Paul H Rubin
Biographic Data
| ID | 631003 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paul H Rubin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paul H |
| FAMILY NAME | Rubin |
| SIGNATURE | RUBIN P H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Emory University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 27 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 123 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 27 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Economics and Crime
Don't scrap the death penalty
Economics, Law and Individual Rights
Public goods and the evolution of altruism The case of law
Though Hamilton's rule is commonly interpreted as relating to two individuals, an alternative interpretation is that it can apply to an altruistic act with respect to a large group of related persons, such as an ethnic group. Then provision of a public good to such a group can be explained by Hamilton's rule. An important class of public goods is the provision of a "legal system" for the group. Provision of this good can have positive feedback ef…
Fairness versus welfare
Public choice and tort reform
Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Information
The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits
Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers
Does Ethnic Conflict Pay
It is often argued that ethnic conflict is an extreme example of nepotism, and is genetically based. This may be so: in the EEA (the environment of evolutionary adaptedness), such conflict may have been fitness improving, and we may be descended from those who participated successfully in such conflicts. This would provide us with a “taste” for xenophobia. But this taste can be overcome relatively easily, as shown by the changes in behavior in th…
Obituary: In Memoriam: Peter H. Aranson, 1943–1999
Hierarchy
Ideology, voting, and shirking
The specification of models of campaign finance: Comments on the Jacobson and the Poole and Romer papers
Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
The objectives of private and public judges: A comment
A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting
In this paper we specify a model in which Congressmen, constituents, and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior. Constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of Congressmen; Congressmen, on the other hand, want to be elected and vote accordingly. We empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model. Our results indicate that p…
The size of government
The economics of the women's movement
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
Public interest lobbies: Membership and influence
Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time-Series Analysis
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?
An empirical investigation of voting on energy issues
The electoral college and the rational vote
Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time-Series Analysis
The size of government
Ideology, voting, and shirking
The Expansion of Firms
The firm is viewed as a collection of particular resources, that is, resources worth more to the firm than their market value because of specialized experience within the firm. Such resources can be used either for producing output or for training new resources. This assumption is incorporated into a programming model of the firm. This model is then used to derive predictive statements about the rate and direction of growth of the firm
The electoral college and the rational vote
An empirical investigation of voting on energy issues
Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers
Hierarchy
Public interest lobbies: Membership and influence
The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits
On the form of special interest legislation
Don't scrap the death penalty
Public choice and tort reform
Does Ethnic Conflict Pay
It is often argued that ethnic conflict is an extreme example of nepotism, and is genetically based. This may be so: in the EEA (the environment of evolutionary adaptedness), such conflict may have been fitness improving, and we may be descended from those who participated successfully in such conflicts. This would provide us with a “taste” for xenophobia. But this taste can be overcome relatively easily, as shown by the changes in behavior in th…
The specification of models of campaign finance: Comments on the Jacobson and the Poole and Romer papers
Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
The objectives of private and public judges: A comment
The economics of the women's movement
The Expansion of Firms
The firm is viewed as a collection of particular resources, that is, resources worth more to the firm than their market value because of specialized experience within the firm. Such resources can be used either for producing output or for training new resources. This assumption is incorporated into a programming model of the firm. This model is then used to derive predictive statements about the rate and direction of growth of the firm
On the form of special interest legislation
The electoral college and the rational vote
Why Is the Common Law Efficient?
An empirical investigation of voting on energy issues
Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time-Series Analysis
Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting
Public interest lobbies: Membership and influence
The economics of the women's movement
The size of government
A General Equilibrium Model of Congressional Voting
In this paper we specify a model in which Congressmen, constituents, and campaign contributors simultaneously decide on behavior. Constituents and contributors desire to influence the voting behavior of Congressmen; Congressmen, on the other hand, want to be elected and vote accordingly. We empirically test this model using roll call voting on eight bills dealing with economic regulation and find support for the model. Our results indicate that p…
The objectives of private and public judges: A comment
Economic and ideological factors in congressional voting: The 1980 election
The specification of models of campaign finance: Comments on the Jacobson and the Poole and Romer papers
Ideology, voting, and shirking
Does Ethnic Conflict Pay
It is often argued that ethnic conflict is an extreme example of nepotism, and is genetically based. This may be so: in the EEA (the environment of evolutionary adaptedness), such conflict may have been fitness improving, and we may be descended from those who participated successfully in such conflicts. This would provide us with a “taste” for xenophobia. But this taste can be overcome relatively easily, as shown by the changes in behavior in th…
Obituary: In Memoriam: Peter H. Aranson, 1943–1999
Hierarchy
Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers
Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Information
The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits
Public choice and tort reform
Fairness versus welfare
Public goods and the evolution of altruism The case of law
Though Hamilton's rule is commonly interpreted as relating to two individuals, an alternative interpretation is that it can apply to an altruistic act with respect to a large group of related persons, such as an ethnic group. Then provision of a public good to such a group can be explained by Hamilton's rule. An important class of public goods is the provision of a "legal system" for the group. Provision of this good can have positive feedback ef…
Economics, Law and Individual Rights
Economics (23 works) · Political science (21 works) · Law (18 works) · Public finance (15 works) · Law (13 works) · Politics (13 works) · Voting (11 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (8 works) · Law and economics (8 works) · Macroeconomics (8 works)