Sadjad Soltanzadeh
Biographic Data
| ID | 6837484 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sadjad Soltanzadeh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sadjad |
| FAMILY NAME | Soltanzadeh |
| SIGNATURE | SOLTANZADEH S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Canberra |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0629-6952 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
A metaphysical account of agency for technology governance
The way in which agency is conceptualised has implications for understanding human–machine interactions and the governance of technology, especially artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Traditionally, agency is conceptualised as a capacity, defined by intrinsic properties, such as cognitive or volitional facilities. I argue that the capacity-based account of agency is inadequate to explain the dynamics of human–machine interactions and guide tec…
Customizable Ethics Settings for Building Resilience and Narrowing the Responsibility Gap
Questioning Two Assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects
A Problem with Societal Desirability as a Component of Responsible Research and Innovation
Humanist and Nonhumanist Aspects of Technologies as Problem Solving Physical Instruments
Peter-Paul Verbeek's Moralizing Technology
No prominent works on this page.
Peter-Paul Verbeek's Moralizing Technology
Humanist and Nonhumanist Aspects of Technologies as Problem Solving Physical Instruments
Questioning Two Assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects
A Problem with Societal Desirability as a Component of Responsible Research and Innovation
Customizable Ethics Settings for Building Resilience and Narrowing the Responsibility Gap
A metaphysical account of agency for technology governance
The way in which agency is conceptualised has implications for understanding human–machine interactions and the governance of technology, especially artificial intelligence (AI) systems. Traditionally, agency is conceptualised as a capacity, defined by intrinsic properties, such as cognitive or volitional facilities. I argue that the capacity-based account of agency is inadequate to explain the dynamics of human–machine interactions and guide tec…
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (4 works) · Philosophy of technology (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Economics (2 works)