Lisa H Schwartzman
Biographic Data
| ID | 6533417 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lisa H Schwartzman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lisa H |
| FAMILY NAME | Schwartzman |
| SIGNATURE | SCHWARTZMAN L H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Michigan State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Action-Guidance, Oppression, and Nonideal Theory
Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality raises important questions about ideal theory, oppression, and the role of action guidance in normative philosophy. After a brief overview of feminist and anti-racist philosophers’ critiques of ideal theory, I examine Tessman’s claim that nonideal oppression theorists focus too narrowly on action guidance and thereby obscure other important normative issues, such as the problem o…
Appetites, Disorder, and Desire
Contemporary discussions of food, diet, and obesity often center on individuals and not on the myriad ways that culture, class, race, and gender affect eating practices. The expectation that one will “choose” foods wisely, track calories, and control one's appetite can have devastating effects on women. Drawing on Caroline Knapp's Appetites: Why Women Want and on recent sociological studies of young women's sexual experiences, I explore connectio…
Non-Ideal Theorizing, Social Groups, and Knowledge of Oppression
In responding to Anderson, Tobin, and Mills, I focus on questions about non-ideal theory, normative individualism, and standpoint theory. In particular, I ask whether feminist theorizing can be “liberal” and yet not embody the problematic forms of abstraction and individualism described in Challenging Liberalism. Ultimately, I call for methods of theorizing that illuminate and challenge oppressive social hierarchies
Abstraction, Idealization, and Oppression
Feminists, critical race scholars, and other social‐justice theorists sometimes object to “abstraction” in liberal normative theory. Arguing that oppression affects individual agents in powerful yet subtle ways, they contend that allegedly abstract theories often reinforce oppressive power structures. Here I critically examine and ultimately reject Onora O'Neill's “abstraction without idealization” as a solution to this problem. Because O'Neill d…
Feminist Analyses of Oppression and the Discourse of “Rights”
Liberal Rights Theory and Social Inequality
Liberal rights theory can be used either to challenge or to support social hierarchies of power. Focusing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights and Catharine MacKinnon's feminist critique of liberalism, I identify a number of problems with the way that liberal theorists conceptualize rights. I argue that rights can be used to chal-lenge oppressive practices and structures only if they are defined and employed with an awareness and critique of soci…
Liberal Rights Theory and Social Inequality
Liberal rights theory can be used either to challenge or to support social hierarchies of power. Focusing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights and Catharine MacKinnon's feminist critique of liberalism, I identify a number of problems with the way that liberal theorists conceptualize rights. I argue that rights can be used to chal-lenge oppressive practices and structures only if they are defined and employed with an awareness and critique of soci…
Liberal Rights Theory and Social Inequality
Liberal rights theory can be used either to challenge or to support social hierarchies of power. Focusing on Ronald Dworkin's theory of rights and Catharine MacKinnon's feminist critique of liberalism, I identify a number of problems with the way that liberal theorists conceptualize rights. I argue that rights can be used to chal-lenge oppressive practices and structures only if they are defined and employed with an awareness and critique of soci…
Feminist Analyses of Oppression and the Discourse of “Rights”
Abstraction, Idealization, and Oppression
Feminists, critical race scholars, and other social‐justice theorists sometimes object to “abstraction” in liberal normative theory. Arguing that oppression affects individual agents in powerful yet subtle ways, they contend that allegedly abstract theories often reinforce oppressive power structures. Here I critically examine and ultimately reject Onora O'Neill's “abstraction without idealization” as a solution to this problem. Because O'Neill d…
Non-Ideal Theorizing, Social Groups, and Knowledge of Oppression
In responding to Anderson, Tobin, and Mills, I focus on questions about non-ideal theory, normative individualism, and standpoint theory. In particular, I ask whether feminist theorizing can be “liberal” and yet not embody the problematic forms of abstraction and individualism described in Challenging Liberalism. Ultimately, I call for methods of theorizing that illuminate and challenge oppressive social hierarchies
Appetites, Disorder, and Desire
Contemporary discussions of food, diet, and obesity often center on individuals and not on the myriad ways that culture, class, race, and gender affect eating practices. The expectation that one will “choose” foods wisely, track calories, and control one's appetite can have devastating effects on women. Drawing on Caroline Knapp's Appetites: Why Women Want and on recent sociological studies of young women's sexual experiences, I explore connectio…
Action-Guidance, Oppression, and Nonideal Theory
Lisa Tessman’s Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality raises important questions about ideal theory, oppression, and the role of action guidance in normative philosophy. After a brief overview of feminist and anti-racist philosophers’ critiques of ideal theory, I examine Tessman’s claim that nonideal oppression theorists focus too narrowly on action guidance and thereby obscure other important normative issues, such as the problem o…
Epistemology (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Law (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Oppression (4 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (4 works) · Gender Studies (3 works) · Normative (3 works)