Marc Smeets
Biographic Data
| ID | 766342 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marc Smeets |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marc |
| FAMILY NAME | Smeets |
| SIGNATURE | SMEETS M |
| AFFILIATIONS | ETH Zurich |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4057-6445 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 14 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 57 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Ransom War
This timely book explores the alarming rise of ransomware: malicious software blocking users from their systems or data, until they have paid money to regain access or to prevent the release of sensitive information. High-profile British examples of the twenty-first century have targeted national libraries and hospital trusts; in the US, hackers of Pennsylvania’s Lehigh Valley Health Network held patient data hostage—when their demands went unmet…
The evolution of cyberconflict studies
In our increasingly digital world, cyberconflict poses a significant challenge to global security, prompting the emergence of an academic field dedicated to its study. Understanding the trajectory, evolution and dominant characteristics of cyberconflict studies is vital for scholars and policy-makers alike. By means of a thorough analysis of articles from the 125 top political science and International Relations journals, we illuminate the field'…
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
Publicly attributing cyber attacks
When should states publicly attribute cyber intrusions? Whilst this is a question governments increasingly grapple with, academia has hardly helped in providing answers. This article describes the stages of public attribution and provides a Public Attribution Framework designed to explain, guide, and improve decision making of public attribution by states. Our general argument is that public attribution is a highly complex process which requires …
Regulatory cybersecurity governance in the making
Over the last decades, cybersecurity has become a top priority for the European Union (EU). As a contribution to scholarship on the 'regulatory security state', we analyze how the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), emerged and stabilized as the EU's key agency for cybersecurity. We use data from policy documents, secondary sources, and semi-structured interviews to show how ENISA struggled to become a relevant actor by carving out a…
The challenges of military adaptation to the cyber domain
Whilst NATO speaks increasingly publicly about the military use of cyber operations, adaptation to the cyber domain has reportedly been challenging for most militaries. Little research has sought to understand the nature of these challenges. This study seeks to address this gap through a case study of the Netherlands. By utilizing a range of primary and secondary sources, this article reveals that the Dutch Defense Cyber Command has faced signifi…
A US history of not conducting cyber attacks
There were numerous occasions when the US military considered conducting cyber attacks but refrained from doing so, but these have been largely overlooked as sources of insight. Six cases that we do know about – mostly from journalistic reporting – reveal much about US strategic thinking, posturing, and assessment of the limits of cyberspace
Cyber campaigns and strategic outcomes
While much focus has remained on the concept of cyberwar, what we have been observing in actual cyber behaviour are campaigns comprised of linked cyber operations, with the specific objective of achieving strategic outcomes without the need of armed attack. These campaigns are not simply transitory clever tactics, but strategic in intent. This article examines strategic cyber competition and reveals how the adoption of a different construct can p…
Cyber Arms Transfer
Was sind die Beweggründe und Möglichkeiten für Waffentransfers im Cyberbereich? Antworten auf diese Frage sind von grosser Bedeutung, um die Operationalisierung von Cyberkommandos und Geheimdienstallianzen, die Funktionsweise der NATO und die Durchführbarkeit von Cyberwaffenkontrollen zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt CSS Forscher Max Smeets in seinem Security Studies Artikel einen neuen konzeptionellen Ansatz zum besseren Verständnis d…
U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward
This article evaluates the implications of U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement for the alliance and intelligence collection. Whilst the strategy may have benefits for certain alliance relationships, I identify four potential negative consequences; loss of allied trust, disruption allied intelligence operations and capabilities, exploitability of the strategy by adversaries, and the implementation (and justification) of persistent engagem…
Integrating offensive cyber capabilities
Across the world, states are establishing military cyber commands or similar units to develop offensive cyber capabilities. One of the key dilemmas faced by these states is whether (and how) to integrate their intelligence and military capabilities to develop a meaningful offensive cyber capacity. This topic, however, has received little theoretical treatment. The purpose of this paper is therefore to address the following question: What are the …
A matter of time
This article examines the transitory nature of cyberweapons. Shedding light on this highly understudied facet is important both for grasping how cyberspace affects international security and policymakers’ efforts to make accurate decisions regarding the deployment of cyberweapons. First, laying out the life cycle of a cyberweapon, I argue that these offensive capabilities are both different in ‘degree’ and in ‘kind’ compared with other regarding …
