Gerard Brun
Biographic Data
| ID | 689149 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gerard Brun |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gerard |
| FAMILY NAME | Brun |
| SIGNATURE | BRUN G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Bern |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-9884-0566 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 36 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 17 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1989 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Explication as a basis for conceptual pluralism
It is generally recognized that there is no such thing as the correct explication of a given concept, but only one or more adequate explications. This paper addresses two questions: In what ways can there be more than one solution to a task of explication? And in what sense and under what conditions can diverse solutions give rise to conceptual pluralism? Based on an analysis of the general structure of explications, I first develop a systematic …
Reflective equilibrium
Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features R…
Introduction to the topical Collection
Empirical Studies on Truth and the Project of Re‐engineering Truth
Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need a more accurate picture of how the term ‘true’ is in fact used. Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical dom…
Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy . Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answe…
Making Reflective Equlibrium Precise
Reflective equilibrium (RE) is often regarded as a powerful method in ethics, logic, and even philosophy in general. Despite this popularity, characterizations of the method have been fairly vague and unspecific so far. It thus may be doubted whether RE is more than a jumble of appealing but ultimately sketchy ideas that cannot be spelled out consistently. In this paper, we dispel such doubts by devising a formal model of RE. The model contains a…
Reflective equilibrium and understanding
Conceptual re-engineering
Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences
Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering
Decision strategies for policy decisions under uncertainties
Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision
Identities of Artefacts
In non‐philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numerical identity, q…
Five Ways of (not) Defining Exemplification
The notion of exemplification is essential for Goodman's theory of symbols. But Goodman's account of exemplification has been criticized as unclear and inadequate. He points out two conditions for an object x exemplifying a label y: (C1) y denotes x and (C2) x refers to y. While (C1) is uncontroversial, (C2) raises the question of how "refers to" should be interpreted. This problem is intertwined with three further questions that consequently sho…
Applaudie et contestée
Preview this article: Applaudie et contestée, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/itl.137-138.05dew-1.gif
Louis Vallon ou la politique en liberte de Jaures a de Gaulle
Reflective equilibrium and understanding
Conceptual re-engineering
Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy . Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answe…
Decision strategies for policy decisions under uncertainties
Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features R…
Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences
Louis Vallon ou la politique en liberte de Jaures a de Gaulle
Applaudie et contestée
Preview this article: Applaudie et contestée, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/itl.137-138.05dew-1.gif
Five Ways of (not) Defining Exemplification
The notion of exemplification is essential for Goodman's theory of symbols. But Goodman's account of exemplification has been criticized as unclear and inadequate. He points out two conditions for an object x exemplifying a label y: (C1) y denotes x and (C2) x refers to y. While (C1) is uncontroversial, (C2) raises the question of how "refers to" should be interpreted. This problem is intertwined with three further questions that consequently sho…
Identities of Artefacts
In non‐philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numerical identity, q…
Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision
Decision strategies for policy decisions under uncertainties
Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering
Logical expressivism, logical theory and the critique of inferences
Conceptual re-engineering
Making Reflective Equlibrium Precise
Reflective equilibrium (RE) is often regarded as a powerful method in ethics, logic, and even philosophy in general. Despite this popularity, characterizations of the method have been fairly vague and unspecific so far. It thus may be doubted whether RE is more than a jumble of appealing but ultimately sketchy ideas that cannot be spelled out consistently. In this paper, we dispel such doubts by devising a formal model of RE. The model contains a…
Reflective equilibrium and understanding
Empirical Studies on Truth and the Project of Re‐engineering Truth
Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need a more accurate picture of how the term ‘true’ is in fact used. Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical dom…
Re-engineering contested concepts. A reflective-equilibrium approach
Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy . Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answe…
Introduction to the topical Collection
Is there a defensible conception of reflective equilibrium
The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features R…
Reflective equilibrium
Explication as a basis for conceptual pluralism
It is generally recognized that there is no such thing as the correct explication of a given concept, but only one or more adequate explications. This paper addresses two questions: In what ways can there be more than one solution to a task of explication? And in what sense and under what conditions can diverse solutions give rise to conceptual pluralism? Based on an analysis of the general structure of explications, I first develop a systematic …
Philosophy (14 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Computer Science (9 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy of language (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Explication (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Economics (5 works)