Attie Duval
Biographic Data
| ID | 761870 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Attie Duval |
| GIVEN NAMES | Attie |
| FAMILY NAME | Duval |
| SIGNATURE | DUVAL A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9804-7039 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
In defense of language‐independent flexibility, or: What rodents and humans can do without language
There are two main approaches within classical cognitive science to explaining how humans can entertain mental states that integrate contents across domains. The language‐based framework states that this ability arises from higher cognitive domain‐specific systems that combine their outputs through the language faculty, whereas the language‐independent framework holds that it comes from non‐language‐involving connections between such systems. Thi…
Pain Asymbolia Is Probably Still Pain
Trevor Griffith and Adrian Kind argue that we should reject a standard interpretation of pain asymbolia, according to which asymbolics experience pain even though their pain lacks the affective-motivational element that typical pains possess. We make the case that Griffith and Kind’s reasons for rejecting the standard interpretation are relatively weak. We end by arguing that debates between the standard interpretation and alternative interpretat…
The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists
Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (th…
L'autonomie de l'éthique
No prominent works on this page.
L'autonomie de l'éthique
The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists
Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (th…
In defense of language‐independent flexibility, or: What rodents and humans can do without language
There are two main approaches within classical cognitive science to explaining how humans can entertain mental states that integrate contents across domains. The language‐based framework states that this ability arises from higher cognitive domain‐specific systems that combine their outputs through the language faculty, whereas the language‐independent framework holds that it comes from non‐language‐involving connections between such systems. Thi…
Pain Asymbolia Is Probably Still Pain
Trevor Griffith and Adrian Kind argue that we should reject a standard interpretation of pain asymbolia, according to which asymbolics experience pain even though their pain lacks the affective-motivational element that typical pains possess. We make the case that Griffith and Kind’s reasons for rejecting the standard interpretation are relatively weak. We end by arguing that debates between the standard interpretation and alternative interpretat…
Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 works) · Cognitive psychology (1 works) · Cognitive science (1 works) · Communication (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · Criticism (1 works) · Epistemology (1 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 works)