Jaideep Roy
Biographic Data
| ID | 6314030 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jaideep Roy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jaideep |
| FAMILY NAME | Roy |
| SIGNATURE | ROY J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bath |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9607-0465 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Individual versus group morality
A rise in the number of moral individuals in a group can hurt the morality of the group’s collective action. In this paper, we characterize strategic environments and models of morality where this is true solely because, after all, individual morals are private information
Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy
Violation of land use regulations for allotment gardens
Allotment gardens are widespread across European cities and serve as much-needed green spaces generating positive environmental externalities. Changing user preferences result in excessive built-up constructions and changing land use, that contradict the environmental aspects of allotment gardens. These create a breeding ground for flourishing, yet highly opaque, markets for allotment gardens, which naturally increase risks of illegal rent-seekin…
Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition
We look beyond the well-studied issues of fair compensation, regulatory takings, and seller-induced holdout that arise in the government purchase of land for economic development. We argue that political rivalry distorts land acquisition negotiations between private sellers and a private buyer driven by profits. We determine these distortions endogenously and characterise conditions when the buyer's optimal design to acquire land generates holdou…
Public-private partnerships in micro-finance
Intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts
Intertemporal discounting and tenurial contracts
Public-private partnerships in micro-finance
Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition
We look beyond the well-studied issues of fair compensation, regulatory takings, and seller-induced holdout that arise in the government purchase of land for economic development. We argue that political rivalry distorts land acquisition negotiations between private sellers and a private buyer driven by profits. We determine these distortions endogenously and characterise conditions when the buyer's optimal design to acquire land generates holdou…
Individual versus group morality
A rise in the number of moral individuals in a group can hurt the morality of the group’s collective action. In this paper, we characterize strategic environments and models of morality where this is true solely because, after all, individual morals are private information
Electoral politics over automation in a dual economy
Violation of land use regulations for allotment gardens
Allotment gardens are widespread across European cities and serve as much-needed green spaces generating positive environmental externalities. Changing user preferences result in excessive built-up constructions and changing land use, that contradict the environmental aspects of allotment gardens. These create a breeding ground for flourishing, yet highly opaque, markets for allotment gardens, which naturally increase risks of illegal rent-seekin…
Economics (4 works) · Business (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Land Rights and Reforms (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Allotment (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Automation (1 work) · Bureaucracy (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work)