Sean Donahue
Biographic Data
| ID | 6574071 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sean Donahue |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sean |
| FAMILY NAME | Donahue |
| SIGNATURE | DONAHUE S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1533-1502 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Platform Legitimacy Between Rights and Rule
This article examines the conditions for the legitimacy of online platforms and their relation to permissible acts of public interference. We develop what we call the Interference Conception of legitimacy and apply it to three categories of moral criticism that can be made against online platforms: that they have the power to violate rights, that they harm without violating rights, and that they inappropriately govern their users. We argue that v…
AI rule and a fundamental objection to epistocracy
Epistocracy is rule by whoever is more likely to make correct decisions. AI epistocracy is rule by an artificial intelligence that is more likely to make correct decisions than any humans, individually or collectively. I argue that although various objections have been raised against epistocracy, the most popular do not apply to epistocracy organized around AI rule. I use this result to show that epistocracy is fundamentally flawed because none o…
Collective procedural memory
Collective procedural memory is a group’s memory of how to do things, as opposed to a group’s memory of facts. It enables groups to mount effective responses to periodic events (e.g., natural hazards) and to sustain collective projects (e.g., combatting climate change). This article presents an account of collective procedural memory called the Ability Conception. The Ability Conception has various advantages over other accounts of collective pro…
Powerful Deceivers and Public Reason Liberalism: An Argument for Externalization
Public reason liberals claim that legitimate rules must be justifiable to diverse perspectives. This Public Justification Principle threatens that failing to justify rules to reprehensible agents makes those rules illegitimate. Although public reason liberals have replies to this objection, they cannot avoid the challenge of powerful deceivers. Powerful deceivers trick people who are purportedly owed public justification into considering otherwis…
Public Justification and the Veil of Testimony
Public Justification and the Veil of Testimony
Powerful Deceivers and Public Reason Liberalism: An Argument for Externalization
Public reason liberals claim that legitimate rules must be justifiable to diverse perspectives. This Public Justification Principle threatens that failing to justify rules to reprehensible agents makes those rules illegitimate. Although public reason liberals have replies to this objection, they cannot avoid the challenge of powerful deceivers. Powerful deceivers trick people who are purportedly owed public justification into considering otherwis…
Collective procedural memory
Collective procedural memory is a group’s memory of how to do things, as opposed to a group’s memory of facts. It enables groups to mount effective responses to periodic events (e.g., natural hazards) and to sustain collective projects (e.g., combatting climate change). This article presents an account of collective procedural memory called the Ability Conception. The Ability Conception has various advantages over other accounts of collective pro…
AI rule and a fundamental objection to epistocracy
Epistocracy is rule by whoever is more likely to make correct decisions. AI epistocracy is rule by an artificial intelligence that is more likely to make correct decisions than any humans, individually or collectively. I argue that although various objections have been raised against epistocracy, the most popular do not apply to epistocracy organized around AI rule. I use this result to show that epistocracy is fundamentally flawed because none o…
Platform Legitimacy Between Rights and Rule
This article examines the conditions for the legitimacy of online platforms and their relation to permissible acts of public interference. We develop what we call the Interference Conception of legitimacy and apply it to three categories of moral criticism that can be made against online platforms: that they have the power to violate rights, that they harm without violating rights, and that they inappropriately govern their users. We argue that v…
Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works)