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Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad

Biographic Data

ID6456017
NAMEOdd‐Helge Fjeldstad
GIVEN NAMESOdd‐Helge
FAMILY NAMEFjeldstad
SIGNATUREFJELDSTAD O H
AFFILIATIONSChr. Michelsen Institute
ORCID0000-0002-2527-0707
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS14
TOTAL CITATIONS134
AUTHOR COUNT14
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2000
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
H-INDEX7
  • Does an Economics Education Produce Technocratic Paternalists? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

    Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Development Studies•2020

    When confronted with information that ordinary citizens do not care that strongly about efficiency, do economists change their views of optimal public policy? In a randomised experiment on tax preferences conducted among business and economics students in Tanzania, we supplied the treatment group with information that ordinary citizens disagree with implications of efficiency-based optimal tax theory. Tax preferences were then measured using disc…

  • The non-oil tax reform in Angola: Escaping from petroleum dependency

    Open Access•Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad, Aslak Orre et al.•ARTICLE•The Extractive Industries and…•2020•References: 5

  • To Pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa

    Open Access•Merima Ali, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2014•Cited by: 33•References: 10

  • Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent

    Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad, Deborah Brautigam et al.•BOOK•Taxation and State-Building in…•2009

  • Vers plus d'éthique dans les douanes en Afrique subsaharienne

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•Afrique contemporaine•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 22

    Cet article étudie les récentes expériences observées en Afrique subsaharienne en matière de lutte contre la corruption douanière. Il soutient que les réformes visant à renforcer l’intégrité sont trop ciblées sur la transformation des institutions formelles et que l’économie politique des réformes, de même que le rôle des institutions informelles, mériterait davantage d’attention. Dans bon nombre d’administrations douanières, le parrainage s’effe…

  • Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2009•Cited by: 9•References: 22

    Since the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of …

  • Taxation during State Formation: Lessons from Palestine, 1994–2000

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•Forum for Development Studies•2004•References: 8

    The article analyses factors constraining the capacity of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to raise domestic tax revenue during the period 1994–2000. The article shows that more than any other factor, Israel represented a constraint on the PNA's tax policies and revenue collection. Israel collected the bulk of taxes on traded goods on behalf of the PNA, and until 2000 a large share of income tax came from Palestinians working in Israel. B…

  • What's trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in local authorities in South Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2004•Cited by: 24

    A major financial problem in many municipalities in South Africa is the inadequate collection of service charges due to widespread non-payment. The prevailing view is that non-compliance is caused by poverty and the existence of an 'entitlement culture'. However, huge variations in compliance exist both within poor communities and between communities with similar socio-economic characteristics. How can these differences be explained? Moreover, wh…

  • Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue”––A Reply

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2003

  • Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2003•Cited by: 9•References: 11

  • Collectors, councillors and donors: Local government taxation and state-society relations in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•IDS Bulletin•2002•References: 12

  • Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2001•Cited by: 29•References: 6

  • Taxation, coercion and donors: Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2001•Cited by: 21

    This paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state-society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In part…

  • Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A Study of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•Forum for Development Studies•2000•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    Local taxes represent less than 5 percent of total tax revenues in Tanzania. However, the large number of these taxes, together with their unsatisfactory nature, means that their economic, political and social impacts are considerably more significant than their figure implies. This paper reviews the main characteristics and impacts of the existing local tax system. It discusses how the present tax system emerged, and why it has been maintained f…

  • To Pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa

    Open Access•Merima Ali, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2014•Cited by: 33•References: 10

  • Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2001•Cited by: 29•References: 6

  • What's trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in local authorities in South Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2004•Cited by: 24

    A major financial problem in many municipalities in South Africa is the inadequate collection of service charges due to widespread non-payment. The prevailing view is that non-compliance is caused by poverty and the existence of an 'entitlement culture'. However, huge variations in compliance exist both within poor communities and between communities with similar socio-economic characteristics. How can these differences be explained? Moreover, wh…

  • Taxation, coercion and donors: Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2001•Cited by: 21

    This paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state-society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In part…

  • Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2009•Cited by: 9•References: 22

    Since the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of …

  • Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2003•Cited by: 9•References: 11

  • Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A Study of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•Forum for Development Studies•2000•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    Local taxes represent less than 5 percent of total tax revenues in Tanzania. However, the large number of these taxes, together with their unsatisfactory nature, means that their economic, political and social impacts are considerably more significant than their figure implies. This paper reviews the main characteristics and impacts of the existing local tax system. It discusses how the present tax system emerged, and why it has been maintained f…