Noblesse Oblige
In the late 1990s the Dutch government under Labour minister-president Wim Kok decided to pursue a replacement for the main strike fighter of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF), the F-16. From very early on, there was a strong preference for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This position has held through the subsequent seven governing coalitions, even though the political balance on the issue has fluctuated over time. Politicians have pre…
Petite Histoire De L'antiaméricanisme
Contains fulltext : 42587.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)
Regulatory cybersecurity governance in the making
Over the last decades, cybersecurity has become a top priority for the European Union (EU). As a contribution to scholarship on the 'regulatory security state', we analyze how the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), emerged and stabilized as the EU's key agency for cybersecurity. We use data from policy documents, secondary sources, and semi-structured interviews to show how ENISA struggled to become a relevant actor by carving out a…
Cyber campaigns and strategic outcomes
While much focus has remained on the concept of cyberwar, what we have been observing in actual cyber behaviour are campaigns comprised of linked cyber operations, with the specific objective of achieving strategic outcomes without the need of armed attack. These campaigns are not simply transitory clever tactics, but strategic in intent. This article examines strategic cyber competition and reveals how the adoption of a different construct can p…
A matter of time
This article examines the transitory nature of cyberweapons. Shedding light on this highly understudied facet is important both for grasping how cyberspace affects international security and policymakers’ efforts to make accurate decisions regarding the deployment of cyberweapons. First, laying out the life cycle of a cyberweapon, I argue that these offensive capabilities are both different in ‘degree’ and in ‘kind’ compared with other regarding …
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
Cyber Arms Transfer
Was sind die Beweggründe und Möglichkeiten für Waffentransfers im Cyberbereich? Antworten auf diese Frage sind von grosser Bedeutung, um die Operationalisierung von Cyberkommandos und Geheimdienstallianzen, die Funktionsweise der NATO und die Durchführbarkeit von Cyberwaffenkontrollen zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt CSS Forscher Max Smeets in seinem Security Studies Artikel einen neuen konzeptionellen Ansatz zum besseren Verständnis d…
The evolution of cyberconflict studies
In our increasingly digital world, cyberconflict poses a significant challenge to global security, prompting the emergence of an academic field dedicated to its study. Understanding the trajectory, evolution and dominant characteristics of cyberconflict studies is vital for scholars and policy-makers alike. By means of a thorough analysis of articles from the 125 top political science and International Relations journals, we illuminate the field'…
Integrating offensive cyber capabilities
Across the world, states are establishing military cyber commands or similar units to develop offensive cyber capabilities. One of the key dilemmas faced by these states is whether (and how) to integrate their intelligence and military capabilities to develop a meaningful offensive cyber capacity. This topic, however, has received little theoretical treatment. The purpose of this paper is therefore to address the following question: What are the …
Publicly attributing cyber attacks
When should states publicly attribute cyber intrusions? Whilst this is a question governments increasingly grapple with, academia has hardly helped in providing answers. This article describes the stages of public attribution and provides a Public Attribution Framework designed to explain, guide, and improve decision making of public attribution by states. Our general argument is that public attribution is a highly complex process which requires …
The challenges of military adaptation to the cyber domain
Whilst NATO speaks increasingly publicly about the military use of cyber operations, adaptation to the cyber domain has reportedly been challenging for most militaries. Little research has sought to understand the nature of these challenges. This study seeks to address this gap through a case study of the Netherlands. By utilizing a range of primary and secondary sources, this article reveals that the Dutch Defense Cyber Command has faced signifi…
Petite Histoire De L'antiaméricanisme
Contains fulltext : 42587.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)
Noblesse Oblige
In the late 1990s the Dutch government under Labour minister-president Wim Kok decided to pursue a replacement for the main strike fighter of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF), the F-16. From very early on, there was a strong preference for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This position has held through the subsequent seven governing coalitions, even though the political balance on the issue has fluctuated over time. Politicians have pre…
Integrating offensive cyber capabilities
Across the world, states are establishing military cyber commands or similar units to develop offensive cyber capabilities. One of the key dilemmas faced by these states is whether (and how) to integrate their intelligence and military capabilities to develop a meaningful offensive cyber capacity. This topic, however, has received little theoretical treatment. The purpose of this paper is therefore to address the following question: What are the …
