Guilhem Lecouteux
Biographic Data
| ID | 6890693 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Guilhem Lecouteux |
| GIVEN NAMES | Guilhem |
| FAMILY NAME | Lecouteux |
| SIGNATURE | LECOUTEUX G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Université Côte d'Azur |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6602-7247 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Inferring welfare from inconsistent choices
There is no consensus on how to infer welfare from inconsistent choices. We argue that theorists must be explicit about the values they endorse to characterize individual welfare. After formalizing a set of values and their relationship with context-independent choices, we review the literature and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of each approach. We demonstrate that defining welfare a priori may violate normative individualism, arguably the…
The view from Manywhere
We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of self-determination , according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension of Sugden’s opportunity criterion and an applica…
Stefan Heidl, Philosophical Problems of Behavioural Economics
In his 2016 Presidential address at the American Economic Association, Richard Thaler predicted “that behavioral economics will eventually disappear” (Thaler, 2016, 1578). Thaler indeed argues that “it is time to fully embrace what [he] would call evidence-based economics” (ibid., 1597, emphasis in original): in this perspective, all economics will become behavioural, and “we will have an approach to economics that yields a higher R2” (ibid.). Be…
Preference purification and the inner rational agent
Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would h…
From Homo Economicus to Homo Psychologicus
Behavioural paternalism aims at designing public policies helping boundedly rational individuals to satisfy their own preferences. It is assumed that (i) individuals have true preferences which would determine their choices if they were rational, (ii) the satisfaction of those preferences constitutes the normative criterion, and (iii) it is possible to elicit those preferences from the social planner standpoint. I argue that behavioural paternali…
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Preference purification and the inner rational agent
Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would h…
From Homo Economicus to Homo Psychologicus
Behavioural paternalism aims at designing public policies helping boundedly rational individuals to satisfy their own preferences. It is assumed that (i) individuals have true preferences which would determine their choices if they were rational, (ii) the satisfaction of those preferences constitutes the normative criterion, and (iii) it is possible to elicit those preferences from the social planner standpoint. I argue that behavioural paternali…
Stefan Heidl, Philosophical Problems of Behavioural Economics
In his 2016 Presidential address at the American Economic Association, Richard Thaler predicted “that behavioral economics will eventually disappear” (Thaler, 2016, 1578). Thaler indeed argues that “it is time to fully embrace what [he] would call evidence-based economics” (ibid., 1597, emphasis in original): in this perspective, all economics will become behavioural, and “we will have an approach to economics that yields a higher R2” (ibid.). Be…
The view from Manywhere
We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of self-determination , according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension of Sugden’s opportunity criterion and an applica…
Inferring welfare from inconsistent choices
There is no consensus on how to infer welfare from inconsistent choices. We argue that theorists must be explicit about the values they endorse to characterize individual welfare. After formalizing a set of values and their relationship with context-independent choices, we review the literature and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of each approach. We demonstrate that defining welfare a priori may violate normative individualism, arguably the…
Economics (5 works) · Positive economics (5 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (4 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (4 works) · Sociology (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Normative (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Econometrics (2 works)