Gabriel L Negretto
Biographic Data
| ID | 770206 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gabriel L Negretto |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gabriel L |
| FAMILY NAME | Negretto |
| SIGNATURE | NEGRETTO G L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9196-8759 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 29 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 215 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 28 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Why some elected autocrats fail: Democratic vulnerability in Latin America
The literature on democratic backsliding offers conflicting assessments of democratic vulnerability. A central source of this disagreement is the failure to distinguish between illiberal rhetoric and illiberal attempts, on the one hand, and democratic erosion and democratic breakdown, on the other. Building on this distinction, we argue that democratic vulnerability to illiberal actions by elected leaders depends primarily on two factors: the inh…
Constitutional renewals: The lineage of democratizing constitutions
Gambling on the constitution: Abortion rights and the 2023 constitution-making process in Chile
When submitted to popular ratification, new constitutions tend to be approved. Chilean voters, however, rejected the proposal put forward by the country’s Constitutional Council in 2023. This article examines the reasons for this outcome. Leveraging an original conjoint experiment exploring voter preferences across four policy areas, we demonstrate that most voters disfavored a proposed clause protecting unborn life, which would have likely restr…
The party system effects of unstable electoral rules in Latin America
Prior studies have shown that electoral rules fail to determine the number of parties in new democracies due to the uncertainty of voters and politicians about which parties are viable. Latin American democracies, where electoral volatility has generally remained high and party institutionalization low, have been a primary example of this phenomenon. We argue that even in shifting political environments the fragmentation of the party system is li…
Shifting Electorates and Preferences in Chile’s Constitutional Process
Normatively, democratic constitutions should express how citizens want to govern themselves collectively. Little is known, however, about how citizens’ constitutional preferences can be elicited and aggregated in practice. An intuitively appealing approach is to allow various forms of popular participation during a constitution-making process, including a popular vote to accept or reject the draft constitution (Fishkin 2011). Based on the Chilean…
How not to write a constitution: Lessons from Chile
On September 4, 2022, Chilean voters massively turned down a constitutional proposal that responded to widely shared criticisms of the 1980 constitution and emerged from a consensual and participatory process. This result is paradoxical because ex ante, the odds seemed largely in favor of changing the status quo. We argue that three factors, which derived from the interaction between rules and political contingency, explain the outcome: a Convent…
Tinkering with executive term limits: Partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America
Why are some democratically elected presidents more likely than others to extend or remove their current term limits? This paper argues that the frequency and type of reforms relaxing executive term limits depend on the relative partisan power of presidents and on inherited institutional constraints. These reforms are more likely when short-term shifts in the distribution of partisan resources significantly favour an incumbent executive vis-à-vis…
Deepening Democracy? Promises and challenges of Chile’s Road to a New Constitution
Response to Rogers M. Smith’s Review of Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900-2015
A strong tradition in democratic theory claims that only constitutions made with direct popular involvement can establish or deepen democracy. Against this view, we argue that new constitutions are likely to enhance liberal democracy when they emerge through a plural agreement among political elites with distinct bases of social support. Power dispersion during constitution writing induces the adoption of institutions that protect opposition forc…
Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
Growing public discontent with the performance and quality of many contemporary democracies makes them vulnerable to popular pressures to profoundly transform or replace their constitutions. However, there is little systematic academic discussion on the legal and political challenges that these events pose to democratic principles and practices. This book, a collaborative effort by legal scholars and political scientists, analyzes these challenge…
Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis
Democratization Through Constitutional Change
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America
The adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe has been portrayed as either a defensive or an offensive competition strategy used by established parties to deal with the rise of new parties under majoritarian electoral rules. Neither explanation accounts for PR reform in other regions of the world, where the change took place in the absence of increased party competition. Analyzing the history of electoral reform in Latin America, …
Procesos constituyentes y refundación democrática: El caso de Chile en perspectiva comparada
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar, desde la teoría y la experiencia constitucional comparada, el problema de cómo crear una nueva constitución dentro de un orden democrático cuando la constitución vigente no prevé un procedimiento para su reemplazo. Se enfoca específicamente en la selección del órgano constituyente y en los canales de participación popular con el fin de ofrecer algunas reflexiones sobre el caso de Chile. Se discuten las al…
Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
Negretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic in…
Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America
Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that constitutions are replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing environments. According to this perspective, constitutio…
Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parti…
Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (review)
Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America
Students of presidential regimes claim that while the combination of plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles favors bipartism, majority rule for electing presidents favors multipartism. I argue that a reverse causality also affects the relationship between party systems and electoral systems. Using a bargaining model of institutional change, I propose that while dominant and large parties are likely to choose plu…
Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America
A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in t…
Can Presidentialism Work Like Parliamentarism
Inter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with ‘presidentialism’ and ‘parliamentarism’, we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction …
Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina
What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda se…
Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America)
Gabriel L. Negretto, Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 41-76
Gobierna solo el Presidente? Poderes de decreto y diseño institucional en brasil y Argentina
Cómo influye el poder constitucional de decreto en la elaboración de políticas públicas de un regimen presidencial? A pesar de intentos recientes por responder este interrogante, persiste aún en la literatura un alto grado de incertidumbre acerca de la medida en que los poderes de decreto permiten a un presidente controlar o influenciar decisivamente el proceso legislativo. En el presente artículo se sostiene que en un sistema de separación de po…
Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina
What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda se…
Can Presidentialism Work Like Parliamentarism
Inter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with ‘presidentialism’ and ‘parliamentarism’, we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction …
Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America
Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that constitutions are replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing environments. According to this perspective, constitutio…
Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parti…
How not to write a constitution: Lessons from Chile
On September 4, 2022, Chilean voters massively turned down a constitutional proposal that responded to widely shared criticisms of the 1980 constitution and emerged from a consensual and participatory process. This result is paradoxical because ex ante, the odds seemed largely in favor of changing the status quo. We argue that three factors, which derived from the interaction between rules and political contingency, explain the outcome: a Convent…
Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America
A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in t…
Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900-2015
A strong tradition in democratic theory claims that only constitutions made with direct popular involvement can establish or deepen democracy. Against this view, we argue that new constitutions are likely to enhance liberal democracy when they emerge through a plural agreement among political elites with distinct bases of social support. Power dispersion during constitution writing induces the adoption of institutions that protect opposition forc…
Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America
Students of presidential regimes claim that while the combination of plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles favors bipartism, majority rule for electing presidents favors multipartism. I argue that a reverse causality also affects the relationship between party systems and electoral systems. Using a bargaining model of institutional change, I propose that while dominant and large parties are likely to choose plu…
Tinkering with executive term limits: Partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America
Why are some democratically elected presidents more likely than others to extend or remove their current term limits? This paper argues that the frequency and type of reforms relaxing executive term limits depend on the relative partisan power of presidents and on inherited institutional constraints. These reforms are more likely when short-term shifts in the distribution of partisan resources significantly favour an incumbent executive vis-à-vis…
Constitution-making and institutional design. The transformations of presidentialism in Argentina
This paper presents an analytical framework for the study of constitutional design from the point of view of the structure of interaction and mechanisms of institutional selection that affect the behavior and choices of the actors involved in a constitution-making process. This framework is used to explain the various limitations introduced to the powers of the President in the Argentine constitution of 1994. I argue that two levels of causation …
Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America
The adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe has been portrayed as either a defensive or an offensive competition strategy used by established parties to deal with the rise of new parties under majoritarian electoral rules. Neither explanation accounts for PR reform in other regions of the world, where the change took place in the absence of increased party competition. Analyzing the history of electoral reform in Latin America, …
Negociando los poderes del presidente: Reforma y cambio constitucional en la Argentina
Este articulo desarrolla un marco analítico para explicar las caracteristicas de concentración o dispersión de poder que presentan las instituciones de gobierno creadas en un proceso constituyente. Se argumenta que, dentro de ciertas opciones generales de diseñio, los diferentes sistemas de distribuir poder entre gobierno y oposición pueden explicarse en términos de tres factores causales: las expectativas electorales de los actores, los recursos…
Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The cases of Argentina (1853-1916) and Mexico (1857-1910)
