George R G Clarke
Biographic Data
| ID | 6447364 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George R G Clarke |
| GIVEN NAMES | George R G |
| FAMILY NAME | Clarke |
| SIGNATURE | CLARKE G R G |
| AFFILIATIONS | World Bank |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9764-2987 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 58 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1982 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Do Reticent Managers Misreport Data during Firm Surveys? Cross-Checking Reticent Managers’ Answers with Other Information
Previous studies have shown reticent managers answer sensitive questions differently than other managers do. If this is because they misreport information, it will be difficult to accurately estimate averages or regression coefficients. It is possible, however, they answer sensitive questions differently because their firms are different. This paper presents evidence from a quasi-experiment that suggests reticent managers misreport sensitive info…
How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa
Bank Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa
Bank privatization in Argentina
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption
Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy. Using enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Easter Europe and Central Asia, the authors look at how characteristics of the firms payi…
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Reform
Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks
More evidence on income distribution and growth
It has been suggested that inequality is an unpleasant precondition for growth. This paper shows that the empirical evidence strongly supports the opposite view: that inequality is negatively correlated with growth. This result is robust across different inequality measures, and to many different specifications of the growth regression. Furthermore, inequality appears to have a negative effect on both democracies and non-democracies. Interaction …
Problems of institutional ownership
More evidence on income distribution and growth
It has been suggested that inequality is an unpleasant precondition for growth. This paper shows that the empirical evidence strongly supports the opposite view: that inequality is negatively correlated with growth. This result is robust across different inequality measures, and to many different specifications of the growth regression. Furthermore, inequality appears to have a negative effect on both democracies and non-democracies. Interaction …
How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Reform
Bank privatization in Argentina
Bank Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa
Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks
Problems of institutional ownership
Problems of institutional ownership
More evidence on income distribution and growth
It has been suggested that inequality is an unpleasant precondition for growth. This paper shows that the empirical evidence strongly supports the opposite view: that inequality is negatively correlated with growth. This result is robust across different inequality measures, and to many different specifications of the growth regression. Furthermore, inequality appears to have a negative effect on both democracies and non-democracies. Interaction …
Why Privatize? The Case of Argentina's Public Provincial Banks
Ownership, Competition, and Corruption
Over the past few years, many studies have looked at the macroeconomic, cultural, and institutional determinants of corruption. This study complements these cross-country studies by focusing on microeconomic factors that affect bribes paid in a single sector of the economy. Using enterprise-level data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economies in Easter Europe and Central Asia, the authors look at how characteristics of the firms payi…
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Reform
Bank privatization in Argentina
Bank Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa
How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa
Do Reticent Managers Misreport Data during Firm Surveys? Cross-Checking Reticent Managers’ Answers with Other Information
Previous studies have shown reticent managers answer sensitive questions differently than other managers do. If this is because they misreport information, it will be difficult to accurately estimate averages or regression coefficients. It is possible, however, they answer sensitive questions differently because their firms are different. This paper presents evidence from a quasi-experiment that suggests reticent managers misreport sensitive info…
Business (8 works) · Economics (8 works) · Finance (4 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Financial system (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Language change (2 works) · Market economy (2 works)