Christopher Jay
Biographic Data
| ID | 6558971 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher Jay |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher |
| FAMILY NAME | Jay |
| SIGNATURE | JAY C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of York |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2498-2929 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable
As is already well known, subjective consequentialists face a challenge which arises from the fact that many (perhaps even most) of the consequences of an action are unforeseeable : this fact makes trouble for the assignment of expected values. Recently there has been some discussion of the role of ‘indifference’ principles in addressing this challenge. In this article, I argue that adopting a principle of indifference to unforeseeable consequenc…
Testimony, belief, and non-doxastic faith
I set out an argument for religious fictionalism which, unusually, proceeds from realist assumptions to the conclusion that even though some people might know that God exists, others ought to accept only non-doxastically that God exists. The argument relies upon the idea that religious experiences can confer immediate warrant on religious beliefs, whereas the warrant conferred by testimony is defeated by some reasonable beliefs which many people …
Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable
As is already well known, subjective consequentialists face a challenge which arises from the fact that many (perhaps even most) of the consequences of an action are unforeseeable : this fact makes trouble for the assignment of expected values. Recently there has been some discussion of the role of ‘indifference’ principles in addressing this challenge. In this article, I argue that adopting a principle of indifference to unforeseeable consequenc…
Testimony, belief, and non-doxastic faith
I set out an argument for religious fictionalism which, unusually, proceeds from realist assumptions to the conclusion that even though some people might know that God exists, others ought to accept only non-doxastically that God exists. The argument relies upon the idea that religious experiences can confer immediate warrant on religious beliefs, whereas the warrant conferred by testimony is defeated by some reasonable beliefs which many people …
Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable
As is already well known, subjective consequentialists face a challenge which arises from the fact that many (perhaps even most) of the consequences of an action are unforeseeable : this fact makes trouble for the assignment of expected values. Recently there has been some discussion of the role of ‘indifference’ principles in addressing this challenge. In this article, I argue that adopting a principle of indifference to unforeseeable consequenc…
Economics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work) · Consequentialism (1 work) · Deontic logic (1 work) · Doxastic logic (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work)