Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa
Biographic Data
| ID | 7687322 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sergio Cermeño-Aínsa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sergio |
| FAMILY NAME | Cermeño-Aínsa |
| SIGNATURE | CERMEÑO-AÍNSA S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9598-8386 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Evaluating Panpsychism
In this article, I evaluate which version of panpsychism is best suited to address the challenges faced by a theory of consciousness. I first argue that a panpsychist theory is more likely to be successful if it meets two conditions: (1) it must be compatible with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and (2) it must provide at least a preliminary indication of how to solve the combination problem. I consider three main versions of panpsychism…
Perceptual reference, object files and Molyneux's Question
Molyneux’s Question (MQ) —whether a newly sighted might immediately recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone— remains inconclusive. The most common way to pose the question is in representational terms, i.e., whether vision and touch generate or not similar representational types or whether there is some intrinsic similarity between visual and tactual shape representations. Recent developments in cross-modal perception suggest that if v…
Yogācāra Buddhism and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness
Is Perception Stimulus-Dependent
The most natural way to distinguish perception from cognition is by considering perception as stimulus-dependent. Perception is tethered to the senses in a way that cognition is not. Beck Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 319-334 (2018) has recently argued in this direction. He develops this idea by accommodating two potential counterexamples to his account: hallucinations and demonstrative thoughts. In this paper, I examine this view. Fi…
Predictive coding and the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability
In this paper, I discuss the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability (CPs), to wit, that the perceptual states (P) of a subject (S) are pervasively influenced, affected, or caused by cognitive factors (C) as expectations, memories, thoughts, goals, and so on, at all levels of perceptual processing. I argue that following the predictive coding models of perception (PC), the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability is to be expected
The perception/cognition distincton
The cognitive penetrability of perception
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The cognitive penetrability of perception
Predictive coding and the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability
In this paper, I discuss the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability (CPs), to wit, that the perceptual states (P) of a subject (S) are pervasively influenced, affected, or caused by cognitive factors (C) as expectations, memories, thoughts, goals, and so on, at all levels of perceptual processing. I argue that following the predictive coding models of perception (PC), the strong thesis of cognitive penetrability is to be expected
The perception/cognition distincton
Is Perception Stimulus-Dependent
The most natural way to distinguish perception from cognition is by considering perception as stimulus-dependent. Perception is tethered to the senses in a way that cognition is not. Beck Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96(2): 319-334 (2018) has recently argued in this direction. He develops this idea by accommodating two potential counterexamples to his account: hallucinations and demonstrative thoughts. In this paper, I examine this view. Fi…
Yogācāra Buddhism and the illusion of phenomenal consciousness
Evaluating Panpsychism
In this article, I evaluate which version of panpsychism is best suited to address the challenges faced by a theory of consciousness. I first argue that a panpsychist theory is more likely to be successful if it meets two conditions: (1) it must be compatible with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and (2) it must provide at least a preliminary indication of how to solve the combination problem. I consider three main versions of panpsychism…
Perceptual reference, object files and Molyneux's Question
Molyneux’s Question (MQ) —whether a newly sighted might immediately recognize tactilely familiar shapes by sight alone— remains inconclusive. The most common way to pose the question is in representational terms, i.e., whether vision and touch generate or not similar representational types or whether there is some intrinsic similarity between visual and tactual shape representations. Recent developments in cross-modal perception suggest that if v…
Cognitive psychology (6 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Perception (5 works) · Cognition (4 works) · Cognitive science (4 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (4 works) · Neuroscience (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (2 works)