Michèle Breton
Biographic Data
| ID | 6547073 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michèle Breton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michèle |
| FAMILY NAME | Breton |
| SIGNATURE | BRETON M |
| AFFILIATIONS | HEC Montréal |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8264-8350 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Self-image and the stability of international environmental agreements
In this paper we examine the stability of international environmental agreements about a (common) \nemissions target. By signing the agreement, the parties develop a sense of responsibility to the commitment made, gaining a self-image that contributes to their utility. \nWe study a dynamic two-stage game where all countries act individualistically. We investigate how \ntwo fundamental components of the model, that is, the ambition of the pledge a…
Could Chapter 11 redeem itself? Wealth and welfare effects of the redemption option
A great fish war model with asymmetric players
Self-image and the stability of international environmental agreements
In this paper we examine the stability of international environmental agreements about a (common) \nemissions target. By signing the agreement, the parties develop a sense of responsibility to the commitment made, gaining a self-image that contributes to their utility. \nWe study a dynamic two-stage game where all countries act individualistically. We investigate how \ntwo fundamental components of the model, that is, the ambition of the pledge a…
A great fish war model with asymmetric players
Could Chapter 11 redeem itself? Wealth and welfare effects of the redemption option
Self-image and the stability of international environmental agreements
In this paper we examine the stability of international environmental agreements about a (common) \nemissions target. By signing the agreement, the parties develop a sense of responsibility to the commitment made, gaining a self-image that contributes to their utility. \nWe study a dynamic two-stage game where all countries act individualistically. We investigate how \ntwo fundamental components of the model, that is, the ambition of the pledge a…
Economics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work) · Agricultural risk and resilience (1 work) · Asymmetry (1 work) · Bankruptcy (1 work)