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M R X Dentith

Biographic Data

ID707774
NAMEM R X Dentith
GIVEN NAMESM R X
FAMILY NAMEDentith
SIGNATUREDENTITH M R X
AFFILIATIONSBeijing Normal University
ORCID0000-0003-3692-5980
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS13
TOTAL CITATIONS14
AUTHOR COUNT13
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2014
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX3
  • Some Problems with Generalist Projects in Conspiracy Theory Theory

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Review of Philosophy and Psychology•2026

  • Two Problems with Ordinary Language Generalism

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2026

    Some philosophers claim that, in ordinary language, when non-philosophers refer to ‘conspiracy theories’ such people take it that conspiracy theories are—in some sense— mad, bad, or dangerous . These philosophers then argue that academics interested in studying conspiracy theories should keep their operating definition close to that notion. I will challenge this by first arguing that whatever the ordinary language conception of ‘conspiracy theory…

  • Particularism Reaffirmed: Why Conspiracy Theories (Variously Defined) Should Be Judged on Their Own Merits

    Kåre Hagen, M R X Dentith et al.•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2025

    In the philosophical debate over the epistemic status of conspiracy theories, the view that each theory ought to be judged on its own merits, ‘particularism’, has the upper hand. But challenges to this view continue to be put forth; this paper summarizes that debate and reaffirms the particularist perspective. In this paper, we address how different conceptions of what counts as a ‘conspiracy theory’ impact how one might evaluate particularism, w…

  • A prolegomena to investigating conspiracy theories

    M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2025

    Central to the particularist project, one that has become the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, is the claim that a general dismissal of these things called `conspiracy theories' is unsustainable. That is, if we want to say a conspiracy theory is suspicious such that we should not believe it, then we have to engage in at least some investigation of it. Particularists have detailed just why a general attitude of skepticism t…

  • Investigating conspiracy theories – introduction to the special issue

    M R X Dentith, J C M Duetz et al.•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2025

    This introduction to this special issue of Inquiry looks at recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory. Looking at two related worries expressed in the wider conspiracy theory theory (the academic study of conspiracy theories) – the Problem of Conspiracy Theories and the Problem of Conspiracy Theorists – this special issue argues that recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theories is getting all the more closer to not just an…

  • Does the Phrase "Conspiracy Theory" Matter

    Open Access•M R X Dentith, Ginna Husting et al.•ARTICLE•Society•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695-705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase "conspiracy theory" has no negat…

  • The Future of the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Conspiracy Theory Theory

    M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2023

    Looking at the early work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, I put in context the papers in this special issue on new work on conspiracy theory theory (itself the product of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory held in February 2022), showing how this new generation of work not only grew out of, but is itself a novel extension of the first generation of philosophical interest in these things called ‘…

  • Some Conspiracy Theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2023

    A remarkable feature of the philosophical work on conspiracy theory theory has been that most philosophers agree there is nothing inherently problematic about conspiracy theories (AKA the thesis of particularism). Recent work, however, has challenged this consensus view, arguing that there really is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising (AKA generalism). Are particularism and generalism incompatible? By looking at just how much…

  • The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories: Concepts, Methods and Theory

    M R X Dentith•BOOK•The Philosophy of Conspiracy…•2023

  • Suspicious conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 3•References: 26

    Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work (such as Cassam Quassim, Keith Harris, and M. Guilia Napolitano), yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers (myself included) like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue…

  • Debunking conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 16

  • The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith, M Dentith•BOOK•Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories•2014

    "Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon when it comes to academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories asks whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philoso…

  • Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 16

  • Suspicious conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 3•References: 26

    Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work (such as Cassam Quassim, Keith Harris, and M. Guilia Napolitano), yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers (myself included) like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue…

  • Debunking conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Does the Phrase "Conspiracy Theory" Matter

    Open Access•M R X Dentith, Ginna Husting et al.•ARTICLE•Society•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695-705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase "conspiracy theory" has no negat…

  • The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith, M Dentith•BOOK•Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories•2014

