Chad Mason Stevenson
Biographic Data
| ID | 6559064 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chad Mason Stevenson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chad Mason |
| FAMILY NAME | Stevenson |
| SIGNATURE | STEVENSON C M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Edinburgh |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8382-4328 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Meaning, anti‐alienation, and fulfillment
One intuition that motivates subjectivist theories about meaning in life is the anti‐alienation intuition, that is, for a life to be meaningful it must engage with the person whose life it is. This article contends that the anti‐alienation and subjectivist theories it motivates are best understood as tracking fulfillment in life; this is an axiologically distinct evaluative dimension a life can have, which stands apart from meaning
Consequentialism, Welfarism, and Meaning in Life
What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life maintain that the consequences of that life confer meaning upon it. This article advances one such theory: welfarism about meaning in life. According to this view, a life is conferred meaning if, and only if, and then only insofar as, it promotes or protects the well‐being of other welfare subjects. The purpose of this article is to show why welfarism abou…
Moral Monsters, Significance, and Meaning in Life
Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don’…
Anything Can Be Meaningful
It is widely held that for a life to be conferred meaning it requires the appropriate type of agency. Call this the agency requirement. The agency requirement is primarily motivated in the philosophical literature by the assumption that there is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that humans have the capacity for meaning whereas animals do not; and that difference must come down to their agency or lack thereof. This paper aims to undercut the…
Experience Machines, Conflicting Intuitions and the Bipartite Characterization of Well-being
While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread anti-hedonist intuition to prefer reality to an experience machine, hedonists have marshalled empirical evidence that shows such an assumption to be unfounded. Results of several experience machine variants indicate there is no widespread anti-hedonist intuition. From these findings, hedonists claim Nozick's argument fails as an objection to hedonism. This article suggests the argumen…
Experience Machines, Conflicting Intuitions and the Bipartite Characterization of Well-being
While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread anti-hedonist intuition to prefer reality to an experience machine, hedonists have marshalled empirical evidence that shows such an assumption to be unfounded. Results of several experience machine variants indicate there is no widespread anti-hedonist intuition. From these findings, hedonists claim Nozick's argument fails as an objection to hedonism. This article suggests the argumen…
Experience Machines, Conflicting Intuitions and the Bipartite Characterization of Well-being
While Nozick and his sympathizers assume there is a widespread anti-hedonist intuition to prefer reality to an experience machine, hedonists have marshalled empirical evidence that shows such an assumption to be unfounded. Results of several experience machine variants indicate there is no widespread anti-hedonist intuition. From these findings, hedonists claim Nozick's argument fails as an objection to hedonism. This article suggests the argumen…
Anything Can Be Meaningful
It is widely held that for a life to be conferred meaning it requires the appropriate type of agency. Call this the agency requirement. The agency requirement is primarily motivated in the philosophical literature by the assumption that there is a widespread pre-theoretical intuition that humans have the capacity for meaning whereas animals do not; and that difference must come down to their agency or lack thereof. This paper aims to undercut the…
Moral Monsters, Significance, and Meaning in Life
Can a moral monster - a person whose life is characterised by immoral actions - live a meaningful life? Pre-theoretical intuitions appear divided. For some, moral monsters can't live a meaningful life because they were immoral, while for others they did because morality is irrelevant. So what is the relationship between morality and meaning? This article contends that both sides are partially correct but for the wrong reasons: moral monsters don’…
Consequentialism, Welfarism, and Meaning in Life
What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Consequentialist theories about meaning in life maintain that the consequences of that life confer meaning upon it. This article advances one such theory: welfarism about meaning in life. According to this view, a life is conferred meaning if, and only if, and then only insofar as, it promotes or protects the well‐being of other welfare subjects. The purpose of this article is to show why welfarism abou…
Meaning, anti‐alienation, and fulfillment
One intuition that motivates subjectivist theories about meaning in life is the anti‐alienation intuition, that is, for a life to be meaningful it must engage with the person whose life it is. This article contends that the anti‐alienation and subjectivist theories it motivates are best understood as tracking fulfillment in life; this is an axiologically distinct evaluative dimension a life can have, which stands apart from meaning
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Intuition (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)