The predominant interpretation of nineteenth century Latin America is to see the failure of constitutional democracy in the region in terms of the inability of liberal elites to break with an authoritarian past. Against these views, we argue that the divorce between liberalism and democracy in Latin America was the unintended outcome of the institutions created by the liberal elite in response to the problems of territorial fragmentation and fact…
Constitutional renewals: The lineage of democratizing constitutions
Gambling on the constitution: Abortion rights and the 2023 constitution-making process in Chile
When submitted to popular ratification, new constitutions tend to be approved. Chilean voters, however, rejected the proposal put forward by the country’s Constitutional Council in 2023. This article examines the reasons for this outcome. Leveraging an original conjoint experiment exploring voter preferences across four policy areas, we demonstrate that most voters disfavored a proposed clause protecting unborn life, which would have likely restr…
The party system effects of unstable electoral rules in Latin America
Prior studies have shown that electoral rules fail to determine the number of parties in new democracies due to the uncertainty of voters and politicians about which parties are viable. Latin American democracies, where electoral volatility has generally remained high and party institutionalization low, have been a primary example of this phenomenon. We argue that even in shifting political environments the fragmentation of the party system is li…
Procesos constituyentes y refundación democrática: El caso de Chile en perspectiva comparada
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar, desde la teoría y la experiencia constitucional comparada, el problema de cómo crear una nueva constitución dentro de un orden democrático cuando la constitución vigente no prevé un procedimiento para su reemplazo. Se enfoca específicamente en la selección del órgano constituyente y en los canales de participación popular con el fin de ofrecer algunas reflexiones sobre el caso de Chile. Se discuten las al…
Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America)
Gabriel L. Negretto, Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 41-76
Gobierna solo el Presidente? Poderes de decreto y diseño institucional en brasil y Argentina
Cómo influye el poder constitucional de decreto en la elaboración de políticas públicas de un regimen presidencial? A pesar de intentos recientes por responder este interrogante, persiste aún en la literatura un alto grado de incertidumbre acerca de la medida en que los poderes de decreto permiten a un presidente controlar o influenciar decisivamente el proceso legislativo. En el presente artículo se sostiene que en un sistema de separación de po…
Qué es el decisionismo? Reflexiones en torno a la doctrina política de Carl Schmitt
Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría “decisionista” de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que so…
Constitution-making and institutional design. The transformations of presidentialism in Argentina
This paper presents an analytical framework for the study of constitutional design from the point of view of the structure of interaction and mechanisms of institutional selection that affect the behavior and choices of the actors involved in a constitution-making process. This framework is used to explain the various limitations introduced to the powers of the President in the Argentine constitution of 1994. I argue that two levels of causation …
Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The cases of Argentina (1853-1916) and Mexico (1857-1910)
The predominant interpretation of nineteenth century Latin America is to see the failure of constitutional democracy in the region in terms of the inability of liberal elites to break with an authoritarian past. Against these views, we argue that the divorce between liberalism and democracy in Latin America was the unintended outcome of the institutions created by the liberal elite in response to the problems of territorial fragmentation and fact…
Negociando los poderes del presidente: Reforma y cambio constitucional en la Argentina
Este articulo desarrolla un marco analítico para explicar las caracteristicas de concentración o dispersión de poder que presentan las instituciones de gobierno creadas en un proceso constituyente. Se argumenta que, dentro de ciertas opciones generales de diseñio, los diferentes sistemas de distribuir poder entre gobierno y oposición pueden explicarse en términos de tres factores causales: las expectativas electorales de los actores, los recursos…
Gobierna solo el Presidente? Poderes de decreto y diseño institucional en brasil y Argentina
Cómo influye el poder constitucional de decreto en la elaboración de políticas públicas de un regimen presidencial? A pesar de intentos recientes por responder este interrogante, persiste aún en la literatura un alto grado de incertidumbre acerca de la medida en que los poderes de decreto permiten a un presidente controlar o influenciar decisivamente el proceso legislativo. En el presente artículo se sostiene que en un sistema de separación de po…
Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America)
Gabriel L. Negretto, Diseño constitucional y separación de poderes en América Latina (Constitutional Design and Separation of Powers in Latin America), Revista Mexicana de Sociología, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 2003), pp. 41-76
Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina
What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives’ ability to act as agenda se…
Can Presidentialism Work Like Parliamentarism
Inter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with ‘presidentialism’ and ‘parliamentarism’, we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction …
Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America
Students of presidential regimes claim that while the combination of plurality rule for presidential elections and concurrent electoral cycles favors bipartism, majority rule for electing presidents favors multipartism. I argue that a reverse causality also affects the relationship between party systems and electoral systems. Using a bargaining model of institutional change, I propose that while dominant and large parties are likely to choose plu…
Minority Presidents and Democratic Performance in Latin America
