Mariela Szwarcberg
Biographic Data
| ID | 635753 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mariela Szwarcberg |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mariela |
| FAMILY NAME | Szwarcberg |
| SIGNATURE | SZWARCBERG M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Reed College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 76 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Avoiding governors
Avoiding governors: federalism, democracy, and poverty alleviation in Brazil and Argentina, by Tracy Beck Fenwick." Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement, 39(1), pp. 155–156
Gender and Politics in Buenos Aires
This paper examines the persistent gender gap in electoral politics at the local level in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I argue that the combination of the division of political work and existing social norms regarding the separation of domestic chores contributes to women's political underrepresentation at the local level. Studying everyday politics in Buenos Aires, a clear division of political work between men and women was found. Only women were i…
Las señales del compromiso
En este trabajo se propone un mecanismo causal alternativo para explicar por qué motivo los partidos políticos controlan a los votantes.Uno de los supuestos básicos de la literatura sobre el tema sostiene que los partidos clientelistas tienen la capacidad de controlar a los votantes, definida como la posibilidad para convencerlos de que el partido puede identificar por quién han optado en las urnas.La lógica subyacente en esta argumentación es qu…
Mobilizing Poor Voters
Democracy has provided opportunities for political representation and accountability, but it has also created incentives for creating and maintaining clientelistic networks. Why has clientelism consolidated with the introduction of democracy? Drawing on network analysis, Mobilizing Poor Voters answers this question by describing and explaining the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks in Argentina. …
Political parties and rallies in Latin America
This article provides a novel answer to explain the persistence of party rallies in the mass and social media era. I argue that rallies contribute to the organizational structure of clientelistic parties by providing information to different members within and outside the machine. Rallies provide party leaders with information that enables them to monitor brokers’ capacity to mobilize voters, party brokers with an opportunity to display their abi…
The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism
This paper challenges the assumption that parties and candidates with access to material benefits will always distribute goods to low-income voters in exchange for electoral support.I claim that a candidate's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain his or her decision to use clientelism.Besides having access to material resources and a network of party activists to distribu…
Forthcoming in Volume 48, Number 2
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Building a following
Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters' demand for particularistic goods and parties' capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates' political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining t…
Revisiting clientelism
Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America
Party brokers have information about voters’ political preferences and their likelihood of turning out to vote, and are able to target clientelistic inducements and monitor voter participation in exchange for voters’ electoral support. Yet, brokers may also use the clientelistic inducements they receive from party bosses to pursue their personal enrichment, at the cost of lost votes for their party. Why would brokers distribute party goods to vot…
Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America
Party brokers have information about voters’ political preferences and their likelihood of turning out to vote, and are able to target clientelistic inducements and monitor voter participation in exchange for voters’ electoral support. Yet, brokers may also use the clientelistic inducements they receive from party bosses to pursue their personal enrichment, at the cost of lost votes for their party. Why would brokers distribute party goods to vot…
Political parties and rallies in Latin America
This article provides a novel answer to explain the persistence of party rallies in the mass and social media era. I argue that rallies contribute to the organizational structure of clientelistic parties by providing information to different members within and outside the machine. Rallies provide party leaders with information that enables them to monitor brokers’ capacity to mobilize voters, party brokers with an opportunity to display their abi…
Building a following
Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters' demand for particularistic goods and parties' capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates' political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining t…
Gender and Politics in Buenos Aires
This paper examines the persistent gender gap in electoral politics at the local level in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I argue that the combination of the division of political work and existing social norms regarding the separation of domestic chores contributes to women's political underrepresentation at the local level. Studying everyday politics in Buenos Aires, a clear division of political work between men and women was found. Only women were i…
Revisiting clientelism
Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America
Party brokers have information about voters’ political preferences and their likelihood of turning out to vote, and are able to target clientelistic inducements and monitor voter participation in exchange for voters’ electoral support. Yet, brokers may also use the clientelistic inducements they receive from party bosses to pursue their personal enrichment, at the cost of lost votes for their party. Why would brokers distribute party goods to vot…
The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism
This paper challenges the assumption that parties and candidates with access to material benefits will always distribute goods to low-income voters in exchange for electoral support.I claim that a candidate's capacity to turn to clientelistic strategies of mobilization is a necessary but insufficient condition to explain his or her decision to use clientelism.Besides having access to material resources and a network of party activists to distribu…
Forthcoming in Volume 48, Number 2
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Building a following
Why do some candidates prefer to use clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters while others do not? Building on existing explanations that highlight the importance of voters' demand for particularistic goods and parties' capacities to supply goods and monitor voters, this article focuses on candidates' political careers. It argues that how candidates begin mobilizing voters to participate in rallies and elections becomes crucial in explaining t…
Political parties and rallies in Latin America
This article provides a novel answer to explain the persistence of party rallies in the mass and social media era. I argue that rallies contribute to the organizational structure of clientelistic parties by providing information to different members within and outside the machine. Rallies provide party leaders with information that enables them to monitor brokers’ capacity to mobilize voters, party brokers with an opportunity to display their abi…
Mobilizing Poor Voters
Democracy has provided opportunities for political representation and accountability, but it has also created incentives for creating and maintaining clientelistic networks. Why has clientelism consolidated with the introduction of democracy? Drawing on network analysis, Mobilizing Poor Voters answers this question by describing and explaining the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks in Argentina. …
Las señales del compromiso
En este trabajo se propone un mecanismo causal alternativo para explicar por qué motivo los partidos políticos controlan a los votantes.Uno de los supuestos básicos de la literatura sobre el tema sostiene que los partidos clientelistas tienen la capacidad de controlar a los votantes, definida como la posibilidad para convencerlos de que el partido puede identificar por quién han optado en las urnas.La lógica subyacente en esta argumentación es qu…
Avoiding governors
Avoiding governors: federalism, democracy, and poverty alleviation in Brazil and Argentina, by Tracy Beck Fenwick." Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d'études du développement, 39(1), pp. 155–156
Gender and Politics in Buenos Aires
This paper examines the persistent gender gap in electoral politics at the local level in Buenos Aires, Argentina. I argue that the combination of the division of political work and existing social norms regarding the separation of domestic chores contributes to women's political underrepresentation at the local level. Studying everyday politics in Buenos Aires, a clear division of political work between men and women was found. Only women were i…
Political science (10 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Economics (7 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (7 works) · Political economy (6 works) · Clientelism (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (5 works) · Latin American socio-political dynamics (4 works) · Law (4 works)