Jörg Guido Hülsmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 711872 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jörg Guido Hülsmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jörg Guido |
| FAMILY NAME | Hülsmann |
| SIGNATURE | HÜLSMANN J G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre Hospitalier Universitaire d'Angers |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The political economy of moral hazard
Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of moral hazard and that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral hazard also results from government interventionism. And in this case negative consequences are systematic and do result eve…
Die Partei der Freiheit
Discursive Rationality and the Division of Labour
One of the great achievements of economic science is the explanation of the benefits of the division of labour in market economies. However, despite its merits this utilitarian explanation is insufficient as an account for the widespread division of labour. This insufficiency stems from the normative shortcomings of the harmony-of-interests doctrine, which cannot justify the respect of private-property titles and. therefore, cannot explain on pur…
No prominent works on this page.
Die Partei der Freiheit
Discursive Rationality and the Division of Labour
One of the great achievements of economic science is the explanation of the benefits of the division of labour in market economies. However, despite its merits this utilitarian explanation is insufficient as an account for the widespread division of labour. This insufficiency stems from the normative shortcomings of the harmony-of-interests doctrine, which cannot justify the respect of private-property titles and. therefore, cannot explain on pur…
The political economy of moral hazard
Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of moral hazard and that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral hazard also results from government interventionism. And in this case negative consequences are systematic and do result eve…
Political science (3 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Positive economics (2 works) · Communism, Protests, Social Movements (1 work) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 work) · Division of labour (1 work)