Antonio Guarino
Biographic Data
| ID | 6411040 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antonio Guarino |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antonio |
| FAMILY NAME | Guarino |
| SIGNATURE | GUARINO A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5241-5855 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The …
Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment
Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment
In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We find that the second subjects weigh their signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when …
Updating ambiguous beliefs in a social learning experiment
We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes a private signal on the value of the good. We are therefore able to disentangle social learning from learning from a private signal. Our main res…
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Updating ambiguous beliefs in a social learning experiment
We present a novel experimental design to study social learning in the laboratory. Subjects have to predict the value of a good in a sequential order. We elicit each subject's belief twice: first ("prior belief"), after he observes his predecessors' action; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes a private signal on the value of the good. We are therefore able to disentangle social learning from learning from a private signal. Our main res…
Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment
In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first ("first belief"), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second ("posterior belief"), after he observes his private signal. We find that the second subjects weigh their signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when …
Non-Bayesian updating in a social learning experiment
Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The …
Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence (3 works) · Bayesian inference (2 works) · Bayesian probability (2 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · Machine learning (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)