Roland Kirstein
Biographic Data
| ID | 707654 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roland Kirstein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roland |
| FAMILY NAME | Kirstein |
| SIGNATURE | KIRSTEIN R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Saarland University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1375-5862 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
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More Rights, Less Income?
We investigate the conflict between authors and their publishers that may result from a copyright system that allows authors to transfer copyrights to an additional publisher. A two-period bargaining model analyzes effects of competition, time preferences, and bargaining power on license prices, publisher investments, and authors' lifetime incomes. We demonstrate that authors benefit from the new copyright system if new publishers continue the di…
Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates May Cartelize Product Markets
Labor law limits the freedom of individual firms and agents to deviate from the clauses prescribed by collective wage agreements. We show that employers' associations and unions may exploit this legal framework to stabilize product market cartels. This new view on the institution of collective wage agreements provides an interesting insight for strategic management: A self-commitment on the labor market may greatly improve the product market situ…
The Violent and the Weak
This article explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups: one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or to exploit the weaker group. The opportunity for exploitation is limited: it reduces the incentives of the exploited to produce private goods and increases t…
Third Party Contingency« Contracts in Settlement and Litigation
We present a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. They combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these »Third Party Contingency« (TPC) contracts. A TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only o…
Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods
The Violent and the Weak
This article explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups: one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or to exploit the weaker group. The opportunity for exploitation is limited: it reduces the incentives of the exploited to produce private goods and increases t…
Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods
Third Party Contingency« Contracts in Settlement and Litigation
We present a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. They combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these »Third Party Contingency« (TPC) contracts. A TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only o…
The Violent and the Weak
This article explores conditions under which dictators comply with a social contract. We assume society to consist of two groups: one with a comparative advantage in using violence, the other with a comparative advantage in producing private goods. Violence can be used to produce security or to exploit the weaker group. The opportunity for exploitation is limited: it reduces the incentives of the exploited to produce private goods and increases t…
Collective Wage Agreements on Fixed Wages and Piece Rates May Cartelize Product Markets
Labor law limits the freedom of individual firms and agents to deviate from the clauses prescribed by collective wage agreements. We show that employers' associations and unions may exploit this legal framework to stabilize product market cartels. This new view on the institution of collective wage agreements provides an interesting insight for strategic management: A self-commitment on the labor market may greatly improve the product market situ…
More Rights, Less Income?
We investigate the conflict between authors and their publishers that may result from a copyright system that allows authors to transfer copyrights to an additional publisher. A two-period bargaining model analyzes effects of competition, time preferences, and bargaining power on license prices, publisher investments, and authors' lifetime incomes. We demonstrate that authors benefit from the new copyright system if new publishers continue the di…
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Economics (6 works) · Business (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Finance (2 works) · Government (linguistics) (2 works)