Andrew Hazlett
Biographic Data
| ID | 714967 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrew Hazlett |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Hazlett |
| SIGNATURE | HAZLETT A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Washington University in St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4611-1139 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Testimonial desire
From Doxastic Blame to Doxastic Shame
There is a philosophical puzzle about blaming people for their attitudes that arises because we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes. The fact that we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes suggests that we are not responsible for them. Defenders of blaming people for their beliefs have appealed to various senses in which we are responsible for our beliefs, despite our lacking direct voluntary control over them. In this pape…
Authenticity as transparency
What do we ordinarily mean when we describe people as authentic or inauthentic? We describe friends, enemies, acquaintances, and colleagues as authentic and inauthentic, as well as politicians, celebrities, and other public figures. What are we saying about someone, when we say that they are authentic or inauthentic? I argue that authenticity is transparency: that you are authentic to the extent that you are transparent and inauthentic to the ext…
Propositional faith and trustworthiness
I argue that propositional faith presupposes trustworthiness, in this sense: faith that p is fitting only if the one in whom you have faith to bring it about that p is trustworthy to bring it about that p. In defence of this, I argue that propositional faith is a species of interpersonal faith and that interpersonal faith presupposes trustworthiness. I also discuss some of the consequences of my thesis for theistic propositional faith
The value of common knowledge
Desire and Goodness
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
I argue that desire sometimes amounts to knowledge, in the same sense that belief sometimes amounts to knowledge. The argument rests on two assumptions: that goodness is the correctness condition for desire (which is one articulation of the idea that we desire things under the 'guise of the good') and that knowledge is apt mental representation (which is a generalized virtue-theoretic account of knowledge). Desire that amounts to knowledge-or 'co…
New Waves in Metaphysics
The Norm of Belief
This is a difficult book on a difficult subject. Gibbons's ostensive topic is the apparent incompatibility of three plausible ideas: that belief aims at truth, that you ought always to believe what it is reasonable for you to believe, and that there are cases of reasonable false belief. Gibbons articulates his puzzle (chapter 1) as a clash between two intuitive principles:(T) You ought to believe that p only if it is true that p.(J ) You ought to…
Contemporary Metaphysics
There is no general agreement or consensus about how to define metaphysics. The word itself derives from the title of one of Aristotle’s books, one that deals with decidedly metaphysical issues, but intuitively metaphysical issues are discussed by Aristotle as much in his other works as in the Metaphysics. Contemporary metaphysics ranges over a broad set of questions: questions about what reality is like, at its most fundamental; questions about …
The Myth of Factive Verbs: The Myth of Factive Verbs
At least since the days of 'ordinary language philosophy', epistemologists (some more than others) have been interested in knowledge attributions—the meaning or meanings of 'knows', the use or uses of sentences of the form 'S knows p', and so on. And there has more recently been renewed interest in how 'knows' is used.1 Theorizing about knowledge on the basis of how 'knows' is used is, at least in principle, quite different from the epistemologic…
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
Knowledge and Conversation
How to Defend Response Moralism
Journal Article How to Defend Response Moralism Get access Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett, Fordham University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 241–255, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp020 Published: 01 July 2009
Models, Truth, and Realism
Book Review| October 01 2008 Models, Truth, and Realism Barry Taylor, Models, Truth, and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 185 pp. Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 630–633. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-024 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitte…
The Myth of Factive Verbs: The Myth of Factive Verbs
At least since the days of 'ordinary language philosophy', epistemologists (some more than others) have been interested in knowledge attributions—the meaning or meanings of 'knows', the use or uses of sentences of the form 'S knows p', and so on. And there has more recently been renewed interest in how 'knows' is used.1 Theorizing about knowledge on the basis of how 'knows' is used is, at least in principle, quite different from the epistemologic…
Knowledge and Conversation
Desire and Goodness
How to Defend Response Moralism
Journal Article How to Defend Response Moralism Get access Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett, Fordham University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 241–255, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp020 Published: 01 July 2009
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
I argue that desire sometimes amounts to knowledge, in the same sense that belief sometimes amounts to knowledge. The argument rests on two assumptions: that goodness is the correctness condition for desire (which is one articulation of the idea that we desire things under the 'guise of the good') and that knowledge is apt mental representation (which is a generalized virtue-theoretic account of knowledge). Desire that amounts to knowledge-or 'co…
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
Models, Truth, and Realism
Book Review| October 01 2008 Models, Truth, and Realism Barry Taylor, Models, Truth, and Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 185 pp. Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (4): 630–633. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-024 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitte…
Knowledge and Conversation
How to Defend Response Moralism
Journal Article How to Defend Response Moralism Get access Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett Allan Hazlett, Fordham University, New York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 3, July 2009, Pages 241–255, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp020 Published: 01 July 2009
Contemporary Metaphysics
There is no general agreement or consensus about how to define metaphysics. The word itself derives from the title of one of Aristotle’s books, one that deals with decidedly metaphysical issues, but intuitively metaphysical issues are discussed by Aristotle as much in his other works as in the Metaphysics. Contemporary metaphysics ranges over a broad set of questions: questions about what reality is like, at its most fundamental; questions about …
The Myth of Factive Verbs: The Myth of Factive Verbs
At least since the days of 'ordinary language philosophy', epistemologists (some more than others) have been interested in knowledge attributions—the meaning or meanings of 'knows', the use or uses of sentences of the form 'S knows p', and so on. And there has more recently been renewed interest in how 'knows' is used.1 Theorizing about knowledge on the basis of how 'knows' is used is, at least in principle, quite different from the epistemologic…
A Problem For Relational Theories of Color
The Norm of Belief
This is a difficult book on a difficult subject. Gibbons's ostensive topic is the apparent incompatibility of three plausible ideas: that belief aims at truth, that you ought always to believe what it is reasonable for you to believe, and that there are cases of reasonable false belief. Gibbons articulates his puzzle (chapter 1) as a clash between two intuitive principles:(T) You ought to believe that p only if it is true that p.(J ) You ought to…
New Waves in Metaphysics
Desire That Amounts to Knowledge
I argue that desire sometimes amounts to knowledge, in the same sense that belief sometimes amounts to knowledge. The argument rests on two assumptions: that goodness is the correctness condition for desire (which is one articulation of the idea that we desire things under the 'guise of the good') and that knowledge is apt mental representation (which is a generalized virtue-theoretic account of knowledge). Desire that amounts to knowledge-or 'co…
Desire and Goodness
The value of common knowledge
Authenticity as transparency
What do we ordinarily mean when we describe people as authentic or inauthentic? We describe friends, enemies, acquaintances, and colleagues as authentic and inauthentic, as well as politicians, celebrities, and other public figures. What are we saying about someone, when we say that they are authentic or inauthentic? I argue that authenticity is transparency: that you are authentic to the extent that you are transparent and inauthentic to the ext…
Propositional faith and trustworthiness
I argue that propositional faith presupposes trustworthiness, in this sense: faith that p is fitting only if the one in whom you have faith to bring it about that p is trustworthy to bring it about that p. In defence of this, I argue that propositional faith is a species of interpersonal faith and that interpersonal faith presupposes trustworthiness. I also discuss some of the consequences of my thesis for theistic propositional faith
From Doxastic Blame to Doxastic Shame
There is a philosophical puzzle about blaming people for their attitudes that arises because we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes. The fact that we lack direct voluntary control over our attitudes suggests that we are not responsible for them. Defenders of blaming people for their beliefs have appealed to various senses in which we are responsible for our beliefs, despite our lacking direct voluntary control over them. In this pape…
Testimonial desire
Philosophy (12 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Art (3 works) · Art history (3 works)