C Kyriacou
Biographic Data
| ID | 768216 |
|---|---|
| NAME | C Kyriacou |
| GIVEN NAMES | C |
| FAMILY NAME | Kyriacou |
| SIGNATURE | KYRIACOU C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cyprus |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1506-1602 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and Covid-19 irrationalities
We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinformation helps foster collective irrationalities (e.g., COVID-19 underestimation and vaccination hesitancy), with detrimental effect for society. Such probability mistakes betray that at least some of us often do not grasp necessary conditions on the con…
The Moral Argument Against Monarchy (Absolute or Constitutional)
Varieties of skeptical invariantism II
Abstarct In the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science‐based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science‐based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the s…
Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II
I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent li…
Evolutionary debunking
Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency
Ingram has argued that the moral fixed points view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau must be false because it implies conceptual deficiency with moral concepts on behalf of moral philosophers, who are supposedly experts about moral concepts. I argue that moral fixed points theory is actually coherent with the possibility that moral antirealists who deny moral fixed points theory are not conceptually deficient with moral concepts. This is because they mi…
How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency
Ingram has argued that the moral fixed points view of Cuneo and Shafer-Landau must be false because it implies conceptual deficiency with moral concepts on behalf of moral philosophers, who are supposedly experts about moral concepts. I argue that moral fixed points theory is actually coherent with the possibility that moral antirealists who deny moral fixed points theory are not conceptually deficient with moral concepts. This is because they mi…
Evolutionary debunking
Varieties of skeptical invariantism II
Abstarct In the first installment of Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism, we set the scene for subsequent discussion with Unger's (1975) modern classic of global skepticism and distinguished three varieties of skeptical invariantism in recent literature: traditional skeptical invariantism, fallibilist science‐based skepticism and practical skepticism. We then presented fallibilist science‐based skepticism, that is, the position that relaxes the s…
Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II
I review proposed skepticisms in recent literature (or skeptical invariantisms, if we understand skepticism semantically), contrast their basic commitments and highlight some of their comparative theoretical attractions and problems. To help set the scene for the discussion, I start with Unger’s (1975) modern classic of global skepticism about knowledge (and justification). I then distinguish three extant categories of skepticism in the recent li…
Probability fixed points, (in)adequate concept possession and Covid-19 irrationalities
We argue that probability mistakes indicate that at least some of us often do not adequately possess the concept of probability (and its cognates) and that the digital dissemination of such misinformation helps foster collective irrationalities (e.g., COVID-19 underestimation and vaccination hesitancy), with detrimental effect for society. Such probability mistakes betray that at least some of us often do not grasp necessary conditions on the con…
The Moral Argument Against Monarchy (Absolute or Constitutional)
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Medicine (3 works) · Skepticism (3 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Misinformation and Its Impacts (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)