Øivind Schøyen
Biographic Data
| ID | 6879523 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Øivind Schøyen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Øivind |
| FAMILY NAME | Schøyen |
| SIGNATURE | SCHØYEN Ø |
| AFFILIATIONS | UiT The Arctic University of Norway |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4610-3342 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The inefficiency of moderate political coercion
Political coercion directed against non-state moralities can serve as a tool for generating legitimacy. Does the efficacy of political coercion in producing legitimacy vary with its intensity? Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity5 indices as proxies for coercive intensity, together with data on regime legitimacy and survival, we find that a mid-level range of coercion is ineffective in generating legitimacy. Relatively few regimes operate in th…
Suspicious minds and views of fairness
Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? In a novel experimental design, participants were significantly more likely to attribute a no-redistribution vote to selfishness if they considered redistribution as being fair. I define this—attributing actions that do not adhere to one’s own fairness view to selfishness—as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how susp…
What limits the efficacy of coercion
We model a game between an authority, seeking to implement its state identity, and a parental generation, seeking to socialize a younger generation into their own identity. The authority first selects a coercion level against the non-state identity. The parental generation then chooses whether to insurrect in response to the coercion level and, if not, decides how much to invest in socializing their children into the non-state identity. In this o…
Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation
Is people’s willingness to implement their fairness views on a group dependent on how many in the group share their view? We designed a new experiment to answer this question. Spectator participants were asked how many other participants they believe share their view of whether it is fair to redistribute income in a work task. They were then given the option to pay two cents to implement the distribution they found fair upon a pair of participant…
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What limits the efficacy of coercion
We model a game between an authority, seeking to implement its state identity, and a parental generation, seeking to socialize a younger generation into their own identity. The authority first selects a coercion level against the non-state identity. The parental generation then chooses whether to insurrect in response to the coercion level and, if not, decides how much to invest in socializing their children into the non-state identity. In this o…
Rejecting Non-Paternalist Motivation
Is people’s willingness to implement their fairness views on a group dependent on how many in the group share their view? We designed a new experiment to answer this question. Spectator participants were asked how many other participants they believe share their view of whether it is fair to redistribute income in a work task. They were then given the option to pay two cents to implement the distribution they found fair upon a pair of participant…
Suspicious minds and views of fairness
Do people with different views of what is fair attribute different intentions to actions? In a novel experimental design, participants were significantly more likely to attribute a no-redistribution vote to selfishness if they considered redistribution as being fair. I define this—attributing actions that do not adhere to one’s own fairness view to selfishness—as suspicious attribution. I develop a theory of intention attribution to show how susp…
The inefficiency of moderate political coercion
Political coercion directed against non-state moralities can serve as a tool for generating legitimacy. Does the efficacy of political coercion in producing legitimacy vary with its intensity? Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity5 indices as proxies for coercive intensity, together with data on regime legitimacy and survival, we find that a mid-level range of coercion is ineffective in generating legitimacy. Relatively few regimes operate in th…
Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Legitimacy (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Affect (linguistics (1 work)