Jacques Lawarrée
Biographic Data
| ID | 6699212 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jacques Lawarrée |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jacques |
| FAMILY NAME | Lawarrée |
| SIGNATURE | LAWARRÉE J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Liège |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4806-6995 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
According to Becker's human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general training relative to specific training because it increases their existing employees' outside opportunities. We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information-gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills. An example is the training of new hires. When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and the agen…
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
We compare rigid and flexible organizations when side contracting among agents is possible. Within a rigid organization, each agent can produce only one component of the final product, whereas within a flexible organization, the agents can reallocate their tasks during the production period. In our model, the principal can only observe the joint output produced by the agents. Our analysis reveals that within a flexible organization, side transfer…
Incitations Manageriales Dans Les Entreprises Publiques
Collusion Et Audit d'Entreprises Publiques
Productivite, Cout Et Caracteristiques Technologiques Des Societes Belges De Transports Urbains
Productivite, Cout Et Caracteristiques Technologiques Des Societes Belges De Transports Urbains
Collusion Et Audit d'Entreprises Publiques
Incitations Manageriales Dans Les Entreprises Publiques
Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
We compare rigid and flexible organizations when side contracting among agents is possible. Within a rigid organization, each agent can produce only one component of the final product, whereas within a flexible organization, the agents can reallocate their tasks during the production period. In our model, the principal can only observe the joint output produced by the agents. Our analysis reveals that within a flexible organization, side transfer…
On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
According to Becker's human-capital theory, employers tend to underinvest in general training relative to specific training because it increases their existing employees' outside opportunities. We show that this is not necessarily true if training has an information-gathering function that allows an agent to learn his skills. An example is the training of new hires. When training creates an information asymmetry between the principal and the agen…
Computer Science (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Business (3 works) · Humanities (3 works) · Library science (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Art (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Private Equity and Venture Capital (2 works) · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (1 work)