Nikki Fortier
Biographic Data
| ID | 6559079 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nikki Fortier |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nikki |
| FAMILY NAME | Fortier |
| SIGNATURE | FORTIER N |
| AFFILIATIONS | Syracuse University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6178-3721 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Trouble with Genuine-Attraction Desires
Many views of well-being hold that a person’s desires directly contribute to well-being. Such views need to account for the plausible thought that not all satisfied desires benefit. An influential way of doing so—chiefly defended by Chris Heathwood—holds that only ‘genuine-attraction desires’ count toward well-being. I aim to show that we lack the conceptual grounds to distinguish genuine-attraction and other kinds of desire. I argue that if we a…
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance
The resonance constraint holds that something can benefit someone only if it bears a connection to her favoring attitudes. It is widely taken as a decisive reason to reject objective views of well-being since they do not guarantee such a connection. I aim to show that this is a mistake and that felt-quality hedonism about well-being can in fact meet the constraint. First, I argue that the typical way of putting the constraint is misguided in its …
No prominent works on this page.
Felt-Quality Hedonism, Alienation, and the Spirit of Resonance
The resonance constraint holds that something can benefit someone only if it bears a connection to her favoring attitudes. It is widely taken as a decisive reason to reject objective views of well-being since they do not guarantee such a connection. I aim to show that this is a mistake and that felt-quality hedonism about well-being can in fact meet the constraint. First, I argue that the typical way of putting the constraint is misguided in its …
The Trouble with Genuine-Attraction Desires
Many views of well-being hold that a person’s desires directly contribute to well-being. Such views need to account for the plausible thought that not all satisfied desires benefit. An influential way of doing so—chiefly defended by Chris Heathwood—holds that only ‘genuine-attraction desires’ count toward well-being. I aim to show that we lack the conceptual grounds to distinguish genuine-attraction and other kinds of desire. I argue that if we a…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Alienation (1 work) · Attraction (1 work) · Hedonism (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Law (1 work) · Linguistics (1 work) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (1 work)