Fumitake Yoshizawa
Biographic Data
| ID | 6686473 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fumitake Yoshizawa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fumitake |
| FAMILY NAME | Yoshizawa |
| SIGNATURE | YOSHIZAWA F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Graduate School of Social Sciences Hitotsubashi University Tokyo Japan |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4984-7849 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Why Death Is Not Necessarily Most in One's Self‐Interest
In this response, I examine Victor Kriska's defense of thanatism, the claim that a quick and painless death is necessarily most in one's self‐interest, and its stronger extension to all possible lives. I argue that Kriska's conclusion does not follow. The principles on which Kriska's argument relies are internally ambiguous. Once disambiguated, these principles either fail to support thanatism or require unpromising theoretical commitments. My cr…
The Wrong Inference to the Best Explanation for Anti-Natalism
David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism has been a subject of long-standing scrutiny. I shall focus on a crucial yet surprisingly overlooked structural flaw in his use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) arguments. Benatar’s argument begins with the procreation asymmetry, which implies that some procreative cases are morally wrong, whereas others are not. He then concludes with anti-natalism, which asserts that all procreative…
Anti‐natalism is incompatible with Theory X
The anti‐natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less‐discussed claim that his anti‐natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non‐Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons . Since the pu…
A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been , Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties,…
No prominent works on this page.
A Dilemma for Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been , Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties,…
Anti‐natalism is incompatible with Theory X
The anti‐natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less‐discussed claim that his anti‐natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non‐Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons . Since the pu…
The Wrong Inference to the Best Explanation for Anti-Natalism
David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism has been a subject of long-standing scrutiny. I shall focus on a crucial yet surprisingly overlooked structural flaw in his use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) arguments. Benatar’s argument begins with the procreation asymmetry, which implies that some procreative cases are morally wrong, whereas others are not. He then concludes with anti-natalism, which asserts that all procreative…
Why Death Is Not Necessarily Most in One's Self‐Interest
In this response, I examine Victor Kriska's defense of thanatism, the claim that a quick and painless death is necessarily most in one's self‐interest, and its stronger extension to all possible lives. I argue that Kriska's conclusion does not follow. The principles on which Kriska's argument relies are internally ambiguous. Once disambiguated, these principles either fail to support thanatism or require unpromising theoretical commitments. My cr…
Epistemology (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Criticism (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Political philosophy (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Sociology (2 works)