    "Conspiracy theories are a popular topic of conversation in everyday life but are often frowned upon when it comes to academic discussions. Looking at the recent spate of philosophical interest in conspiracy theories, The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories asks whether the assumption that belief in conspiracy theories is typically irrational is well founded. The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories is aimed at both the philosopher and the non-philoso…

  • Conspiracy theories on the basis of the evidence

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2019•Cited by: 7•References: 16

  • Debunking conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2021•Cited by: 3•References: 26

  • Suspicious conspiracy theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Synthese•2022•Cited by: 3•References: 26

    Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work (such as Cassam Quassim, Keith Harris, and M. Guilia Napolitano), yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers (myself included) like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue…

  • The Future of the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory: An Introduction to the Special Issue on Conspiracy Theory Theory

    M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2023

    Looking at the early work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, I put in context the papers in this special issue on new work on conspiracy theory theory (itself the product of the 1st International Conference on the Philosophy of Conspiracy Theory held in February 2022), showing how this new generation of work not only grew out of, but is itself a novel extension of the first generation of philosophical interest in these things called ‘…

  • Some Conspiracy Theories

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2023

    A remarkable feature of the philosophical work on conspiracy theory theory has been that most philosophers agree there is nothing inherently problematic about conspiracy theories (AKA the thesis of particularism). Recent work, however, has challenged this consensus view, arguing that there really is something epistemically wrong with conspiracy theorising (AKA generalism). Are particularism and generalism incompatible? By looking at just how much…

  • The Philosophy of Conspiracy Theories: Concepts, Methods and Theory

    M R X Dentith•BOOK•The Philosophy of Conspiracy…•2023

  • Does the Phrase "Conspiracy Theory" Matter

    Open Access•M R X Dentith, Ginna Husting et al.•ARTICLE•Society•2024•Cited by: 1•References: 23

    Research on conspiracy theories has proliferated since 2016, in part due to the US election of President Trump, the COVID-19 pandemic, and increasingly threatening environmental conditions. In the rush to publication given these concerning social consequences, researchers have increasingly treated as definitive a 2016 paper by Michael Wood (Political Psychology, 37(5), 695-705, 2016) that concludes that the phrase "conspiracy theory" has no negat…

  • Particularism Reaffirmed: Why Conspiracy Theories (Variously Defined) Should Be Judged on Their Own Merits

    Kåre Hagen, M R X Dentith et al.•ARTICLE•Social Epistemology•2025

    In the philosophical debate over the epistemic status of conspiracy theories, the view that each theory ought to be judged on its own merits, ‘particularism’, has the upper hand. But challenges to this view continue to be put forth; this paper summarizes that debate and reaffirms the particularist perspective. In this paper, we address how different conceptions of what counts as a ‘conspiracy theory’ impact how one might evaluate particularism, w…

  • A prolegomena to investigating conspiracy theories

    M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2025

    Central to the particularist project, one that has become the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, is the claim that a general dismissal of these things called `conspiracy theories' is unsustainable. That is, if we want to say a conspiracy theory is suspicious such that we should not believe it, then we have to engage in at least some investigation of it. Particularists have detailed just why a general attitude of skepticism t…

  • Investigating conspiracy theories – introduction to the special issue

    M R X Dentith, J C M Duetz et al.•ARTICLE•Inquiry•2025

    This introduction to this special issue of Inquiry looks at recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory. Looking at two related worries expressed in the wider conspiracy theory theory (the academic study of conspiracy theories) – the Problem of Conspiracy Theories and the Problem of Conspiracy Theorists – this special issue argues that recent work in the philosophy of conspiracy theories is getting all the more closer to not just an…

  • Some Problems with Generalist Projects in Conspiracy Theory Theory

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Review of Philosophy and Psychology•2026

  • Two Problems with Ordinary Language Generalism

    Open Access•M R X Dentith•ARTICLE•Erkenntnis•2026

    Some philosophers claim that, in ordinary language, when non-philosophers refer to ‘conspiracy theories’ such people take it that conspiracy theories are—in some sense— mad, bad, or dangerous . These philosophers then argue that academics interested in studying conspiracy theories should keep their operating definition close to that notion. I will challenge this by first arguing that whatever the ordinary language conception of ‘conspiracy theory…

Misinformation and Its Impacts (13 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Political science (4 works)

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