Edward Peter Stringham
Biographic Data
| ID | 707207 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Edward Peter Stringham |
| GIVEN NAMES | Edward Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Stringham |
| SIGNATURE | STRINGHAM E P |
| AFFILIATIONS | American Institute for Economic Research |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3795-7186 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 47 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Banking regulation got you down? The rise of fintech and cryptointermediation in Africa
Anarchy And the Law
Anarchy and the Law assembles for the first time in one volume the most important classic and contemporary studies exploring and debating non-state legal and political systems, especially involving the tradition of natural law and private contracts. Should markets and contracts provide law, and can the rule of law itself be understood as a private institution? Are the state and its police powers benign societal forces, or are they a system of con…
On the Origins of Stock Markets
Where did stock markets come from? Stock exchanges and the rules and regulations that make stock markets possible were not invented by government but instead emerged from the market. From the world’s first major stock market in seventeenth-century Amsterdam to the world’s second and third major stock markets in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in London and New York, the markets developed over a long period when government officials did no…
Private Governance
From the world’s first stock markets in the seventeenth century, to private policing in the early days of San Francisco, to the millions of credit card transactions and the complex financial markets governed by private rules today, this book makes the case that private rules and regulations are more common, effective, and promising than most of us believe. Analytical narratives weave together history and economics to show readers how private gove…
It’s not me, it’s you
Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order
Beyond Kelly Green Golf Shoes
We evaluate statistics from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) to see how much free-market economists are being read and ranked compared with mainstream economists. We find that under various rankings using SSRN data, the top free-market economists rank among the most-read authors in the economics profession
Rivalry and superior dispatch
Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy
Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law
FREY [2001] and others propose subjecting governments to competition within their jurisdiction, but classical liberals argue that having competing law enforcers cannot work. This article describes a hybrid system that relies on markets but has one law enforcement agency per region, with profit motivated proprietors policing their properties. Vertically integrated proprietary communities wishing to attract customers would need to police their prop…
The failings of legal centralism for helping stock markets in transition
After Czech voucher privatization many companies simply ignored the interests of their shareholders. The government has since increased the amount of regulation, but they have failed to establish significant investor confidence. This article offers some explanations of why their legal centric approach remains unlikely to create good corporate governance. Mandating that companies maximize shareholder value is easier said than done because it requi…
Evaluating Economic Justifications for Alcohol Restrictions
Does economics justify restricting alcohol consumption? A new line of research concludes that alcohol involves significant social costs and that various restrictions would lead to net social gains. This article focuses on Levy and Miller (1995), who conduct a cost-benefit analysis of serving-intoxicated-patron laws. We administer a survey of taverns in Washtenaw County, Michigan, to investigate the plausibility of some of Levy and Miller's claims…
Anarchy, State and Public Choice
1. Introduction 2. Individual Welfare in Anarchy 3. Jungle or Just Bush? Anarchy and the Evolution of Cooperation 4. The Edge of the Jungle 5. Social Interaction without the State 6. Towards a Theory of the Evolution of Government 7. Do Contracts Require Formal Enforcement? 8. Before Public Choice 9. Public Choice and Leviathan 10. Cases in Anarchy 11. Defining Anarchy as Rock-n-Roll: Rethinking Hogarty's Three Cases 12. Private Property Anarchis…
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Incentives vs. knowledge
In the 1920s, Ludwig von Mises argued correctly that the problem of making economics calculations without market-generated prices would be an insuperable difficulty for systems of production. Bryan Caplan is right to argue that there is no theoretical way to infer the magnitude of this difficulty, but he is wrong to insist that the history of poor economic performance displayed by real-world socialism should be attributed not to the socialist cal…
Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Rivalry and superior dispatch
Incentives vs. knowledge
In the 1920s, Ludwig von Mises argued correctly that the problem of making economics calculations without market-generated prices would be an insuperable difficulty for systems of production. Bryan Caplan is right to argue that there is no theoretical way to infer the magnitude of this difficulty, but he is wrong to insist that the history of poor economic performance displayed by real-world socialism should be attributed not to the socialist cal…
Banking regulation got you down? The rise of fintech and cryptointermediation in Africa