  • Vers plus d'éthique dans les douanes en Afrique subsaharienne

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•Afrique contemporaine•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 22

    Cet article étudie les récentes expériences observées en Afrique subsaharienne en matière de lutte contre la corruption douanière. Il soutient que les réformes visant à renforcer l’intégrité sont trop ciblées sur la transformation des institutions formelles et que l’économie politique des réformes, de même que le rôle des institutions informelles, mériterait davantage d’attention. Dans bon nombre d’administrations douanières, le parrainage s’effe…

  • Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A Study of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•Forum for Development Studies•2000•Cited by: 8•References: 8

    Local taxes represent less than 5 percent of total tax revenues in Tanzania. However, the large number of these taxes, together with their unsatisfactory nature, means that their economic, political and social impacts are considerably more significant than their figure implies. This paper reviews the main characteristics and impacts of the existing local tax system. It discusses how the present tax system emerged, and why it has been maintained f…

  • Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2001•Cited by: 29•References: 6

  • Taxation, coercion and donors: Local government tax enforcement in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2001•Cited by: 21

    This paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state-society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In part…

  • Collectors, councillors and donors: Local government taxation and state-society relations in Tanzania

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•IDS Bulletin•2002•References: 12

  • Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue”––A Reply

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2003

  • Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2003•Cited by: 9•References: 11

  • Taxation during State Formation: Lessons from Palestine, 1994–2000

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•Forum for Development Studies•2004•References: 8

    The article analyses factors constraining the capacity of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) to raise domestic tax revenue during the period 1994–2000. The article shows that more than any other factor, Israel represented a constraint on the PNA's tax policies and revenue collection. Israel collected the bulk of taxes on traded goods on behalf of the PNA, and until 2000 a large share of income tax came from Palestinians working in Israel. B…

  • What's trust got to do with it? Non-payment of service charges in local authorities in South Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2004•Cited by: 24

    A major financial problem in many municipalities in South Africa is the inadequate collection of service charges due to widespread non-payment. The prevailing view is that non-compliance is caused by poverty and the existence of an 'entitlement culture'. However, huge variations in compliance exist both within poor communities and between communities with similar socio-economic characteristics. How can these differences be explained? Moreover, wh…

  • Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent

    Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad, Deborah Brautigam et al.•BOOK•Taxation and State-Building in…•2009

  • Vers plus d'éthique dans les douanes en Afrique subsaharienne

    Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad•ARTICLE•Afrique contemporaine•2009•Cited by: 1•References: 22

    Cet article étudie les récentes expériences observées en Afrique subsaharienne en matière de lutte contre la corruption douanière. Il soutient que les réformes visant à renforcer l’intégrité sont trop ciblées sur la transformation des institutions formelles et que l’économie politique des réformes, de même que le rôle des institutions informelles, mériterait davantage d’attention. Dans bon nombre d’administrations douanières, le parrainage s’effe…

  • Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa

    Open Access•Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Modern African…•2009•Cited by: 9•References: 22

    Since the early 1990s, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have established semi-autonomous revenue authorities (ARAs), organisationally distinct from ministries of finance, with some real operational autonomy, and with staff paid at rates substantially higher than those in comparable public sector jobs. This has been seen by some observers as a step to dilute the power of the central state executive. We demonstrate that this is a misreading of …

  • To Pay or Not to Pay? Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Taxation in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and South Africa

    Open Access•Merima Ali, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad et al.•ARTICLE•World Development•2014•Cited by: 33•References: 10

  • Does an Economics Education Produce Technocratic Paternalists? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

    Ivar Kolstad, Arne Wiig et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Development Studies•2020

    When confronted with information that ordinary citizens do not care that strongly about efficiency, do economists change their views of optimal public policy? In a randomised experiment on tax preferences conducted among business and economics students in Tanzania, we supplied the treatment group with information that ordinary citizens disagree with implications of efficiency-based optimal tax theory. Tax preferences were then measured using disc…

  • The non-oil tax reform in Angola: Escaping from petroleum dependency

    Open Access•Odd‐Helge Fjeldstad, Aslak Orre et al.•ARTICLE•The Extractive Industries and…•2020•References: 5

Economics (12 works) · Political science (12 works) · Taxation and Compliance Studies (12 works) · Public economics (10 works) · Business (8 works) · Revenue (7 works) · Finance (6 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Tanzania (6 works)

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