Marie Van Loon
Biographic Data
| ID | 6424358 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marie Van Loon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marie |
| FAMILY NAME | Van Loon |
| SIGNATURE | VAN LOON M |
| AFFILIATIONS | UCLA |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1109-6648 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Against the Permission Not to Engage
This paper challenges Robin McKenna’s claim that socially marginalized individuals are not obliged to engage with challenges to their beliefs. We argue that this view, based on externalism, undermines epistemic agency and risks reinforcing marginalization
(The possibility of) responsibility for delusions
In this paper I argue that a prominent account of doxastic responsibility, Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness can be amended to avoid two problems with its treatment of delusions. I do so by appealing to Carolina Flores’ recent work on the evidence-responsiveness of delusions: by excluding what Flores calls masking factors from the mechanism of reasons-responsiveness, we are able to accommodate the possibility for individuals with delusions to be r…
Beyond Evidence in Epistemology
This special issue arises from the observation that an exploration of the role of non-evidential considerations in epistemology through a broader lens is missing from the current landscape of philosophical research. The present collection of contributions fills this research gap by bringing together three central and much-discussed epistemological topics for which non-evidential considerations become relevant
Implicit bias
It is widely believed that implicit bias is common and that it contributes, in part, to the perpetuation of systemic injustice. Hence, the existence of implicit bias raises the question: can individuals be blameworthy for their implicit bias? Here, I consider what it is about implicit bias that renders agents blameworthy. I defend the claim that, when individuals omit to engage in activities that could prevent the influence of implicit bias on th…
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
No prominent works on this page.
La connaissance et ses raisons
Cet ouvrage est le produit des premiers travaux du Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie (GRÉ), porté par Claudine Tiercelin au sein de la chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance du Collège de France. Les textes qui s’y trouvent réunis traitent de questions particulièrement discutées de l’épistémologie contemporaine, entendue comme élucidation philosophique de la nature de la connaissance, de sa valeur et de ses modalités, ainsi q…
Implicit bias
It is widely believed that implicit bias is common and that it contributes, in part, to the perpetuation of systemic injustice. Hence, the existence of implicit bias raises the question: can individuals be blameworthy for their implicit bias? Here, I consider what it is about implicit bias that renders agents blameworthy. I defend the claim that, when individuals omit to engage in activities that could prevent the influence of implicit bias on th…
Beyond Evidence in Epistemology
This special issue arises from the observation that an exploration of the role of non-evidential considerations in epistemology through a broader lens is missing from the current landscape of philosophical research. The present collection of contributions fills this research gap by bringing together three central and much-discussed epistemological topics for which non-evidential considerations become relevant
Against the Permission Not to Engage
This paper challenges Robin McKenna’s claim that socially marginalized individuals are not obliged to engage with challenges to their beliefs. We argue that this view, based on externalism, undermines epistemic agency and risks reinforcing marginalization
(The possibility of) responsibility for delusions
In this paper I argue that a prominent account of doxastic responsibility, Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness can be amended to avoid two problems with its treatment of delusions. I do so by appealing to Carolina Flores’ recent work on the evidence-responsiveness of delusions: by excluding what Flores calls masking factors from the mechanism of reasons-responsiveness, we are able to accommodate the possibility for individuals with delusions to be r…
Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Cultural Insights and Digital Impacts (1 work) · Delusion (1 work) · Doxastic logic (1 work)