Emmanuelle Auriol
Biographic Data
| ID | 706702 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Emmanuelle Auriol |
| GIVEN NAMES | Emmanuelle |
| FAMILY NAME | Auriol |
| SIGNATURE | AURIOL E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Toulouse School of Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2261-8736 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Corporate criminals in a market context: Enforcement and optimal sanctions
By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and of industrial organization, this paper analyzes optimal enforcement for three different forms of corporate misconduct that harm competition. The analysis shows why corporate crime is more harmful in large markets, why governments have a disinclination to sanction firms whose crime materializes abroad, and why leniency for those who self-report their crime is a complement, and not a sub…
The Quran and the Sword
This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loya…
Intellectual property rights protection and trade: An empirical analysis
Betting on the lord: Lotteries and religiosity in Haiti
God Insures those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana
This article provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church co…
Cannabis: Comment reprendre le contrôle
En depit de poltiques repressives mises en place, les Francais et en particulier les mineurs restent parmi les plus gros consommateurs de cannabis en Europe. Les auteurs explorent les reformes a entreprendre pour reprendre le controle de ce marche. En s’appuyant sur l’analyse economique et l’etude des experiences etrangeres recentes, ils defendent l’idee selon laquelle la legalisation du cannabis recreatif, strictement encadree, permet a la fois …
Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis
In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their resources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive predictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms run by entrepreneurs of African versus non‐African origin. …
La responsabilité à l'épreuve de la division mondiale du travail: Les Apports De l'Économie Comportementale
Pour les économistes, ce sont les institutions, les règles de droit et les contrats qui doivent inciter, voire contraindre, les individus à se comporter de manière responsable. Ils étudient les marchés et leur fonctionnement dans le but de trouver les règles qui permettent de se prémunir des comportements opportunistes et déviants. Que l'on considère les apports des néo-classiques ou ceux, plus récents, de l'économie comportementale, la responsab…
Nonprofits in the Field: An Economic Analysis of Peer Monitoring and Sabotage
Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: good workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas bad workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. Compared to the case with only good workers, the mission‐oriented sector has to resort to higher monitoring to deal with the threat of sabotage. When standard monitoring is not possible, peer monitoring might deter bad workers from entering the nonprofit sector but redu…
Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses
Cet article étudie l’impact des caractéristiques institutionnelles de la régulation nationale et internationale sur l’efficacité des deux types de régulation. Il s’intéresse à quatre dimensions de faiblesse institutionnelle : la capacité pratique de réguler, la capacité à rendre des comptes, la capacité d’engagement et la capacité fiscale. En identifiant les coûts et les bénéfices générés par une régulation supranationale, l’analyse montre que ce…
Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history
Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would‐be migrants. A visa‐selling policy may be successful in eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits, but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade‐off we show that legalization through selling visas…
Quality signaling through certification in developing countries
On the optimal number of representatives
The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However government can contract ex post with the privat…
Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa
On Robust Constitution Design
Concurrence par comparaison: Un point de vue normatif
Concurrence par comparaison. Un point de vue normatif
[eng] Yardstick competition: a normative approach This paper proposes a normative analysis of yardstick competition that take into account the heterogeneity of the firms. When there are several local monopolies, like in water distribution, education or health, it is possible to implement yardstick competition among them even if they do not face identical cost function. The regulator is able to improve her knowledge of the firms' cost by centraliz…
Deregulation and quality
Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage
Dans cet article, on étudie l'arbitrage qui existe entre les économies d'échelle associées à un monopole et le gain réalisé sur le coût variable d'acquisition quand on dispose au contraire d'un échantillon plus important : l'effet d'échantillonnage. On étudie la structure de marché optimale (monopole ou duopole) issue de cet arbitrage quand les paramètres de coût des entreprises sont indépendants mais différemment distribués. On montre que ce n'e…
The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa
Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa
Quality signaling through certification in developing countries
On the optimal number of representatives
Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However government can contract ex post with the privat…
Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis
In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their resources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive predictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms run by entrepreneurs of African versus non‐African origin. …
Nonprofits in the Field: An Economic Analysis of Peer Monitoring and Sabotage
Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: good workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas bad workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. Compared to the case with only good workers, the mission‐oriented sector has to resort to higher monitoring to deal with the threat of sabotage. When standard monitoring is not possible, peer monitoring might deter bad workers from entering the nonprofit sector but redu…
Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would‐be migrants. A visa‐selling policy may be successful in eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits, but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade‐off we show that legalization through selling visas…
Intellectual property rights protection and trade: An empirical analysis
La responsabilité à l'épreuve de la division mondiale du travail: Les Apports De l'Économie Comportementale
