Joseph J Harrington
Biographic Data
| ID | 6622336 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joseph J Harrington |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joseph J |
| FAMILY NAME | Harrington |
| SIGNATURE | HARRINGTON J J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Engaging Chicago Hospitals in the Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative
A Model of Sustainable Extraction of Nontimber Forest Products in Subsistence Societies
The shrinking forest in many parts of the world is a problem often blamed on the patterns of ownership and harvesting by the resource owners. We develop a model which demonstrates that holding a resource in common where there is competition among individuals leads to inefficient harvesting of the resource but cannot lead to the destruction of forests. The same model is used to demonstrate that climatic conditions, low wage rates, and increases in…
A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Introducing More-Efficient Wood-Burning Stoves into Households in the Sahelian Region
Two models of the village firewood-gathering economy are developed: one where the firewood is treated by households as a common-property resource and one where it is treated as a private asset. Under both models, rebound of consumption occurs as a result of distributing more-efficient wood-burning stoves into households. It follows that policies premised on the assumption that the use of scarce resources can be curtailed simply by raising the ene…
Generating alternative designs for interjurisdictional natural resource development schemes in the Greater Ganges River basin
Generating Alternative Designs for Interjurisdictional Natural Resource Development Schemes in the Greater Ganges River Basin
A Linear Constraint Formulation for Spatial and Temporal Cost Imputations in Accord with Shapley Values
In a recent paper we presented a linear programming model of a three-riparian, two-time-period, joint river-basin development scheme by using cooperative game theory. The objective of the model was to develop 'fair' and equitable divisions of the benefits and costs of cooperation. In this paper the analysis is extended by including linear constraints which satisfy the well-known Shapley-value imputation scheme
Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Benefits and Costs in River-Basin Schemes
River-basin developments inevitably require participation by numerous entities (for example, riparians and external funding agencies). The division of the costs and benefits consequent to the scheme is further complicated by time schedules for implementation. In this paper the extension of cooperative game theory to temporal allocations is explored. The approach is illustrated with an example problem involving three riparians and two time periods…
Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Benefits and Costs in River-Basin Schemes
River-basin developments inevitably require participation by numerous entities (for example, riparians and external funding agencies). The division of the costs and benefits consequent to the scheme is further complicated by time schedules for implementation. In this paper the extension of cooperative game theory to temporal allocations is explored. The approach is illustrated with an example problem involving three riparians and two time periods…
A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Introducing More-Efficient Wood-Burning Stoves into Households in the Sahelian Region
Two models of the village firewood-gathering economy are developed: one where the firewood is treated by households as a common-property resource and one where it is treated as a private asset. Under both models, rebound of consumption occurs as a result of distributing more-efficient wood-burning stoves into households. It follows that policies premised on the assumption that the use of scarce resources can be curtailed simply by raising the ene…
A Linear Constraint Formulation for Spatial and Temporal Cost Imputations in Accord with Shapley Values
In a recent paper we presented a linear programming model of a three-riparian, two-time-period, joint river-basin development scheme by using cooperative game theory. The objective of the model was to develop 'fair' and equitable divisions of the benefits and costs of cooperation. In this paper the analysis is extended by including linear constraints which satisfy the well-known Shapley-value imputation scheme
Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Benefits and Costs in River-Basin Schemes
River-basin developments inevitably require participation by numerous entities (for example, riparians and external funding agencies). The division of the costs and benefits consequent to the scheme is further complicated by time schedules for implementation. In this paper the extension of cooperative game theory to temporal allocations is explored. The approach is illustrated with an example problem involving three riparians and two time periods…
A Linear Constraint Formulation for Spatial and Temporal Cost Imputations in Accord with Shapley Values
In a recent paper we presented a linear programming model of a three-riparian, two-time-period, joint river-basin development scheme by using cooperative game theory. The objective of the model was to develop 'fair' and equitable divisions of the benefits and costs of cooperation. In this paper the analysis is extended by including linear constraints which satisfy the well-known Shapley-value imputation scheme
Generating alternative designs for interjurisdictional natural resource development schemes in the Greater Ganges River basin
Generating Alternative Designs for Interjurisdictional Natural Resource Development Schemes in the Greater Ganges River Basin
A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of the Impact of Introducing More-Efficient Wood-Burning Stoves into Households in the Sahelian Region
Two models of the village firewood-gathering economy are developed: one where the firewood is treated by households as a common-property resource and one where it is treated as a private asset. Under both models, rebound of consumption occurs as a result of distributing more-efficient wood-burning stoves into households. It follows that policies premised on the assumption that the use of scarce resources can be curtailed simply by raising the ene…
A Model of Sustainable Extraction of Nontimber Forest Products in Subsistence Societies
The shrinking forest in many parts of the world is a problem often blamed on the patterns of ownership and harvesting by the resource owners. We develop a model which demonstrates that holding a resource in common where there is competition among individuals leads to inefficient harvesting of the resource but cannot lead to the destruction of forests. The same model is used to demonstrate that climatic conditions, low wage rates, and increases in…
Engaging Chicago Hospitals in the Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative
Computer Science (5 works) · Economics (3 works) · Environmental Science (3 works) · Geography (3 works) · Water resources management and optimization (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Cooperative game theory (2 works) · Drainage basin (2 works) · Ecology (2 works)