Joshua Jowitt
Biographic Data
| ID | 6686528 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joshua Jowitt |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joshua |
| FAMILY NAME | Jowitt |
| SIGNATURE | JOWITT J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Newcastle University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5566-0653 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Plural Visions of Law
Tomorrow You Shall Cease to Be a Marionette, and You Shall Become an Inventor
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
On the Legal Status of Human Cerebral Organoids
This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the …
The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings
The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewir…
Assessing contemporary legislative proposals for their compatibility with a natural law case for AI legal personhood
The question of the moral status of AI and the extent to which that status ought to be recognised by societal institutions is one that has not yet received a satisfactory answer from lawyers. This paper seeks to provide a solution to the problem by defending a moral foundation for the recognition of legal personhood for AI, requiring the status to be granted should a threshold criterion be reached. The threshold proposed will be bare, noumenal ag…
Legal rights for animals
Whereas regulation relating to minimum standards of animal welfare is increasingly uncontroversial in contemporary popular discourse, the same cannot be said of viewing animals as legal persons possessing legally enforceable rights in and of themselves. The purpose of this article will be to explore this reticence and ask whether the continued anthropocentricity of legally enforceable rights is compatible with the very concept of law itself. The …
Legal rights for animals
Whereas regulation relating to minimum standards of animal welfare is increasingly uncontroversial in contemporary popular discourse, the same cannot be said of viewing animals as legal persons possessing legally enforceable rights in and of themselves. The purpose of this article will be to explore this reticence and ask whether the continued anthropocentricity of legally enforceable rights is compatible with the very concept of law itself. The …
Legal rights for animals
Whereas regulation relating to minimum standards of animal welfare is increasingly uncontroversial in contemporary popular discourse, the same cannot be said of viewing animals as legal persons possessing legally enforceable rights in and of themselves. The purpose of this article will be to explore this reticence and ask whether the continued anthropocentricity of legally enforceable rights is compatible with the very concept of law itself. The …
The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings
The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewir…
Assessing contemporary legislative proposals for their compatibility with a natural law case for AI legal personhood
The question of the moral status of AI and the extent to which that status ought to be recognised by societal institutions is one that has not yet received a satisfactory answer from lawyers. This paper seeks to provide a solution to the problem by defending a moral foundation for the recognition of legal personhood for AI, requiring the status to be granted should a threshold criterion be reached. The threshold proposed will be bare, noumenal ag…
On the Legal Status of Human Cerebral Organoids
This paper will ask whether the legal status presently afforded to nonhuman animals ought to influence regulatory debates concerning human cerebral organoids. The New York Courts recently refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to Happy the Elephant as she was property rather than a legal person while at the same time accepting that she is a moral patient deserving of rights protection. An undesirable situation has therefore arisen in which the …
Tomorrow You Shall Cease to Be a Marionette, and You Shall Become an Inventor
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Plural Visions of Law
Law (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Law in Society and Culture (2 works) · Moral agency (2 works) · Moral rights (2 works)