A widely accepted argument among scholars of Latin American presidential regimes is that interbranch cooperation is impaired when the president's party falls short of a majority of seats in the legislature. This argument fails to consider three factors that affect the performance of minority presidents: the policy position of the president's party, the president's capacity to sustain a veto, and the legislative status of the parties included in t…
Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (review)
Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice in Latin America
The formulas for electing presidents and the rules determining the legislative powers of presidents are important variables for explaining the performance of presidential democracies. This article develops a strategic choice model to explain variations in these institutional features. Based on this model, it is proposed here that constitution makers are likely to opt for more-than-plurality rules of presidential elections when the number of parti…
Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America
Since 1978, all countries in Latin America have either replaced or amended their constitutions. What explains the choice between these two substantively different means of constitutional transformation? This article argues that constitutions are replaced when they fail to work as governance structures or when their design prevents competing political interests from accommodating to changing environments. According to this perspective, constitutio…
Making Constitutions: Presidents, Parties, and Institutional Choice in Latin America
Negretto provides the first systematic explanation of the origins of constitutional designs from an analytical, historical and comparative perspective. Based on analysis of constitutional change in Latin America from 1900 to 2008 and four detailed case studies, Negretto shows the main determinants of constitutional choice are the past performance of constitutions in providing effective and legitimate instruments of government and the strategic in…
Procesos constituyentes y refundación democrática: El caso de Chile en perspectiva comparada
El objetivo de este artículo es analizar, desde la teoría y la experiencia constitucional comparada, el problema de cómo crear una nueva constitución dentro de un orden democrático cuando la constitución vigente no prevé un procedimiento para su reemplazo. Se enfoca específicamente en la selección del órgano constituyente y en los canales de participación popular con el fin de ofrecer algunas reflexiones sobre el caso de Chile. Se discuten las al…
Electoral Reform Under Limited Party Competition: The Adoption of Proportional Representation in Latin America
The adoption of proportional representation in Western Europe has been portrayed as either a defensive or an offensive competition strategy used by established parties to deal with the rise of new parties under majoritarian electoral rules. Neither explanation accounts for PR reform in other regions of the world, where the change took place in the absence of increased party competition. Analyzing the history of electoral reform in Latin America, …
Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis
Democratization Through Constitutional Change
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
Growing public discontent with the performance and quality of many contemporary democracies makes them vulnerable to popular pressures to profoundly transform or replace their constitutions. However, there is little systematic academic discussion on the legal and political challenges that these events pose to democratic principles and practices. This book, a collaborative effort by legal scholars and political scientists, analyzes these challenge…
Deepening Democracy? Promises and challenges of Chile’s Road to a New Constitution
Response to Rogers M. Smith’s Review of Redrafting Constitutions in Democratic Regimes: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Constitutional Origins and Liberal Democracy: A Global Analysis, 1900-2015
A strong tradition in democratic theory claims that only constitutions made with direct popular involvement can establish or deepen democracy. Against this view, we argue that new constitutions are likely to enhance liberal democracy when they emerge through a plural agreement among political elites with distinct bases of social support. Power dispersion during constitution writing induces the adoption of institutions that protect opposition forc…
Tinkering with executive term limits: Partisan imbalances and institutional legacies in Latin America
Why are some democratically elected presidents more likely than others to extend or remove their current term limits? This paper argues that the frequency and type of reforms relaxing executive term limits depend on the relative partisan power of presidents and on inherited institutional constraints. These reforms are more likely when short-term shifts in the distribution of partisan resources significantly favour an incumbent executive vis-à-vis…
How not to write a constitution: Lessons from Chile
On September 4, 2022, Chilean voters massively turned down a constitutional proposal that responded to widely shared criticisms of the 1980 constitution and emerged from a consensual and participatory process. This result is paradoxical because ex ante, the odds seemed largely in favor of changing the status quo. We argue that three factors, which derived from the interaction between rules and political contingency, explain the outcome: a Convent…
Gambling on the constitution: Abortion rights and the 2023 constitution-making process in Chile
When submitted to popular ratification, new constitutions tend to be approved. Chilean voters, however, rejected the proposal put forward by the country’s Constitutional Council in 2023. This article examines the reasons for this outcome. Leveraging an original conjoint experiment exploring voter preferences across four policy areas, we demonstrate that most voters disfavored a proposed clause protecting unborn life, which would have likely restr…
Political science (26 works) · Law (24 works) · Politics (18 works) · Democracy (14 works) · Economics (14 works) · Politics and Society in Latin America (14 works) · Political economy (13 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (12 works) · Law and economics (11 works) · Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies (10 works)