It’s not me, it’s you
Beyond Kelly Green Golf Shoes
We evaluate statistics from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) to see how much free-market economists are being read and ranked compared with mainstream economists. We find that under various rankings using SSRN data, the top free-market economists rank among the most-read authors in the economics profession
Anarchy, State and Public Choice
1. Introduction 2. Individual Welfare in Anarchy 3. Jungle or Just Bush? Anarchy and the Evolution of Cooperation 4. The Edge of the Jungle 5. Social Interaction without the State 6. Towards a Theory of the Evolution of Government 7. Do Contracts Require Formal Enforcement? 8. Before Public Choice 9. Public Choice and Leviathan 10. Cases in Anarchy 11. Defining Anarchy as Rock-n-Roll: Rethinking Hogarty's Three Cases 12. Private Property Anarchis…
Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice
The political economy of Ludwig von Mises and Frederic Bastiat has been largely ignored even by their admirers. We argue that Mises' and Bastiat's views in this area were both original and insightful. While traditional public choice generally maintains that democracy fails because voters' views are rational but ignored, the Mises-Bastiat view is that democracy fails because voters' views are irrational but heeded. Mises and Bastiat anticipate man…
Incentives vs. knowledge
In the 1920s, Ludwig von Mises argued correctly that the problem of making economics calculations without market-generated prices would be an insuperable difficulty for systems of production. Bryan Caplan is right to argue that there is no theoretical way to infer the magnitude of this difficulty, but he is wrong to insist that the history of poor economic performance displayed by real-world socialism should be attributed not to the socialist cal…
Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law
FREY [2001] and others propose subjecting governments to competition within their jurisdiction, but classical liberals argue that having competing law enforcers cannot work. This article describes a hybrid system that relies on markets but has one law enforcement agency per region, with profit motivated proprietors policing their properties. Vertically integrated proprietary communities wishing to attract customers would need to police their prop…
The failings of legal centralism for helping stock markets in transition
After Czech voucher privatization many companies simply ignored the interests of their shareholders. The government has since increased the amount of regulation, but they have failed to establish significant investor confidence. This article offers some explanations of why their legal centric approach remains unlikely to create good corporate governance. Mandating that companies maximize shareholder value is easier said than done because it requi…
Evaluating Economic Justifications for Alcohol Restrictions
Does economics justify restricting alcohol consumption? A new line of research concludes that alcohol involves significant social costs and that various restrictions would lead to net social gains. This article focuses on Levy and Miller (1995), who conduct a cost-benefit analysis of serving-intoxicated-patron laws. We administer a survey of taverns in Washtenaw County, Michigan, to investigate the plausibility of some of Levy and Miller's claims…
Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy
Rivalry and superior dispatch
Beyond Kelly Green Golf Shoes
We evaluate statistics from the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) to see how much free-market economists are being read and ranked compared with mainstream economists. We find that under various rankings using SSRN data, the top free-market economists rank among the most-read authors in the economics profession
Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order
It’s not me, it’s you
On the Origins of Stock Markets
Where did stock markets come from? Stock exchanges and the rules and regulations that make stock markets possible were not invented by government but instead emerged from the market. From the world’s first major stock market in seventeenth-century Amsterdam to the world’s second and third major stock markets in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in London and New York, the markets developed over a long period when government officials did no…
Private Governance
From the world’s first stock markets in the seventeenth century, to private policing in the early days of San Francisco, to the millions of credit card transactions and the complex financial markets governed by private rules today, this book makes the case that private rules and regulations are more common, effective, and promising than most of us believe. Analytical narratives weave together history and economics to show readers how private gove…
Anarchy And the Law
Anarchy and the Law assembles for the first time in one volume the most important classic and contemporary studies exploring and debating non-state legal and political systems, especially involving the tradition of natural law and private contracts. Should markets and contracts provide law, and can the rule of law itself be understood as a private institution? Are the state and its police powers benign societal forces, or are they a system of con…
Banking regulation got you down? The rise of fintech and cryptointermediation in Africa
Economics (14 works) · Political science (12 works) · Law (11 works) · Law and economics (8 works) · Business (7 works) · Market economy (7 works) · Finance (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (5 works) · Incentive (5 works)