Pinaki Bose
Biographic Data
| ID | 6447417 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pinaki Bose |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pinaki |
| FAMILY NAME | Bose |
| SIGNATURE | BOSE P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Memphis |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1998 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency
Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of …
Informal sector, regulatory compliance, and leakage
Corruption with Heterogeneous Enforcement Agents in the Shadow Economy
We analyze the relationship between the underground (or shadow) economy and the formal or legal sector in the presence of corruption in both sectors. Firms choose between operating in the legal and in the underground economy. With morally heterogeneous law enforcement agents monitoring the underground economy, the equilibrium in both sectors depends critically on the incentives of honest enforcers and on the proportion of such agents. In particul…
Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay
Formal–informal sector interaction in rural credit markets
Formal–informal sector interaction in rural credit markets
Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay
Corruption with Heterogeneous Enforcement Agents in the Shadow Economy
We analyze the relationship between the underground (or shadow) economy and the formal or legal sector in the presence of corruption in both sectors. Firms choose between operating in the legal and in the underground economy. With morally heterogeneous law enforcement agents monitoring the underground economy, the equilibrium in both sectors depends critically on the incentives of honest enforcers and on the proportion of such agents. In particul…
Informal sector, regulatory compliance, and leakage
Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency
Incomplete contracts and inadequate enforcement of labor rights, together with the asymmetry of power between a worker and her employer, create an environment where the employer can forcibly extract additional services (e.g., unpaid overtime or sexual favors) from the worker beyond the mutually agreed terms of exchange. We show that coercive impositions can coexist with voluntary transactions in the labor market, and that a positive incidence of …
Business (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · Market economy (5 works) · Corruption and Economic Development (3 works) · Enforcement (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Incentive (2 works)