Peter Kurrild‐klitgaard
Biographic Data
| ID | 715767 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter Kurrild‐klitgaard |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter |
| FAMILY NAME | Kurrild‐klitgaard |
| SIGNATURE | KLITGAARD P K |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Copenhagen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5897-361X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 137 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Size isn’t everything: Covid-19 and the role of government
The calculus of democratic deliberation
Public choice and political science: A view from Europe
Computers, coders, and voters: Comparing automated methods for estimating party positions
Assigning political actors positions in ideological space is a task of key importance to political scientists. In this paper we compare estimates obtained using the automated Wordscores and Wordfish techniques, along with estimates from voters and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), against expert placements. We estimate the positions of 254 manifestos across 33 elections in Germany and Denmark, two cases with very different textual data ava…
Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000
Conventional arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820 to 2000 to estimate these differences. Results show no significant growth differences between the two regime types. Effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong valley-of-te…
Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975
Empirical social choice: An introduction
It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations
Public choice, political economy and development: An introduction to the life, times and themes of Martin Paldam
Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital
Election Inversions, Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples of Voting Paradoxes in Danish Government Formations
When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision makers, so‐called ‘election inversions’ may take place, where each round produces different majority outcomes. In this article, two versions of such compound majority paradoxes are identified that are particularly, but not exclusively, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: the ‘Threshold Paradox’ and the ‘Federal …
Modeling constitutional choice: Reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on
Voting Paradoxes under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Eight Danish Elections
Voter preferences for eight general elections for the Danish parliament are analysed using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves, while three others occur with different frequencies. One paradox always occurs – namely, for the social ordering of political parties based on pair‐wise co…
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
Blood, Baath and Beyond: The Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq
Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings
Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit
The central aspect, which makes markets operate differently than governments, is the ability of market actors to "exit" from future interactions. This point is applied to constitutional analysis, with an emphasis on the constitutional possibility of individuals or groups in a society "exiting," wholly or partly, from the political community or from specific institutions within such. Hobbesian and Lockean states-of-nature are sketched using a comm…
An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate
The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
Computers, coders, and voters: Comparing automated methods for estimating party positions
Assigning political actors positions in ideological space is a task of key importance to political scientists. In this paper we compare estimates obtained using the automated Wordscores and Wordfish techniques, along with estimates from voters and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), against expert placements. We estimate the positions of 254 manifestos across 33 elections in Germany and Denmark, two cases with very different textual data ava…
Voting Paradoxes under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Eight Danish Elections
Voter preferences for eight general elections for the Danish parliament are analysed using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves, while three others occur with different frequencies. One paradox always occurs – namely, for the social ordering of political parties based on pair‐wise co…
Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings
An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate
Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit
The central aspect, which makes markets operate differently than governments, is the ability of market actors to "exit" from future interactions. This point is applied to constitutional analysis, with an emphasis on the constitutional possibility of individuals or groups in a society "exiting," wholly or partly, from the political community or from specific institutions within such. Hobbesian and Lockean states-of-nature are sketched using a comm…
Election Inversions, Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples of Voting Paradoxes in Danish Government Formations
When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision makers, so‐called ‘election inversions’ may take place, where each round produces different majority outcomes. In this article, two versions of such compound majority paradoxes are identified that are particularly, but not exclusively, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: the ‘Threshold Paradox’ and the ‘Federal …
It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations
Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital
Blood, Baath and Beyond: The Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq
Size isn’t everything: Covid-19 and the role of government
The calculus of democratic deliberation
Public choice and political science: A view from Europe
Public choice, political economy and development: An introduction to the life, times and themes of Martin Paldam
The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession
An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate
Opting-Out: The Constitutional Economics of Exit
The central aspect, which makes markets operate differently than governments, is the ability of market actors to "exit" from future interactions. This point is applied to constitutional analysis, with an emphasis on the constitutional possibility of individuals or groups in a society "exiting," wholly or partly, from the political community or from specific institutions within such. Hobbesian and Lockean states-of-nature are sketched using a comm…
Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings
Blood, Baath and Beyond: The Constitutional Dilemma of Iraq
The political economy of freedom, democracy and transnational terrorism
Voting Paradoxes under Proportional Representation: Evidence from Eight Danish Elections
Voter preferences for eight general elections for the Danish parliament are analysed using survey data to investigate the possible presence of five types of social choice paradoxes that may occur in list systems of proportional representation. Two serious paradoxes fail to manifest themselves, while three others occur with different frequencies. One paradox always occurs – namely, for the social ordering of political parties based on pair‐wise co…
Modeling constitutional choice: Reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on
It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations
Public choice, political economy and development: An introduction to the life, times and themes of Martin Paldam
Institutional interactions and economic growth: The joint effects of property rights, veto players and democratic capital
Election Inversions, Coalitions and Proportional Representation: Examples of Voting Paradoxes in Danish Government Formations
When collective choices are made in more than one round and with different groups of decision makers, so‐called ‘election inversions’ may take place, where each round produces different majority outcomes. In this article, two versions of such compound majority paradoxes are identified that are particularly, but not exclusively, relevant for systems of proportional representation with governing coalitions: the ‘Threshold Paradox’ and the ‘Federal …
Economic Growth and Institutional Reform in Modern Monarchies and Republics: A Historical Cross-Country Perspective 1820-2000
Conventional arguments suggest that republics ought to grow faster than monarchies and experience lower transitional costs following reforms. We employ a panel of 27 countries observed from 1820 to 2000 to estimate these differences. Results show no significant growth differences between the two regime types. Effects of incremental reforms do not differ between them, but those of large-scale reforms do. Specifically, we find a strong valley-of-te…
Picking a loser? A social choice perspective on the Danish government formation of 1975
Empirical social choice: An introduction
Computers, coders, and voters: Comparing automated methods for estimating party positions
Assigning political actors positions in ideological space is a task of key importance to political scientists. In this paper we compare estimates obtained using the automated Wordscores and Wordfish techniques, along with estimates from voters and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), against expert placements. We estimate the positions of 254 manifestos across 33 elections in Germany and Denmark, two cases with very different textual data ava…
Public choice and political science: A view from Europe
The calculus of democratic deliberation
Size isn’t everything: Covid-19 and the role of government
Economics (19 works) · Political science (17 works) · Law (15 works) · Politics (14 works) · Public finance (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (9 works) · Democracy (7 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Political economy (6 works)