T K Ahn
Biographic Data
| ID | 763903 |
|---|---|
| NAME | T K Ahn |
| GIVEN NAMES | T K |
| FAMILY NAME | Ahn |
| SIGNATURE | AHN T K |
| AFFILIATIONS | Seoul National University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 270 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea
The overvaluing of expertise in discussion partner choice
Since the introduction of economic theory to political science, theorists have argued that discussion could serve as an effective information shortcut if individuals communicate with experts who have similar preferences. Previous experimental and survey studies have found mixed results for the efficacy of social communication, but they have not observed the process of discussion partner selection which is so central to the previous models. This p…
Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment
Expertise and Bias in Political Communication Networks
Citizens minimize information costs by obtaining political guidance from others who have already assumed the costs of acquiring and processing political information. A problem occurs because ideal informants, typically characterized by the joint presence of political expertise and shared viewpoints, are frequently unavailable or rare within the groups where individuals are located. Hence, individuals must often look beyond their own group boundar…
Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas
Communication, Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among Voters: Communication and Informational Asymmetries
The costs of political information vary dramatically across individuals, and these costs help explain why some individuals become politically expert while others demonstrate low levels of political knowledge and awareness. An attractive alternative, particularly for those with high information costs, is to rely on information and advice taken from others who are politically expert. This paper focuses on the complications that arise when the infor…
The Meaning of Social Capital and its Link to Collective Action
From p. 2-3:\n\n "The social capital approach takes these factors seriously as causes of behavior and collective social outcomes. The social capital approach does this in ways that are consistent with continued and lively development of neoclassical economics and rational choice approaches. In sum, the social capital approach improves the knowledge of macro political and economic phenomena by expanding the factors to be incorporated in such knowl…
Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges: Comparing Local and Central Institutions
Our experimental study compares the effectiveness of three reputation mechanisms believed to enhance cooperation. Groups of 14 subjects repeatedly select partners, play two-person prisoner's dilemmas, and rely only on individual experience to find trustworthy exchange partners in the baseline condition. The local condition represents emergent, bottom-up networks that allow partners to voluntarily share recommendations. The central condition repre…
A Dynamic Model of Generalized Social Trust
How does generalized social trust — a Trustor's willingness to allow anonymous Trustees to make decisions affecting the Trustor's own welfare without an enforceable contract or guarantee, despite the Trustees' incentives to exploit or defraud — come to predominate in a community? This article is organized around a theoretical argument about the dynamics of generalized trust. This argument is deduced from a formal model built on assumptions that a…
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of othe…
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: Capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action)
Elinor Ostrom, T. K. Ahn, Cecilia Olivares, Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 155-233
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: A survey
The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: A survey
Communication, Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among Voters: Communication and Informational Asymmetries
The costs of political information vary dramatically across individuals, and these costs help explain why some individuals become politically expert while others demonstrate low levels of political knowledge and awareness. An attractive alternative, particularly for those with high information costs, is to rely on information and advice taken from others who are politically expert. This paper focuses on the complications that arise when the infor…
Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: Capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action)
Elinor Ostrom, T. K. Ahn, Cecilia Olivares, Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 155-233
Expertise and Bias in Political Communication Networks
Citizens minimize information costs by obtaining political guidance from others who have already assumed the costs of acquiring and processing political information. A problem occurs because ideal informants, typically characterized by the joint presence of political expertise and shared viewpoints, are frequently unavailable or rare within the groups where individuals are located. Hence, individuals must often look beyond their own group boundar…
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges: Comparing Local and Central Institutions
Our experimental study compares the effectiveness of three reputation mechanisms believed to enhance cooperation. Groups of 14 subjects repeatedly select partners, play two-person prisoner's dilemmas, and rely only on individual experience to find trustworthy exchange partners in the baseline condition. The local condition represents emergent, bottom-up networks that allow partners to voluntarily share recommendations. The central condition repre…