Pour les économistes, ce sont les institutions, les règles de droit et les contrats qui doivent inciter, voire contraindre, les individus à se comporter de manière responsable. Ils étudient les marchés et leur fonctionnement dans le but de trouver les règles qui permettent de se prémunir des comportements opportunistes et déviants. Que l'on considère les apports des néo-classiques ou ceux, plus récents, de l'économie comportementale, la responsab…
Concurrence par comparaison. Un point de vue normatif
[eng] Yardstick competition: a normative approach This paper proposes a normative analysis of yardstick competition that take into account the heterogeneity of the firms. When there are several local monopolies, like in water distribution, education or health, it is possible to implement yardstick competition among them even if they do not face identical cost function. The regulator is able to improve her knowledge of the firms' cost by centraliz…
Une note sur l'effet d'échantillonnage
Dans cet article, on étudie l'arbitrage qui existe entre les économies d'échelle associées à un monopole et le gain réalisé sur le coût variable d'acquisition quand on dispose au contraire d'un échantillon plus important : l'effet d'échantillonnage. On étudie la structure de marché optimale (monopole ou duopole) issue de cet arbitrage quand les paramètres de coût des entreprises sont indépendants mais différemment distribués. On montre que ce n'e…
Deregulation and quality
Concurrence par comparaison: Un point de vue normatif
Concurrence par comparaison. Un point de vue normatif
[eng] Yardstick competition: a normative approach This paper proposes a normative analysis of yardstick competition that take into account the heterogeneity of the firms. When there are several local monopolies, like in water distribution, education or health, it is possible to implement yardstick competition among them even if they do not face identical cost function. The regulator is able to improve her knowledge of the firms' cost by centraliz…
On Robust Constitution Design
Capture and corruption in public utilities: The cases of water and electricity in Sub-Saharan Africa
Government Outsourcing: Public Contracting with Private Monopoly
The article studies the impact of the government budget constraint on the regulation of natural monopolies in adverse selection contexts. The government maximises total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds à la Laffont and Tirole (1993). Government outsourcing is proposed as an alternative to regulation in which firms freely enter the market and choose their prices and output levels. However government can contract ex post with the privat…
The marginal cost of public funds and tax reform in Africa
On the optimal number of representatives
Quality signaling through certification in developing countries
Religious co-option in autocracy: A theory inspired by history
Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling services and the demand from would‐be migrants. A visa‐selling policy may be successful in eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits, but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade‐off we show that legalization through selling visas…
Nonprofits in the Field: An Economic Analysis of Peer Monitoring and Sabotage
Two types of intrinsically motivated workers are considered: good workers care about the mission of an organization, whereas bad workers derive pleasure from destructive behavior. Compared to the case with only good workers, the mission‐oriented sector has to resort to higher monitoring to deal with the threat of sabotage. When standard monitoring is not possible, peer monitoring might deter bad workers from entering the nonprofit sector but redu…
Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses
Cet article étudie l’impact des caractéristiques institutionnelles de la régulation nationale et internationale sur l’efficacité des deux types de régulation. Il s’intéresse à quatre dimensions de faiblesse institutionnelle : la capacité pratique de réguler, la capacité à rendre des comptes, la capacité d’engagement et la capacité fiscale. En identifiant les coûts et les bénéfices générés par une régulation supranationale, l’analyse montre que ce…
La responsabilité à l'épreuve de la division mondiale du travail: Les Apports De l'Économie Comportementale
Pour les économistes, ce sont les institutions, les règles de droit et les contrats qui doivent inciter, voire contraindre, les individus à se comporter de manière responsable. Ils étudient les marchés et leur fonctionnement dans le but de trouver les règles qui permettent de se prémunir des comportements opportunistes et déviants. Que l'on considère les apports des néo-classiques ou ceux, plus récents, de l'économie comportementale, la responsab…
God Insures those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana
This article provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church co…
Cannabis: Comment reprendre le contrôle
En depit de poltiques repressives mises en place, les Francais et en particulier les mineurs restent parmi les plus gros consommateurs de cannabis en Europe. Les auteurs explorent les reformes a entreprendre pour reprendre le controle de ce marche. En s’appuyant sur l’analyse economique et l’etude des experiences etrangeres recentes, ils defendent l’idee selon laquelle la legalisation du cannabis recreatif, strictement encadree, permet a la fois …
Does Social Pressure Hinder Entrepreneurship in Africa? The Forced Mutual Help Hypothesis
In the absence of a public safety net, wealthy Africans have the social obligation to share their resources with their needy relatives in the form of cash transfers and inefficient family hiring. We develop a model of entrepreneurial choice that accounts for this social redistributive constraint. We derive predictions regarding employment choices, productivity, and profitability of firms run by entrepreneurs of African versus non‐African origin. …
Betting on the lord: Lotteries and religiosity in Haiti
Intellectual property rights protection and trade: An empirical analysis
Corporate criminals in a market context: Enforcement and optimal sanctions
By combining approaches from the economic theory of crime and of industrial organization, this paper analyzes optimal enforcement for three different forms of corporate misconduct that harm competition. The analysis shows why corporate crime is more harmful in large markets, why governments have a disinclination to sanction firms whose crime materializes abroad, and why leniency for those who self-report their crime is a complement, and not a sub…
The Quran and the Sword
This paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loya…
Economics (16 works) · Political science (14 works) · Business (10 works) · Microeconomics (10 works) · Law (7 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (6 works) · Market economy (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Economic growth (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works)