Arthur T Denzau
Biographic Data
| ID | 714214 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Arthur T Denzau |
| GIVEN NAMES | Arthur T |
| FAMILY NAME | Denzau |
| SIGNATURE | DENZAU A T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Washington University in St. Louis |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 689 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The humanomics underpinning free market productivity: Synthesizing Insights From Social Philosophy, Systems Thinking, and Neuroeconomics
Shared Mental Models: Insights and Perspectives on Ideologies and Institutions
This article leads off a special symposium comprised of a select group of public choice economists and political scientists that assembled to reflect on the important contribution that Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North’s seminal piece on Shared Mental Models (1993) has made over the last quarter of a century. Relatedly, we apply concepts from Denzau and North’s Shared Mental Models to suggest a modified model of the Nash equilibrium used in …
Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions
Trade protection comes to Silicon Valley
Made in America: The Japanese auto cartel
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for poli…
Tax systems and tax shares
Constitutional change and agenda control
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced b…
Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates
Removing the shackles
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
By modeling sophisticated forms of committee behavior-sophistication with full information and expected utility maximization with incomplete information-this article more fully conveys the nature and importance of committee power than does previous work based on sincere committee behavior. Under the germaneness rule, for example, sophisticated committee behavior greatly expands the set of structure-induced equilibrium points. Under the closed rul…
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
This paper extends the work on structure-induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters' expectations. The standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect-foresight expectations. In the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority-rule outcomes on the second issue. If voters act on this …
Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for poli…
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced b…
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
This paper extends the work on structure-induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters' expectations. The standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect-foresight expectations. In the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority-rule outcomes on the second issue. If voters act on this …
Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates
Constitutional change and agenda control
The humanomics underpinning free market productivity: Synthesizing Insights From Social Philosophy, Systems Thinking, and Neuroeconomics
Removing the shackles
Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
This paper extends the work on structure-induced equilibria by explicitly considering voters' expectations. The standard assumption of myopic expectations is contrasted with the alternative assumption of perfect-foresight expectations. In the institutional setting examined perfect foresight means voters know how the outcome on the first issue in a sequence of two issues conditions majority-rule outcomes on the second issue. If voters act on this …
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior
By modeling sophisticated forms of committee behavior-sophistication with full information and expected utility maximization with incomplete information-this article more fully conveys the nature and importance of committee power than does previous work based on sincere committee behavior. Under the germaneness rule, for example, sophisticated committee behavior greatly expands the set of structure-induced equilibrium points. Under the closed rul…
Determinants of local school spending: Some consistent estimates
Removing the shackles
Tax systems and tax shares
Constitutional change and agenda control
Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style
This article is aimed at integrating two kinds of analysis of legislators' calculations of advantage. We assume that legislators operate in two arenas, in the legislative arena itself, where their calculations of advantage concern simply their effectiveness in voting (Farquharson), and in the electoral arena, where their calculations concern the rewards for their position-taking as well as their effectiveness (Fenno). Our analysis is introduced b…
Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented
This paper derives a supply price for public policy using a constrained maximization model. In the model, three sets of agents each have preferences over outcomes: organized interest groups offer campaign contributions to improve their own wealth, voters offer votes to obtain outcomes closer to their most preferred outcomes, and legislators seek both campaign contributions and votes to obtain reelection. A given legislator's supply price for poli…
Made in America: The Japanese auto cartel
Trade protection comes to Silicon Valley
Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions
Shared Mental Models: Insights and Perspectives on Ideologies and Institutions
This article leads off a special symposium comprised of a select group of public choice economists and political scientists that assembled to reflect on the important contribution that Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North’s seminal piece on Shared Mental Models (1993) has made over the last quarter of a century. Relatedly, we apply concepts from Denzau and North’s Shared Mental Models to suggest a modified model of the Nash equilibrium used in …
The humanomics underpinning free market productivity: Synthesizing Insights From Social Philosophy, Systems Thinking, and Neuroeconomics
Economics (12 works) · Political science (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Law (6 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Macroeconomics (4 works) · Political economy (4 works)