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Jay C Brown

Biographic Data

ID6540495
NAMEJay C Brown
GIVEN NAMESJay C
FAMILY NAMEBrown
SIGNATUREBROWN J C
AFFILIATIONSStony Brook University
ORCID0000-0003-0978-7244
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS2
TOTAL CITATIONS0
AUTHOR COUNT2
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1998
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2000
H-INDEX0
  • Discounting in judgments of delay and probability

    Open Access•Howard Rachlin, Jay C Brown et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•2000•References: 2

    Subjects drew lines proportional in length to their subjective valuation of various amounts of money, available immediately and certainly, relative to a standard amount ranging across groups from $1,000,000 to $10. They also drew lines proportional to their subjective valuation of standard amounts with delays ranging from 1 day to 50 years and with probabilities ranging from 1/10 to 1/10,000,000. Amounts of certain–immediate money equivalent (in …

  • Prior experience and patterning in a prisoner's dilemma game

    Open Access•Albert Silverstein, David V Cro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•1998•References: 3

    Female college students first played a pseudo-prisoner's dilemma (PPD) game with the experimenter, who followed a fixed strategy. In the first experiment the experimenter's strategies for different groups of subjects were: (a) play tit-for-tat; (b) play randomly; (c) always cooperate; (d) always defect (‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’, defined as in an actual prisoner's dilemma game). Only the tit-for-tat group increased cooperation over trials; ot…

No prominent works on this page.

  • Prior experience and patterning in a prisoner's dilemma game

    Open Access•Albert Silverstein, David V Cro et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•1998•References: 3

    Female college students first played a pseudo-prisoner's dilemma (PPD) game with the experimenter, who followed a fixed strategy. In the first experiment the experimenter's strategies for different groups of subjects were: (a) play tit-for-tat; (b) play randomly; (c) always cooperate; (d) always defect (‘cooperation’ and ‘defection’, defined as in an actual prisoner's dilemma game). Only the tit-for-tat group increased cooperation over trials; ot…

  • Discounting in judgments of delay and probability

    Open Access•Howard Rachlin, Jay C Brown et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•2000•References: 2

    Subjects drew lines proportional in length to their subjective valuation of various amounts of money, available immediately and certainly, relative to a standard amount ranging across groups from $1,000,000 to $10. They also drew lines proportional to their subjective valuation of standard amounts with delays ranging from 1 day to 50 years and with probabilities ranging from 1/10 to 1/10,000,000. Amounts of certain–immediate money equivalent (in …

Economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 works) · Delay discounting (1 works) · Dilemma (1 works) · Discounting (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (1 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (1 works) · Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior (1 works)

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