David Balcarras
Biographic Data
| ID | 6745760 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Balcarras |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Balcarras |
| SIGNATURE | BALCARRAS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5337-3685 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A puzzle about hallucination
What Is It To Have A Language
This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages
Is meaning cognized
In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections
Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar
In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing …
No prominent works on this page.
What Is It To Have A Language
This article defends the view that having a language just is knowing how to engage in communication with it. It also argues that, despite claims to the contrary, this view is compatible and complementary with the Chomskyan conception of language on which humans have languages in virtue of being in brain states realizing tacit knowledge of grammars for those languages
Is meaning cognized
In this article, I defend an account of linguistic comprehension on which meaning is not cognized, or on which we do not tacitly know our language's semantics. On this view, sentence comprehension is explained instead by our capacity to translate sentences into the language of thought. I explain how this view can explain our capacity to correctly interpret novel utterances, and then I defend it against several standing objections
Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar
In this article, I argue that if tacit knowledge of grammar is analyzable in functional‐computational terms, then it cannot ground linguistic meaning, structure, or sound. If to know or cognize a grammar is to be in a certain computational state playing a certain functional role, there can be no unique grammar cognized. Satisfying the functional conditions for cognizing a grammar G entails satisfying those for cognizing many grammars disagreeing …
A puzzle about hallucination
Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (3 works) · Historical Linguistics and Language Studies (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Rule-based machine translation (2 works) · Comprehension (1 work) · Emergent grammar (1 work)