René Van Den Brink

Biographic Data

ID635665
NAMERené Van Den Brink
GIVEN NAMESRené Van Den
FAMILY NAMEBrink
SIGNATUREVAN DEN BRINK R
AFFILIATIONSTinbergen Institute
ORCID0000-0001-8570-3706
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS15
TOTAL CITATIONS2
AUTHOR COUNT15
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2000
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX1

  • Combining the Shapley value and the equal division solution

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Yukihiko FunakiARTICLETheory and Decision2025

    We give an overview of several results on the axiomatization and strategic implementation of cooperative game solutions that combine marginalism and egalitarianism. The best-known marginalist solution for cooperative transferable utility games is the Shapley value, while the equal division solution is the most direct egalitarian solution. Both solutions have been axiomatized in various ways, starting with Shapley (1953)’s original axiomatization …

  • Power in plurality voting games

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2025

    Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power…

  • On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games with transferable utility

    Open AccessZhengxing Zou, René Van Den Brink et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2025References: 19

  • Two new classes of methods to share the cost of cleaning up a polluted river

    Open AccessWenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2023

  • Sharing the surplus and proportional values

    Open AccessZhengxing Zou, René Van Den Brink et al.ARTICLETheory and Decision2022

  • Axiomatizations of the proportional division value

    Open AccessZhengxing Zou, René Van Den Brink et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2021

    We present axiomatic characterizations of the proportional division value for TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to the stand-alone worths of the players. First, a new proportionality principle, called proportional-balanced treatment , is introduced by strengthening Shapley’s symmetry axiom, which states that if two players make the same contribution to any nonempty coalition, then they receive the amounts …

  • Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLESocial Choice and Welfare2020

    We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is called decisive if in every …

  • Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2019

  • The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Agnieszka RusinowskaARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2017

  • Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLERePEc: Research Papers in Economics2013

    Opinion leaders are actors who have some power over their followers as they are able to influence their followers' choice of action in certain instances. In van den Brink et al. (Homo Oeconomicus 28:161-185, 2011) we proposed a two-action model for societies with opinion leaders. We introduced a power and a satisfaction score and studied some common properties. In this paper we strengthen two of these properties and present two further properties…

  • Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Frank SteffenARTICLEPublic Choice2012Cited by: 2References: 38

    The extant literature on positional power in hierarchies is mainly restricted to the analysis of power in terms of the authority structure. This is based upon the bare positions of actors and ignores the existence of decision-making mechanisms. The few studies, which also take into account decision-making mechanisms, are ‘membership-based’. In an earlier paper we demonstrated that such an approach is, in general, inappropriate. As a solution we s…

  • Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Agnieszka Rusinowska et al.ARTICLESSRN Electronic Journal2011

  • The VL control measure for symmetric networks

    Open AccessRuud Hendrickx, Peter Borm et al.ARTICLESocial Networks2009

  • On two new social choice correspondences

    Open AccessPeter Borm, René Van Den Brink et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2004References: 15

  • Measuring domination in directed networks

    Open AccessRené Van Den Brink, Robert P GillesARTICLESocial Networks2000