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Peter A Zaleski

Biographic Data

ID715265
NAMEPeter A Zaleski
GIVEN NAMESPeter A
FAMILY NAMEZaleski
SIGNATUREZALESKI P A
AFFILIATIONSVillanova University
ORCID0000-0002-6703-6011
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS8
TOTAL CITATIONS47
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1992
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1999
H-INDEX4
  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 6•References: 10

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Cited by: 11•References: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Cited by: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech et al.•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, R. Hoge, Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 197-206

  • Antitrust, the market, and the State

    Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Forum for Social Economics•1993•References: 1

    (1993). Antitrust, the market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams. Edited by James W. Brock and Kenneth G. Elzinga. Forum for Social Economics: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Cited by: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Cited by: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Cited by: 11•References: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Cited by: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 6•References: 10

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Determinants of Contributions to Religious Organizations

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1992•Cited by: 15

    A model of contributions to one's religious congregation suggests that since the operations of the congregation rely upon voluntary contributions from members, congregation members will contribute less as congregation size increases. This type of behavior, known as free riding is supported by the empirical results. Furthermore, income, race, congregation expenses and denomination are key determinants of contributions

  • Antitrust, the market, and the State

    Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Forum for Social Economics•1993•References: 1

    (1993). Antitrust, the market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams. Edited by James W. Brock and Kenneth G. Elzinga. Forum for Social Economics: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 76-77

  • Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994•Cited by: 9

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, Economic and Attitudinal Factors in Catholic and Protestant Religious Giving, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 158-167

  • Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech et al.•ARTICLE•Review of Religious Research•1994

    Peter A. Zaleski, Charles E. Zech, R. Hoge, Determinants of Religious Giving in Urban Presbyterian Congregations, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 36, No. 2, Special Issue: Patterns of Financial Contributions to Churches (Dec., 1994), pp. 197-206

  • The Effect of Religious Market Competition on Church Giving

    Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Review of Social Economy•1995•Cited by: 11•References: 17

    This paper contributes to the debate over the effects of religious pluralism on religosity. A key innovative feature of the paper is the use of voluntary contributions from members as a measure of religiosity. Using data from 177 congregations, and employing both the Herfindahl Index and market share as measures of religious market competition, a two-stage least squares estimation technique shows that Protestants give more when their congregation…

  • The Optimal Size of a Religious Congregation

    Open Access•Peter Zaleski, Peter A Zaleski et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 4•References: 7

    The economic theory of clubs model is applied to determine the optimal size of a religious congregation. The optimal size is specified to be where total contributions are maximized. This occurs where the marginal benefits of adding a new member (in terms of contributions gained from that new member) equal the marginal costs of that new member (in terms of contributions lost from existing members). Benefits from adding members include enhanced fel…

  • Group size and the free-rider hypothesis

    Open Access•Peter A Zaleski, Charles E Zech•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996•Cited by: 2•References: 9

  • Economic Freedom and the Quality of Life

    Open Access•Alfredo G Esposto, Peter A Zaleski•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 6•References: 10

Economics (7 works) · Religion and Society Interactions (6 works) · Political science (5 works) · Religion, Society, and Development (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Religion, Spirituality, and Psychology (4 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works)

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