Anders Poulsen
Biographic Data
| ID | 6792711 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anders Poulsen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anders |
| FAMILY NAME | Poulsen |
| SIGNATURE | POULSEN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Aarhus University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1742-2595 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Toward a third-generation rational choice theory
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a “third-generation” rational choice theory by introducing a Multiple Player Approach for analysing collective action problems. Drawing on the foundational first and second generation works of Olson (The logic of collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Ostrom (Scand Polit Stud 23(1):3–16), we introduce five player types that we believe capture essential empirical feat…
Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions
There is robust experimental evidence that some people have selfish preferences, and others have social, or other-regarding, preferences. This paper seeks to explain why there is such preference heterogeneity. In our approach preferences are endogenous to the economy's institutional setup. We consider institutions of the social-dilemma type. Our main result characterizes the endogenous preferences: There is, under a wide set of institutional setu…
Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences
On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining
Using Local Knowledge as a Research Tool in the Study of River Fish Biology
Customs and Rites Connected with Pregnancy and Childbirth in a Northeastern Thai Village
Customs and Rites Connected with Pregnancy and Childbirth in a Northeastern Thai Village
Using Local Knowledge as a Research Tool in the Study of River Fish Biology
On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining
Social Capital and Endogenous Preferences
Endogenous Preferences and Social-Dilemma Institutions
There is robust experimental evidence that some people have selfish preferences, and others have social, or other-regarding, preferences. This paper seeks to explain why there is such preference heterogeneity. In our approach preferences are endogenous to the economy's institutional setup. We consider institutions of the social-dilemma type. Our main result characterizes the endogenous preferences: There is, under a wide set of institutional setu…
Toward a third-generation rational choice theory
This paper aims to contribute to the development of a “third-generation” rational choice theory by introducing a Multiple Player Approach for analysing collective action problems. Drawing on the foundational first and second generation works of Olson (The logic of collective action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Ostrom (Scand Polit Stud 23(1):3–16), we introduce five player types that we believe capture essential empirical feat…
Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Biology (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Dilemma (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (2 works)