Leonardo De Mello Ribeiro
Biographic Data
| ID | 6798393 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leonardo De Mello Ribeiro |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leonardo De Mello |
| FAMILY NAME | Ribeiro |
| SIGNATURE | RIBEIRO L M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5912-2921 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Trust as a social emotion
The development of trusting relations is one of the central aspects of human sociality. Trust makes it possible for people to count on and cooperate with each other, creating the conditions for people to achieve goods and promote their interests and well-being. Yet, justifying trust can be a vexing task. This paper offers a proposal on the nature of trust and its possible justification that aims to combine both cognitive and emotional aspects int…
Emoções e valores
Neste artigo, uma tese sentimentalista qualificada é formulada para explicar a relação entre emoção e valor, em especial a aquisição de conceitos e de competências valorativas. Esta tese defende, por um lado, que sentimentos são os elementos essenciais para a caracterização de emoções e, por outro lado, que valores devem ser compreendidos em referência a emoções. Duas objeções à tese serão consideradas: as objeções da recalcitrância e da circular…
Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility
According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agentis morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s refl…
No prominent works on this page.
Revisiting Frankfurt on Freedom and Responsibility
According to Harry Frankfurt’s account of moral responsibility, an agentis morally responsible only if her reflected choices and actions are not constrained by an irresistible force —either from the first- or the third-person perspective. I shall argue here that this claim is problematic. Given some of the background assumptions of Frankfurt’s discussion, there seem to be cases according to which one may be deemed responsible, although one’s refl…
Emoções e valores
Neste artigo, uma tese sentimentalista qualificada é formulada para explicar a relação entre emoção e valor, em especial a aquisição de conceitos e de competências valorativas. Esta tese defende, por um lado, que sentimentos são os elementos essenciais para a caracterização de emoções e, por outro lado, que valores devem ser compreendidos em referência a emoções. Duas objeções à tese serão consideradas: as objeções da recalcitrância e da circular…
Trust as a social emotion
The development of trusting relations is one of the central aspects of human sociality. Trust makes it possible for people to count on and cooperate with each other, creating the conditions for people to achieve goods and promote their interests and well-being. Yet, justifying trust can be a vexing task. This paper offers a proposal on the nature of trust and its possible justification that aims to combine both cognitive and emotional aspects int…
Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Cognition (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work) · Humanities (1 work) · Law (1 work)