Oren Bar‐Gill
Biographic Data
| ID | 6727146 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Oren Bar‐Gill |
| GIVEN NAMES | Oren |
| FAMILY NAME | Bar‐Gill |
| SIGNATURE | GILL O B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Harvard University Press |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4445-0428 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Misprioritized Information
This paper lays a foundation for a new theory of manipulation based on the misprioritization of (truthful) information. Since consumers review only a subset of all available information, firms can harm consumers by prioritizing information that maximizes firms’ profits but has a smaller impact on the utility that consumers stand to gain from the purchase. Moreover, the distortions due to misprioritized information can arise not only from firms’ b…
Consumer Misperception in a Hotelling Model
This paper studies the implications of consumer misperception in a market fora (horizontally) differentiated product. Two distinct types of misperceptions are considered: (i) a common misperception that leads consumers to similarly overestimate the benefit from both firms' products; and (ii) a relative misperception that leads consumers to overestimate the benefit of one firm's product relativeto the product offered by its competitor. The paper a…
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law
How does the prospect of sale affect the seller’s incentive to investigate—to acquire socially valuable information about the asset? How do the disclosure rules of contract law influence the investigation decision? Research has shown that if sellers and buyers are symmetrically informed at the preinvestigation stage, then a mandatory disclosure rule leads to a first-best outcome, and a voluntary disclosure rule leads to a suboptimal outcome. But …
Smart disclosure
The move to smart disclosure promises to revitalize disclosure mandates and save them from a fate of ignored verbiage. But by making disclosure relevant and effective, this shift to smart disclosure also raises several concerns. Specifically, simple disclosures like genetically modified food disclosures, restaurant hygiene grades, annual percentage rate disclosures, etc., can result in market distortions and inefficiencies as: (1) consumers might…
Drawing false inferences from mandated disclosures
Disclosure mandates are pervasive. Though designed to inform consumers, such mandates may lead consumers to draw false inferences – for example, that a product is harmful when it is not. When deciding to require disclosure of an ingredient in or characteristic of a product, regulators may be motivated by evidence that the ingredient or characteristic is harmful to consumers. But they may also be motivated by a belief that consumers have a right t…
Consumer Transactions
Consumer transactions differ from the archetypal arm’s-length contract on which both classical contract law and neoclassical economics focus. These transactions are marked by an imbalance between sellers and buyers. The underlying concern is that imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational consumers might fail to fully comprehend the costs and benefits of the product or service that they are purchasing. Moreover, sophisticated sellers can be ex…
The Market for Corporate Law
This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. Such competition is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private benefits but not with respect to issues that have such an effect. We analyze why a dominant state such as Delaware can emerge, as well as the price that this state will set and the profits it will make. The results of th…
Drawing false inferences from mandated disclosures
Disclosure mandates are pervasive. Though designed to inform consumers, such mandates may lead consumers to draw false inferences – for example, that a product is harmful when it is not. When deciding to require disclosure of an ingredient in or characteristic of a product, regulators may be motivated by evidence that the ingredient or characteristic is harmful to consumers. But they may also be motivated by a belief that consumers have a right t…
The Market for Corporate Law
This paper develops a model of the competition among states in providing corporate law rules. Such competition is shown to produce optimal rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private benefits but not with respect to issues that have such an effect. We analyze why a dominant state such as Delaware can emerge, as well as the price that this state will set and the profits it will make. The results of th…
Consumer Transactions
Consumer transactions differ from the archetypal arm’s-length contract on which both classical contract law and neoclassical economics focus. These transactions are marked by an imbalance between sellers and buyers. The underlying concern is that imperfectly informed and imperfectly rational consumers might fail to fully comprehend the costs and benefits of the product or service that they are purchasing. Moreover, sophisticated sellers can be ex…
Drawing false inferences from mandated disclosures
Disclosure mandates are pervasive. Though designed to inform consumers, such mandates may lead consumers to draw false inferences – for example, that a product is harmful when it is not. When deciding to require disclosure of an ingredient in or characteristic of a product, regulators may be motivated by evidence that the ingredient or characteristic is harmful to consumers. But they may also be motivated by a belief that consumers have a right t…
Smart disclosure
The move to smart disclosure promises to revitalize disclosure mandates and save them from a fate of ignored verbiage. But by making disclosure relevant and effective, this shift to smart disclosure also raises several concerns. Specifically, simple disclosures like genetically modified food disclosures, restaurant hygiene grades, annual percentage rate disclosures, etc., can result in market distortions and inefficiencies as: (1) consumers might…
Consumer Misperception in a Hotelling Model
This paper studies the implications of consumer misperception in a market fora (horizontally) differentiated product. Two distinct types of misperceptions are considered: (i) a common misperception that leads consumers to similarly overestimate the benefit from both firms' products; and (ii) a relative misperception that leads consumers to overestimate the benefit of one firm's product relativeto the product offered by its competitor. The paper a…
Disclosure Rules in Contract Law
How does the prospect of sale affect the seller’s incentive to investigate—to acquire socially valuable information about the asset? How do the disclosure rules of contract law influence the investigation decision? Research has shown that if sellers and buyers are symmetrically informed at the preinvestigation stage, then a mandatory disclosure rule leads to a first-best outcome, and a voluntary disclosure rule leads to a suboptimal outcome. But …
Misprioritized Information
This paper lays a foundation for a new theory of manipulation based on the misprioritization of (truthful) information. Since consumers review only a subset of all available information, firms can harm consumers by prioritizing information that maximizes firms’ profits but has a smaller impact on the utility that consumers stand to gain from the purchase. Moreover, the distortions due to misprioritized information can arise not only from firms’ b…
Business (6 works) · Economics (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Actuarial science (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Product (mathematics) (3 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (2 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works)