Dario Cecchini
Biographic Data
| ID | 7102258 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dario Cecchini |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dario |
| FAMILY NAME | Cecchini |
| SIGNATURE | CECCHINI D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Genoa |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0943-5898 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Why Moral Intuitions are Not Emotions
In this paper we argue that moral intuitions, understood as non-doxastic mental states, should not be reduced to emotions. We reject the moral-intuition-as-emotion view by arguing that having an emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a moral intuition. In particular, we deny the necessity claim by stressing the existence of dispassionate moral intuitions, which lack emotional phenomenology, and by claiming that some moral intuitions …
Moral judgment in realistic traffic scenarios
The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of making moral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with human moral judgment. For this purpose, studies like the Moral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an ina…
Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition
Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main fe…
Dual-process reflective equilibrium
Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgeme…
Experiencing the Conflict
No prominent works on this page.
Dual-process reflective equilibrium
Dual-process theories of the mind emphasize how reasoning is an interplay between intuitive and reflective thinking. This paper aims to understand how the two types of processing interact in the moral domain. According to a ‘default-interventionist’ model of moral reasoning intuition and reflection are conflicting cognitions: intuitive thinking would elicit heuristic and deontological responses, whereas reflection would favour utilitarian judgeme…
Experiencing the Conflict
Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition
Moral intuitions are generally understood as automatic strong responses to moral facts. In this paper, I offer a metacognitive account according to which the strength of moral intuitions denotes the level of confidence of a subject. Confidence is a metacognitive appraisal of the fluency with which a subject processes information from a morally salient stimulus. I show that this account is supported by some empirical evidence, explains the main fe…
Why Moral Intuitions are Not Emotions
In this paper we argue that moral intuitions, understood as non-doxastic mental states, should not be reduced to emotions. We reject the moral-intuition-as-emotion view by arguing that having an emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a moral intuition. In particular, we deny the necessity claim by stressing the existence of dispassionate moral intuitions, which lack emotional phenomenology, and by claiming that some moral intuitions …
Moral judgment in realistic traffic scenarios
The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of making moral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with human moral judgment. For this purpose, studies like the Moral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an ina…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Ethics in Business and Education (2 works)