A Dynamic Model of Generalized Social Trust
How does generalized social trust — a Trustor's willingness to allow anonymous Trustees to make decisions affecting the Trustor's own welfare without an enforceable contract or guarantee, despite the Trustees' incentives to exploit or defraud — come to predominate in a community? This article is organized around a theoretical argument about the dynamics of generalized trust. This argument is deduced from a formal model built on assumptions that a…
Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment
Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of othe…
The overvaluing of expertise in discussion partner choice
Since the introduction of economic theory to political science, theorists have argued that discussion could serve as an effective information shortcut if individuals communicate with experts who have similar preferences. Previous experimental and survey studies have found mixed results for the efficacy of social communication, but they have not observed the process of discussion partner selection which is so central to the previous models. This p…
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: A survey
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: Capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action)
Elinor Ostrom, T. K. Ahn, Cecilia Olivares, Una perspectiva del capital social desde las ciencias sociales: capital social y acción colectiva (A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 155-233
Learning, Signaling, and Social Preferences in Public-Good Games
This study compares the empirical performance of a variety of learning models and theories of social preferences in the context of experimental games involving the provision of public goods. Parameters are estimated via maximum likelihood estimation. We also performed estimations to identify different types of agents and distributions of parameters. The estimated models suggest that the players of such games take into account the learning of othe…
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
A Dynamic Model of Generalized Social Trust
How does generalized social trust — a Trustor's willingness to allow anonymous Trustees to make decisions affecting the Trustor's own welfare without an enforceable contract or guarantee, despite the Trustees' incentives to exploit or defraud — come to predominate in a community? This article is organized around a theoretical argument about the dynamics of generalized trust. This argument is deduced from a formal model built on assumptions that a…
The Meaning of Social Capital and its Link to Collective Action
From p. 2-3:\n\n "The social capital approach takes these factors seriously as causes of behavior and collective social outcomes. The social capital approach does this in ways that are consistent with continued and lively development of neoclassical economics and rational choice approaches. In sum, the social capital approach improves the knowledge of macro political and economic phenomena by expanding the factors to be incorporated in such knowl…
Reputation and Cooperation in Voluntary Exchanges: Comparing Local and Central Institutions
Our experimental study compares the effectiveness of three reputation mechanisms believed to enhance cooperation. Groups of 14 subjects repeatedly select partners, play two-person prisoner's dilemmas, and rely only on individual experience to find trustworthy exchange partners in the baseline condition. The local condition represents emergent, bottom-up networks that allow partners to voluntarily share recommendations. The central condition repre…
A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
Elinor Ostrom’s contributions to the experimental study of social dilemmas
Communication, Influence, and Informational Asymmetries among Voters: Communication and Informational Asymmetries
The costs of political information vary dramatically across individuals, and these costs help explain why some individuals become politically expert while others demonstrate low levels of political knowledge and awareness. An attractive alternative, particularly for those with high information costs, is to rely on information and advice taken from others who are politically expert. This paper focuses on the complications that arise when the infor…
Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
Strategic reward and altruistic punishment support cooperation in a public goods game experiment
Expertise and Bias in Political Communication Networks
Citizens minimize information costs by obtaining political guidance from others who have already assumed the costs of acquiring and processing political information. A problem occurs because ideal informants, typically characterized by the joint presence of political expertise and shared viewpoints, are frequently unavailable or rare within the groups where individuals are located. Hence, individuals must often look beyond their own group boundar…
The overvaluing of expertise in discussion partner choice
Since the introduction of economic theory to political science, theorists have argued that discussion could serve as an effective information shortcut if individuals communicate with experts who have similar preferences. Previous experimental and survey studies have found mixed results for the efficacy of social communication, but they have not observed the process of discussion partner selection which is so central to the previous models. This p…
How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea
Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (13 works) · Economics (12 works) · Political science (11 works) · Computer Science (10 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (9 works) · Social Psychology (9 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Microeconomics (7 works)