Aggey Semenov
Biographic Data
| ID | 6448060 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aggey Semenov |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aggey |
| FAMILY NAME | Semenov |
| SIGNATURE | SEMENOV A |
| AFFILIATIONS | National University of Singapore |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and di…
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term co…
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics
A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire
Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information
This paper introduces asymmetric information in a pluralistic model of interest groups competition and analyzes its impact on policy biases. Lobbying groups are uninformed on a decision maker's preferences and use nonlinear contributions not only to compete for the agent's services but also to learn about his preferences in an otherwise standard common agency model of lobbying. Asymmetric information can be either on the decision maker's ideal po…
Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition
Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information
This paper introduces asymmetric information in a pluralistic model of interest groups competition and analyzes its impact on policy biases. Lobbying groups are uninformed on a decision maker's preferences and use nonlinear contributions not only to compete for the agent's services but also to learn about his preferences in an otherwise standard common agency model of lobbying. Asymmetric information can be either on the decision maker's ideal po…
The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics
A proposal for social pricing of water supply in Côte d'Ivoire
Bargaining in the appointment process, constrained delegation and the political weight of the Senate
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
We present a Theory of Contracts under costly enforcement in the context of a dynamic relationship between an uninformed buyer and a seller who is privately informed on his persistent cost at the outset. Public enforcement relies on remedies for breach. Private enforcement comes from severing relationships. We first characterize aggregate enforcement constraints ensuring that trading partners do not breach contracts unduly. Whether a long-term co…
Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection
A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game
We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria include those with non-differentiable payoffs and di…
Economics (9 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (6 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Political science (5 works) · Private information retrieval (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Information asymmetry (4 works)