Nils‐Frederic Wagner
Biographic Data
| ID | 7172452 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nils‐Frederic Wagner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nils‐Frederic |
| FAMILY NAME | Wagner |
| SIGNATURE | WAGNER N F |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Duisburg-Essen |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6145-2399 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justice
Personal identity, possible worlds, and medical ethics
Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linke…
Who's next? Shifting balances between medical AI, physicians and patients in shaping the future of medicine
Doing Away with the Agential Bias
Brain transplants and possible worlds
I am very grateful to Simon Beck for his thoughtful response to my paper “Transplanting Brains?” (2016). Needless to say, he raises more issues than I can hope to answer in a brief response. While Beck seemingly feels that the deck has been stacked against him, I think that the majority of his criticisms result from misconceptions and misunderstandings that I intend to straighten out in what follows. Before proceeding, I would like to draw attent…
Transplanting brains
Brain transplant thought experiments figure prominently in the debate on personal identity. Such hypotheticals are usually taken to provide support for psychological continuity theories. This standard interpretation has recently been challenged by Marya Schechtman. Simon Beck argues that Schechtman's critique rests upon 'two costly mistakes'—claiming that (1) when evaluating these cases, philosophers mistakenly try to figure out the intuitions th…
Staying Alive—Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life
Imagine that you are recollecting your high school graduation day. You ask yourself: What makes it true that it was me, who had this graduation experience that I remember having? And, by the same token: What makes it true that it will be me who will still exist some time in the future? When you ask these questions, you are looking for the conditions of your persistence through time: your diachronic personal identity. Ever since The Constitution o…
Transplanting brains
Brain transplant thought experiments figure prominently in the debate on personal identity. Such hypotheticals are usually taken to provide support for psychological continuity theories. This standard interpretation has recently been challenged by Marya Schechtman. Simon Beck argues that Schechtman's critique rests upon 'two costly mistakes'—claiming that (1) when evaluating these cases, philosophers mistakenly try to figure out the intuitions th…
Staying Alive—Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life
Imagine that you are recollecting your high school graduation day. You ask yourself: What makes it true that it was me, who had this graduation experience that I remember having? And, by the same token: What makes it true that it will be me who will still exist some time in the future? When you ask these questions, you are looking for the conditions of your persistence through time: your diachronic personal identity. Ever since The Constitution o…
Brain transplants and possible worlds
I am very grateful to Simon Beck for his thoughtful response to my paper “Transplanting Brains?” (2016). Needless to say, he raises more issues than I can hope to answer in a brief response. While Beck seemingly feels that the deck has been stacked against him, I think that the majority of his criticisms result from misconceptions and misunderstandings that I intend to straighten out in what follows. Before proceeding, I would like to draw attent…
Transplanting brains
Brain transplant thought experiments figure prominently in the debate on personal identity. Such hypotheticals are usually taken to provide support for psychological continuity theories. This standard interpretation has recently been challenged by Marya Schechtman. Simon Beck argues that Schechtman's critique rests upon 'two costly mistakes'—claiming that (1) when evaluating these cases, philosophers mistakenly try to figure out the intuitions th…
Doing Away with the Agential Bias
Personal identity, possible worlds, and medical ethics
Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linke…
Who's next? Shifting balances between medical AI, physicians and patients in shaping the future of medicine
Promoting inequality? Self-monitoring applications and the problem of social justice
Sociology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Ethics in medical practice (3 works) · History (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Medicine (3 works)