A matter of time
This article examines the transitory nature of cyberweapons. Shedding light on this highly understudied facet is important both for grasping how cyberspace affects international security and policymakers’ efforts to make accurate decisions regarding the deployment of cyberweapons. First, laying out the life cycle of a cyberweapon, I argue that these offensive capabilities are both different in ‘degree’ and in ‘kind’ compared with other regarding …
U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward
This article evaluates the implications of U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement for the alliance and intelligence collection. Whilst the strategy may have benefits for certain alliance relationships, I identify four potential negative consequences; loss of allied trust, disruption allied intelligence operations and capabilities, exploitability of the strategy by adversaries, and the implementation (and justification) of persistent engagem…
A US history of not conducting cyber attacks
There were numerous occasions when the US military considered conducting cyber attacks but refrained from doing so, but these have been largely overlooked as sources of insight. Six cases that we do know about – mostly from journalistic reporting – reveal much about US strategic thinking, posturing, and assessment of the limits of cyberspace
Cyber campaigns and strategic outcomes
While much focus has remained on the concept of cyberwar, what we have been observing in actual cyber behaviour are campaigns comprised of linked cyber operations, with the specific objective of achieving strategic outcomes without the need of armed attack. These campaigns are not simply transitory clever tactics, but strategic in intent. This article examines strategic cyber competition and reveals how the adoption of a different construct can p…
Cyber Arms Transfer
Was sind die Beweggründe und Möglichkeiten für Waffentransfers im Cyberbereich? Antworten auf diese Frage sind von grosser Bedeutung, um die Operationalisierung von Cyberkommandos und Geheimdienstallianzen, die Funktionsweise der NATO und die Durchführbarkeit von Cyberwaffenkontrollen zu verstehen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt CSS Forscher Max Smeets in seinem Security Studies Artikel einen neuen konzeptionellen Ansatz zum besseren Verständnis d…
Publicly attributing cyber attacks
When should states publicly attribute cyber intrusions? Whilst this is a question governments increasingly grapple with, academia has hardly helped in providing answers. This article describes the stages of public attribution and provides a Public Attribution Framework designed to explain, guide, and improve decision making of public attribution by states. Our general argument is that public attribution is a highly complex process which requires …
Regulatory cybersecurity governance in the making
Over the last decades, cybersecurity has become a top priority for the European Union (EU). As a contribution to scholarship on the 'regulatory security state', we analyze how the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), emerged and stabilized as the EU's key agency for cybersecurity. We use data from policy documents, secondary sources, and semi-structured interviews to show how ENISA struggled to become a relevant actor by carving out a…
The challenges of military adaptation to the cyber domain
Whilst NATO speaks increasingly publicly about the military use of cyber operations, adaptation to the cyber domain has reportedly been challenging for most militaries. Little research has sought to understand the nature of these challenges. This study seeks to address this gap through a case study of the Netherlands. By utilizing a range of primary and secondary sources, this article reveals that the Dutch Defense Cyber Command has faced signifi…
The evolution of cyberconflict studies
In our increasingly digital world, cyberconflict poses a significant challenge to global security, prompting the emergence of an academic field dedicated to its study. Understanding the trajectory, evolution and dominant characteristics of cyberconflict studies is vital for scholars and policy-makers alike. By means of a thorough analysis of articles from the 125 top political science and International Relations journals, we illuminate the field'…
If it bleeps it leads? Media coverage on cyber conflict and misperception
What determines media coverage on cyber conflict (CC)? Media bias fostering misperception is a well-established problem in conflict reporting. Because of the secrecy and complexity surrounding cyber operations (COs), where most data moreover come from marketing publications by private sector firms, this problem is likely to be especially pronounced in reporting on cyber threats. Because media reporting shapes public perception, such bias can shap…
Ransom War
This timely book explores the alarming rise of ransomware: malicious software blocking users from their systems or data, until they have paid money to regain access or to prevent the release of sensitive information. High-profile British examples of the twenty-first century have targeted national libraries and hospital trusts; in the US, hackers of Pennsylvania’s Lehigh Valley Health Network held patient data hostage—when their demands went unmet…
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (11 works) · Political science (11 works) · Business (8 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Computer security (8 works) · Information and Cyber Security (8 works) · Public relations (7 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Economics (5 works)