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Rudolf Vetschera

Biographic Data

ID6540836
NAMERudolf Vetschera
GIVEN NAMESRudolf
FAMILY NAMEVetschera
SIGNATUREVETSCHERA R
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Vienna
ORCID0000-0003-2809-8989
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS10
TOTAL CITATIONS4
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT2
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2004
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX1
  • Dominant Smart Contracts Based on Major Bargaining Solutions

    Open Access•Elmira Mohammadhosseini Fadafan, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    We consider a situation in which two parties have concluded an efficient contract corresponding to one major bargaining solution. After the parties have agreed on one particular contract, an unanticipated shock may change the contract outcomes in a way that benefits one party but harms the other party. If this happens, they have the option to either stay with the original exchange contract or adjust some contract parameters such as the price. We …

  • Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model

    Open Access•Rudolf Vetschera, Luís C Dias•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    This work proposes and studies a dynamic model of two bargaining parties exchanging offers over time, considering their confidence about the share of the “pie” they obtain, which translates into expectations regarding the outcome of the bargaining process. The model predicts the sequence of offers as well as the final agreement for given confidence parameters. A mathematical analysis of the model shows the outcome is an Asymmetric Nash Bargaining…

  • Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations

    Open Access•D Marc Kilgour, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    In the literature, many desirable properties for allocations of indivisible goods have been proposed, including envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and maximization of either the total welfare of all agents, the welfare of the worst-off agent, or the Nash product of agents’ welfares. In the two-person context, we study relationships among these properties using both analytical models and simulation in a setting where individual preferences are give…

  • Negotiation Systems and Studies

    Open Access•Mareike Schoop, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

  • Two-party Bargaining Processes Based on Subjective Expectations

    Open Access•Luís C Dias, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

    This work presents a model for a two-party bargaining process in which multiple offers are exchanged as the negotiation goes on, under a risk of breakdown. Typical game theoretical analyses of such settings assume the breakdown risk is known and the parties are able to calculate an initial offer that is immediately accepted by the other party, ending the negotiation. Aiming to develop a model that is closer to real-life situations, in which parti…

  • Testing Fairness Principles for Public Environmental Infrastructure Decisions

    Open Access•Sara Schmid, Rudolf Vetschera et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2021

    Public infrastructure decisions affect many stakeholders with various benefits and costs. For public decisions, it is crucial that decision-making processes and outcomes are fair. Fairness concepts have rarely been explored in public infrastructure planning. We close this gap for a global issue of growing importance: replacing sewer-based, centralized by decentralized wastewater systems. We empirically study fairness principles in this policy-rel…

  • Is there more than one ratio bias? If so, why

    Open Access•David Bourdin, Ayşegül Engin et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    The ratio bias refers to decision makers' propensity to overestimate probabilities that are specified as ratios of large numbers in comparison to a ratio of smaller numbers (e.g., 9:100 vs. 1:10). To reconcile conflicting findings about this bias, we study such deviations in a more general setting allowing for deviations in both directions, irrational indifference, and inability to decide. We find that the predominant direction of deviations depe…

  • Group Decision and Negotiation in an Uncertain World

    Open Access•Ye Chen, Gregory E Kersten et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation in…•2018

  • Group Decision and Negotiation. Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Application

    Open Access•Deepinder Bajwa, Sabine T Koeszegi et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation.…•2017

  • National Cultural Differences in the Use and Perception of Internet-based NSS

    Gregory E Kersten, Gregory Kersten et al.•ARTICLE•International Negotiation•2004•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    In this article, we apply an extended technology acceptance model (TAM) to explore whether national culture influences a user's perception and use of Internet-based negotiation support systems (NSS). In particular, we are interested in whether different preferences for communication patterns, as we find them for low-context and high-context cultures, influence the use and perception of different NSS support tools. The Web-based system Inspire, wh…

  • National Cultural Differences in the Use and Perception of Internet-based NSS

    Gregory E Kersten, Gregory Kersten et al.•ARTICLE•International Negotiation•2004•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    In this article, we apply an extended technology acceptance model (TAM) to explore whether national culture influences a user's perception and use of Internet-based negotiation support systems (NSS). In particular, we are interested in whether different preferences for communication patterns, as we find them for low-context and high-context cultures, influence the use and perception of different NSS support tools. The Web-based system Inspire, wh…

