Edmund Dain
Biographic Data
| ID | 6298478 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Edmund Dain |
| GIVEN NAMES | Edmund |
| FAMILY NAME | Dain |
| SIGNATURE | DAIN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wales |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8334-2556 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Sympathy for the Devil
What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler's ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong (or vice versa) in fiction, and Gendler's claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine t…
Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Central to a new, or ‘resolute’, reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an ‘austere’ view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a fea…
Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Central to a new, or ‘resolute’, reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an ‘austere’ view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a fea…
Contextualism and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Central to a new, or ‘resolute’, reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus is the idea that Wittgenstein held there an ‘austere’ view of nonsense: the view, that is, that nonsense is only ever a matter of our failure to give words a meaning, and so that there are no logically distinct kinds of nonsense. Resolute readers tend not only to ascribe such a view to Wittgenstein, but also to subscribe to it themselves; and it is also a fea…
Sympathy for the Devil
What are the limits of the imagination in morality? What role does fiction play in moral thought? My starting point in addressing these questions is Tamar Szabo Gendler's ‘puzzle of imaginative resistance’, the problem of explaining the special difficulties we seem to encounter in imagining to be right what we take to be morally wrong (or vice versa) in fiction, and Gendler's claim that those difficulties are due to our unwillingness to imagine t…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Contextualism (1 work) · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art (1 work) · History (1 work) · Linguistics (1 work) · Logic, programming, and type systems (1 work) · Moral psychology (1 work) · Morality (1 work)