll and Gaut argue that doing so would imply a high degree of irrationality. In this paper I stand for the claim that we can identify with fictional characters thanks to a suspension of disbelief. First, I rely on narrative theories of personal identity to propose a model of how the process of identification might happen i…
Beyond Fictionality
While the nature of fictional characters has received much attention in the last few years within analytic philosophy, most accounts fail to grasp what distinguishes fictional characters from other fictional entities. In this paper, I propose to amend this deficiency by defining fictional characterhood. I claim that fictional characters are fictional intentional systems, a thesis that I label as FIST. After introducing FIST, I compare it to some …
Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (2 works) · Narrative (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Art (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice (1 work)