  • Is there more than one ratio bias? If so, why

    Open Access•David Bourdin, Ayşegül Engin et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    The ratio bias refers to decision makers' propensity to overestimate probabilities that are specified as ratios of large numbers in comparison to a ratio of smaller numbers (e.g., 9:100 vs. 1:10). To reconcile conflicting findings about this bias, we study such deviations in a more general setting allowing for deviations in both directions, irrational indifference, and inability to decide. We find that the predominant direction of deviations depe…

  • National Cultural Differences in the Use and Perception of Internet-based NSS

    Gregory E Kersten, Gregory Kersten et al.•ARTICLE•International Negotiation•2004•Cited by: 3•References: 8

    In this article, we apply an extended technology acceptance model (TAM) to explore whether national culture influences a user's perception and use of Internet-based negotiation support systems (NSS). In particular, we are interested in whether different preferences for communication patterns, as we find them for low-context and high-context cultures, influence the use and perception of different NSS support tools. The Web-based system Inspire, wh…

  • Group Decision and Negotiation. Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Application

    Open Access•Deepinder Bajwa, Sabine T Koeszegi et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation.…•2017

  • Group Decision and Negotiation in an Uncertain World

    Open Access•Ye Chen, Gregory E Kersten et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation in…•2018

  • Testing Fairness Principles for Public Environmental Infrastructure Decisions

    Open Access•Sara Schmid, Rudolf Vetschera et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2021

    Public infrastructure decisions affect many stakeholders with various benefits and costs. For public decisions, it is crucial that decision-making processes and outcomes are fair. Fairness concepts have rarely been explored in public infrastructure planning. We close this gap for a global issue of growing importance: replacing sewer-based, centralized by decentralized wastewater systems. We empirically study fairness principles in this policy-rel…

  • Is there more than one ratio bias? If so, why

    Open Access•David Bourdin, Ayşegül Engin et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Behavioral Decision…•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 11

    The ratio bias refers to decision makers' propensity to overestimate probabilities that are specified as ratios of large numbers in comparison to a ratio of smaller numbers (e.g., 9:100 vs. 1:10). To reconcile conflicting findings about this bias, we study such deviations in a more general setting allowing for deviations in both directions, irrational indifference, and inability to decide. We find that the predominant direction of deviations depe…

  • Negotiation Systems and Studies

    Open Access•Mareike Schoop, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

  • Two-party Bargaining Processes Based on Subjective Expectations

    Open Access•Luís C Dias, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

    This work presents a model for a two-party bargaining process in which multiple offers are exchanged as the negotiation goes on, under a risk of breakdown. Typical game theoretical analyses of such settings assume the breakdown risk is known and the parties are able to calculate an initial offer that is immediately accepted by the other party, ending the negotiation. Aiming to develop a model that is closer to real-life situations, in which parti…

  • Dominant Smart Contracts Based on Major Bargaining Solutions

    Open Access•Elmira Mohammadhosseini Fadafan, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    We consider a situation in which two parties have concluded an efficient contract corresponding to one major bargaining solution. After the parties have agreed on one particular contract, an unanticipated shock may change the contract outcomes in a way that benefits one party but harms the other party. If this happens, they have the option to either stay with the original exchange contract or adjust some contract parameters such as the price. We …

  • Confidence and Outcome Expectations in Bilateral Negotiations–A Dynamic Model

    Open Access•Rudolf Vetschera, Luís C Dias•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    This work proposes and studies a dynamic model of two bargaining parties exchanging offers over time, considering their confidence about the share of the “pie” they obtain, which translates into expectations regarding the outcome of the bargaining process. The model predicts the sequence of offers as well as the final agreement for given confidence parameters. A mathematical analysis of the model shows the outcome is an Asymmetric Nash Bargaining…

  • Two-Person Fair Division with Additive Valuations

    Open Access•D Marc Kilgour, Rudolf Vetschera•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2024

    In the literature, many desirable properties for allocations of indivisible goods have been proposed, including envy-freeness, Pareto optimality, and maximization of either the total welfare of all agents, the welfare of the worst-off agent, or the Nash product of agents’ welfares. In the two-person context, we study relationships among these properties using both analytical models and simulation in a setting where individual preferences are give…

Computer Science (8 works) · Negotiation (7 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (4 works) · Business (4 works) · Conflict Management and Negotiation (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae