Balder Edmund Ask Zaar
Biographic Data
| ID | 6845913 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Balder Edmund Ask Zaar |
| GIVEN NAMES | Balder Edmund Ask |
| FAMILY NAME | Zaar |
| SIGNATURE | ZAAR B E A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8031-0310 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Does Safety Entail Context-Sensitivity
In this article I discuss whether viewing safety as a necessary condition for knowing entails that the truth-conditions for knowledge is context-sensitive. I argue that, while it is far from clear-cut, there is at least not a strict entailment between the positing of safety as necessary for knowledge and the context-sensitivity of knowledge, and so, that one can remain an invariantist about knowledge and yet view safety as necessary for knowing
Language Norms
The notion of a language norm is far from clear. Lacking a conclusive explication, one may wonder what language studies are actually studying. Is it the experience of speakers? Is it their brains? Is it their behavior? Is it the product of expert intuitions? Even within linguistics the views seem scattered on this point, and no consensus has been reached on what the object of study in linguistics is supposed to be. The ontology of language norms …
Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved
In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but no…
No prominent works on this page.
Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved
In this paper, I evaluate some recent attacks on Williamson's claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative propositional attitude. Two types of approaches are discussed: The first approach attempts to show that there are factive mental states denoted by factive mental state operators that are not cases of knowing. The second approach aims to show that there are factive mental states that to Williamson count as cases of knowing, but no…
Language Norms
The notion of a language norm is far from clear. Lacking a conclusive explication, one may wonder what language studies are actually studying. Is it the experience of speakers? Is it their brains? Is it their behavior? Is it the product of expert intuitions? Even within linguistics the views seem scattered on this point, and no consensus has been reached on what the object of study in linguistics is supposed to be. The ontology of language norms …
Does Safety Entail Context-Sensitivity
In this article I discuss whether viewing safety as a necessary condition for knowing entails that the truth-conditions for knowledge is context-sensitive. I argue that, while it is far from clear-cut, there is at least not a strict entailment between the positing of safety as necessary for knowledge and the context-sensitivity of knowledge, and so, that one can remain an invariantist about knowledge and yet view safety as necessary for knowing
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills (1 works) · Cognitive science (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Deception detection and forensic psychology (1 works) · Engineering (1 works)